On the possibility of Kant's answer to Hume : subjective necessity and objective validity by Haldane, Adrian
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/55830
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
On the Possibility of Kant's Answer to Hume: 
Subjective Necessity and Objective Validity 
Adrian Haldane 
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the 
University of Warwick 
(I>epactInentofPhilosophy) 
1 st July 1999 
© Copyright by Adrian Haldane 1999 
All Rights Reserved 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONltNTS ............................................................................................... iii 
ACKN"OWLEDGEMrnTS ............................................................................................. v 
SUMMARy ................................................................................................................... vi 
ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES ..................................................................... vii 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER ONE: SCEPTICISM, NATURALISM AND CRITICISM ............................ 5 
1 INlRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 6 
2 "1HE FIRST SPARK OF LIGHT" ................................................................................. 6 
3 SCEPTICISM AND NAHJRALISM ................................................................................ 9 
4 TRANSCENDENTAL CONCEPTS ............................................................................... 15 
5 A PSYCHOLOGICAL KANT AND A TRANSCENDENTALHUME ................................... 21 
6 SOME DILEMMAS ................................................................................................... 27 
CHAPTER TWO: THE SCEPTICAL RESPONSE ....................................................... 30 
1 lNlRoDUCTION ...................................................................................................... 31 
2 THE OBJECTIVITY OF TIIE CATEGORIES .................................................................. 32 
3 THE INITIAL RECEPTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY ................................. 37 
4 THE SCEPTICISM OF AENESIDEMUS ........................................................................ 44 
5 TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AS SUBJECTIVE AND CIRCULAR ........................... 50 
6 HUME AND KANT REVISITED ................................................................................. 58 
CHAPTER THREE: KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION ........................... 62 
1 WfRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 63 
2 TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND OBJECTIVITY .................................................... 64 
3 THE ARGUMENT OF TIlE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION ...................................... 70 
3.1 Step One: The Manifold of Intuition .......................................................... 71 
3.1.1 Step One: Summary ..................................................................... 76 
3.2 Step Two: The Analytic Unity of Consciousness ........................................ 76 
3.2.1 Step Two: Summary ..................................................................... 87 
3.3 Step Three: Synthesis and Concepts ........................................................... 88 
3.3.1 The Subjective Unity of Consciousness .......... '" ............................ 91 
3.3.2 Step Three: Summary ................................................................... 95 
3.4 Step Four: A Priori Conceptual Synthesis .................................................. 95 
3 4 1 F" . S th· d She' fA h . 
.. 19uratlve yn eSlS an ynt SIS 0 ppre enslOll ...................... 98 
3.4.2 Step Four: Summary .................................................................. 103 
3.5 The Transcendental Deduction in Summary ............................................. 103 
4 GUYER ON THE DEDUCTION ................................................................................. 110 
5 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 113 
iii 
CHAPTER FOUR: APPERCEPTION AND THE 'I TIllNK' ..................................... 115 
I INTRoDUCTION .................................................................................................... 116 
2 SCHULZE, 11IE SUBJECT AND TIlE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION ....................... 117 
2.1 Current Debates on the Kantian Subject .................................................. 119 
3 KANT's INVITATION TO lNrELLECTUAL INTIJITION: INTELLIGENCE AND FEELING .124 
3.1 The Existence of the 1: "Something Real that is Given" ............................ ] 29 
3 .2 Kant's Position Reconsidered .................................................................. 131 
4 THE ORIGIN OF FICIITE'S MISUNDERSTANDING (AND DEFENCE) OF KANT ........... 134 
4.1 From Unconditioned to Undetermined ...................................................... 138 
5 RECENT REVERBERATIONS OF FICHIE'S MISUNDERSTANDING ............................. 142 
6 THE TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION AND 11IE 'I THINK' ................. 152 
6.1 The 'I Think' .......................................................................................... 152 
6.2 Transcendental Apperception ................................................................. 155 
6.3 Confusions Regarding the Kantian Subject .............................................. 158 
7 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 165 
CHAPTER FIVE: AN ANSWER TO HUME? ............................................................ 169 
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 170 
2 SCEPTICISM AND TIlE SUBJECT ............................................................................ 170 
3 THE CATEGORIES AND OBJECTIVE VALIDITy ....................................................... 181 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 188 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 195 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My greatest intellectual and personal debt is owed to Diane Beddoes, Judith Norman, 
and Alistair Welchman, whose company I kept during the writing of this thesis. 
Unfortunately writing a thesis on Kant turns out not to be a sufficient condition for the 
possession of the outstanding qualities displayed by these three. 
My supervisor Christine Battersby read several draft versions of this thesis: her 
advice and time were given freely and much appreciated. Any approximation to a 
readable state which the thesis attains is in large measure due to her comments. 
The final draft of this thesis was read by Ian Lyne, Judith Norman, and Alistair 
Welchman. It was extremely generous of them to read the thesis at such short notice 
and each provided insights that I wish I had thought of sooner. Draft versions of 
various chapters were also read by Diane Beddoes, Steven Houlgate and the 
participants in Burkhard Tushling's Doktoranden-Seminar at the University of 
Marburg. 
v 
SUMMARY 
This thesis argues that Kant is able to maintain the distinctiveness of his position in 
opposition to Hume's naturalism (contrary to the arguments of R. A. Mall and L. W. 
Beck) without invoking premises which are question begging with regard to Hume's 
scepticism. The argument of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, as 
presented in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, is considered in relation 
to the two sets of criticism that have been levelled at it from its publication up to the 
present day, both of which aim to demonstrate that synthetic a priori judgements are 
subjectively necessary but without objective validity. 
The first set of criticisms involves problems raised with regard to the status of 
transcendental arguments. The difficulties identified here (by B. Stroud, M. S. Gram, 
and others) are that the Deduction can either, at best, show that it is necessary for 
experience to be regarded in a certain way without demonstrating anything as to the 
nature of experience as such, or the argument is circular in that it begins by making 
assumptions regarding the nature of our experience. 
Alternatively, if the Deduction is taken to establish the objective nature of concepts 
via an analysis of the conditions under which it is possible for us to have some 
knowledge of ourselves, then incoherence is said to arise because this requires either an 
implausible reflective theory of consciousness (according to D. Henrich) or that we 
have knowledge of the subject-in-itself (as held by J. G. Fichte and other 
contemporaries of Kant). 
Through a consideration of both the historical and contemporary manifestations of 
these criticisms, the thesis advances an interpretation of the Deduction, with special 
attention paid to the role and nature of the subject, which does not fall prey to the 
alleged incoherence. As such, the thesis defends both the distinctiveness and legitimacy 
of transcendental philosophy. 
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Introduction 
Philosophy has always been miscast as the understudy to a benevolent 
deity ready to guarantee that the world will remain orderly and people 
tolerably decent, even if God is not on the scene. But then, what is the 
value of these arguments?l 
In asking the question of how synthetic a priori judgements are possible 
Kant casts philosophy in exactly this role. If synthetic a priori judgements are 
possible, th~ without having to make appeal to the beneficence of a transcendent 
deity, one can be assured of some necessary truths. Of course, the question of the 
value of this as a philosophical position is multifaceted. This is no absurdity 
involved in assessing the world-historical significance of Kant's thought: its 
relationship to the development capitalism from feudalism, to Protestantism, or to 
Modernity per se. Within the discipline of philosophy itself Kant's value is said to 
reside in his ability to defeat scepticism, provide a theoretical matrix for cognitive 
science, reconcile the dualism of scheme and content, as well as the introduction of a 
distinctive method of doing philosophy, the transcendental argument. 
The aim of this thesis is not to assess the value of Kant in terms of its 
significance, usefulness, or indeed point. Judgements can be formed on these 
matters without needing to arrive at any conclusions regarding the worth of what 
Kant himself says - one can even be Kantian while holding that Kant himself failed 
to muster arguments of sufficient coherence to make his own position viable~ indeed, 
it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that this is something of a default position 
for Kantians. Our concern is more basic than this. It is simply to investigate the 
question of the possibility of transcendental philosophy - or, more specifically, the 
possibility of synthetic a priori judgements having any objective validity. 
The possibility of transcendental philosophy has been contested from its 
inauguration. Broadly speaking, the problems raised take one of two forms: the 
transcendental is assimilated either to the empirical or to the transcendent. In the 
first case, the claim is that the very most that can be demonstrated about synthetic a 
priori judgements is that it is necessary for us to make them, but not that these 
judgements are true. And in the second instance, the judgements are said to be 
premised upon the assumption of knowledge which itself cannot be accounted for 
within transcendental philosophy: knowledge of some necessary feature of 
1 Patricia Kitcher, "Kant's Patchy Epistemology," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 
(1987): 307. 
·2· 
expenence from which the transcendental conditions of this expenence are 
(logically) deduced, or knowledge of things as they are in themselves. In either case 
there is no space for the transcendental. These questions most spectacularly 
provided the premises for post-Kantian idealism. The distinction between the spirit 
and the letter of Kantian philosophy was made because it was felt that Kant had 
failed to articulate the ground of the transcendental and that this remained as a task 
for others to perform. However, the same problematic has been equally prevalent 
throughout the last few decades: transcendental arguments have been declared 
impossible; the first Critique rewritten, founded anew in analytic conceptual 
analysis; rediscovered as advancing a psychological argument. In essence, there is a 
recurring theme to Kant interpretation: as it stands the first Critique is incoherent, 
but becomes of value when rooted in, or reinterpreted in light of, some context which 
grounds the transcendental. Typically, however, this ground itself is either empirical 
or transcendent, and the question addressed in the reinterpretation of Kant is whether 
this can be justified by bolstering Kant's premises (as occurred in the tradition of 
post-Kantian idealism) or by weakening his conclusions (as is the current standard). 
The relationship between Kant and Hume provides the groundwork for the 
exploration of this issue. In his own defence of the objective validity of synthetic a 
priori judgements, Kant contrasts his position with that of Hume. More pertinently, 
Hume can be seen to provide opposition to Kant by giving a naturalistic explanation 
of (what Kant would call) synthetic a priori judgements, while being sceptical as to 
their objective validity. Hume disallows appeals beyond experience to explain what 
occurs within it. This immediately problematises the notion that one can claim that 
there are any necessary features of experience encapsulated within synthetic a priori 
judgements, and that is because we have no experience of necessity. What, 
therefore, remains to be explained is how we come to regard some aspects of 
experience as necessary when all experience is contingent. Kant's claim is that he 
remains bound to Hume's strictures that necessity cannot be explained empirically 
and that appeals to transcendence explain nothing, and yet can still maintain that 
synthetic a priori judgements can have objective validity. This is how Kant answers 
Hurne and the mere possibility of this answer is the topic of this thesis. 
The first chapter provides a general account of the relationship bern.'een 
Kant and Hurne, concentrating on the opposition between subjective necessity and 
·3· 
objective validity. Kant's own description of his response to Hume is defended and 
the notion that there might be a reconciliation between the Kantian and the Humean 
projects is rejected. The internal coherence of both of their respective positions 
demands that they can be rigorously distinguished from one another. The challenges 
that have been made, both in the immediate aftermath of the publication of the first 
Critique and also within some current secondary literature, to the possibility in 
principle of Kant providing an answer to Hume are discussed in the second chapter. 
It is suggested there that Kant appears to need to invoke some premise that is 
explicitly rejected by Hume. The problem is twofold: Kant can maintain that 
synthetic a priori judgements have objective validity if he supposes either that there 
is some necessary order in experience, or if he maintains that the subject imposes 
order onto a chaotic experience. The first option is question begging in that the 
condition under which it is possible for synthetic a priori judgements to have 
objective validity is presupposed in order to demonstrate that they have this very 
quality. Moreover, it is precisely his denial of this point that leads Hume to be 
sceptical about experience demonstrating any necessary features. If Kant adopts the 
model of the subject imposing order he fares no better. In this case he cannot merely 
maintain that it is necessary for us to regard ourselves as giving order to experience. 
This only establishes how we must think that experience is ordered (a subjective 
necessity), without demonstrating that we actually do impose order. If, however, we 
are to know ourselves as imposing order, then we need a knowledge of ourselves 
which extends beyond the awareness that we have of ourselves as we appear to 
ourselves, and must have knowledge of ourselves as we are in ourselves; knowledge 
which transgresses the boundaries of legitimacy upon which transcendental 
philosophy is founded. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with each of these issues in tum. The 
third chapter provides an interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories which does not invoke a question-begging premise, and the fourth 
discusses the role attributed to the subject in the Deduction. In the final chapter the 
limitations on the defence of Kant that has been offered are assessed; nonetheless, it 
is concluded that the distinctiveness and possibility of a genuinely transcendental 
philosophy is established by Kant. 
·4· 
Chapter One 
Scepticism, Naturalism and Criticism 
1. Introduction 
This chapter situates Kant's critical philosophy in the context of Hume's 
sceptical questioning of the origin of the concept of causality. It is argued that 
Kant's claim in the Prolegomena to provide an answer to a question first posed by 
Hume is correct and the distinctiveness of Kantian and Humean solutions is 
defended. 
That Kant took himself to be responding to Hume' s scepticism is not a 
matter of controversy. However, within the secondary literature this is as far as the 
agreement on the question of Kant's relation to Hume extends. The points of 
dispute range from questions concerning what aspect of Hume' s scepticism awoke 
Kant from his dogmatic slumber to the denial that the solutions proposed by Kant 
and Hume differ. It will be argued that whatever Kant's precise intentions were he 
does provide an answer to Hume' s scepticism with regard to causality. In order to 
establish this, Hume's sceptical arguments are briefly outlined. The naturalistic tum 
performed by Hume is then contrasted with Kant's transcendental philosophy and 
the distinctions between their respective positions are highlighted by disputing 
claims which purport to show that there is an underlying similarity. In conclusion 
we shall identify what Kant's argument must achieve in order to constitute a 
successful reply to Hume. 
2. "The First Spark of Light" 
Upon publication in 1781 the Critique of Pure Reason met with little 
interest and even less understanding. Although Kant cannot have expected this work 
to find an audience with the public at large, the lack of response from within the 
philosophical community, which Kant says "honours" the book "with silence"[IV 
380]1, was sufficiently disturbing to Kant for him to write a popular exposition of 
the central themes of the Critique in order to aid the understanding and 
promulgation of this latter work. To this end Kant identifies the unique selling point 
of his new critical philosophy as that of being able to provide an answer to ''Hume' s 
problem'TIV 261 f. 
2 
The popularity of Hume in Germany along with disputes concerning the 
"das Stillschweigen ... , womit es ... meine Kritik beehrt hat". 
"Humischen Problems". 
. 6· 
extent of Kant's knowledge of Hume and questions of both when and how much 
Kant was influenced by Hume are well documented.3 It seems certain that Kant was 
familiar with a wide variety of Hume's doctrines prior to the publication of the first 
Critique: he owned a copy of the Enquiry (which was translated in 1755) and was 
acquainted with some of the Treatise through the 1771 publication of Hamann's 
translation of the concluding chapter of Book 1 in the K6nigsberger Zeitung and 
from the extensive quotations provided in the 1772 translation of James Beattie's 
Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth. Between the publication of the 
first Critique and the Prolegomena Kant had also read Hume's Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion, which were translated in 1781. 
Kant identifies Hume' s problem as ''"a question regarding the origin of the 
concept"[IV 259]4 of causality. In summary, Hume had demonstrated that there is 
no rational justification for a belief in the principle of causality since there is, in 
Kant's language, no analytic relationship between the concept of an event and the 
concept of a cause of that event. However, if the origin of belief in the principle of 
causality lies in experience, then the necessity of every event having a cause requires 
radical reinterpretation. 
Kant recognises that Hume undertook such a reinterpretation rather than 
abandon the concept altogether, but Kant asserts that if Hume had realised the 
extent of the problem that he had uncovered he would never have proposed the 
solution that he did. Underlying the problematic status of the concept of causality 
are questions regarding the status of mathematics and natural science. Both these 
fields, for Kant, employ concepts whose necessity can derive neither from reason nor 
from experience alone. The threat of any sceptical encroachment within these fields, 
Kant claims, has been halted though his "execution of Hume's problems to their 
3 Details of the spread of Hume's philosophy within Germany can be found in E. C. 
Mossner, "The Continental Reception of Hume's Treatise, 1739 - 1741," Mind 56 (1947) 
and Manfred Kuehn, Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768--1800 (Kingston, Ontario: 
McGill-Queen's UP, 1987). The direct and indirect sources of Hume's influence on Kant 
are enumerated by a number of commentators, for example, Manfred Kuehn, "Kant's 
Conception of 'Hume's Problem'," in 1mmanuel Kant's "Prolegomena to Any Future 
l'v1etaphysics" in Focus, ed. Beryl Logan (London: Routledge, 1996); L. W. Beck, 
"Lambert and Hume in Kant's Development," in Essays on Kant and Hume (London: 
Yale UP, 1978); R. P. Wolf, "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie," Journal of the History of 
1deas 21 (1960). 
4 "die Rede von dem Ursprunge dieses Begriffs" . 
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greatest possible cxtent"[IV 26115 in the first Critique. The most straightforward 
understanding of this statement, and that which is the focus of most of the 
discussions concerning the relationship between Hume and Kant, would lead one to 
infer that what Kant has in mind here is his attempt to identify the concepts which 
are open to the challenge posed by Hume, and yet defensible by means of Kant's 
newly discovered mechanism of transcendental deduction. This view suffers two 
weaknesses. Firstly, in the period prior to the Prolegomena Kant makes only scant 
reference to Hume. The letter to Marcus Herz, of 21 February 1772, within which 
the problem of how intellectual conceptions can come by the "agreement that they 
are supposed to have with objects"[X l31 t is first raised, contains no reference to 
Hume. Furthennore, the 1781 edition of the first Critique makes no reference to 
Hurne within the context of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories where 
both the answer to the 1772 question and Hume's problem are located. Secondly, 
focusing on the Transcendental Deduction eclipses the context ,vithin which this 
argument takes place. 
It is Kant's stated aim not merely both to defend propositions that cannot be 
justified on the basis of analytic entailment or through experience and to place limits 
on the range within which these propositions are legitimate, but also to leave room 
for faith. In this regard, Hume' s arguments (especially those contained in the 
Dialogues) are a provocation for Kant because they challenge the notion that we 
have any determinate concept of a Supreme Being. Thus, theism, which Kant 
intended to defend in the first Critique, would thereby be undermined. It is within 
the context of these arguments that Kant says that the Critique of Pure Reason 
shows the "true middle path between Dogmatism, which Hume fought, and 
Scepticism, which he would introduce in its place"[IV 360t This wider context of 
the debate between Kant and Hume has now received some belated attention. g 
However, the concerns of this thesis remain within what is the more traditional focus 
of debate, and we only consider the differences between Kant's transcendentalism 
5 "der Ausfiihrung des Humischen Problems in seiner moglich groBten Erweiterung". 
6 "die Ubereinstimmung die sie mit Gegenstanden haben sollen". 
7 "den wahren Mittelweg :mischen dem Dogmatism, den Hume bekampfte, und dem 
Scepticism, den der dagegen einfiihren wollte". 
8 See, for example, J. H. Gill, "Kant, Analogy, and Natural Theology," in Kant's 
"Prolegomena, " ed. Beryl Logan. 
·8· 
and Hume' s naturalism with regard to questions of knowledge to the exclusion of the 
(perhaps, for Kant, more pressing) question of faith. This is not to underestimate 
the difficulties inherent in this account if it is taken to reflect either the historical 
relation between Hume and Kant, or Kant's intentions in writing the first Critique. 
Nevertheless, we need not be overly concerned about determining these historical 
questions because the conceptual relationship between Kant and Hume is part of an 
ongoing debate about the coherence of Kantian philosophy.9 It is from this analytic 
perspective that the question of 'Kant's answer to Hume' is here posed. Within the 
context in which we are working this question is taken not to be a matter of whether 
Kant knew enough of Hume's works to frame an answer, or whether his answer was 
incidental to his overall project, but merely a matter of determining where the 
conceptual frameworks of Kant and Hume collide and where they abut. As we shall 
see this issue is more complicated than it might be supposed. 
The superficial differences between Kant and Home appear to be 
indisputable. According to their caricatures, Hume is an empiricist sceptic who 
takes refuge in a form of naturalism and Kant provides a rationalistic defence of a 
set of a priori concepts. However, this set of distinctions is no longer as secure as it 
once was. It has been argued that Hume does in fact display a commitment to 
concepts which have no naturalistic justification in order to support his scepticism 
with regard to concepts of a more limited range!O Concomitantly, Kant's 
transcendental categories have been interpreted as involving, and being based upon, 
naturalist claims about the "specific constitution of human mind. "11 The remainder 
of the chapter will consist in an evaluation of these claims. 
3. Scepticism and Naturalism 
Any attempt to posit a naturalistic theory of the mind alongside sceptical 
arguments regarding the concept of causality looks to be self-contradictory. On the 
one hand, the origin of belief is explained by Hume in terms of the force with which 
9 In particular the question of whether Kant begins the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories with assumptions that are open to sceptical challenge. We shall see, in the 
next chapter, that this issue is raised both by Kant's O\\'TI contemporaries (for instance, G. 
E. Schulze) and in recent discussions on the coherence of transcendental arguments (for 
instance, Barry Stroud). 
10 L. W. Beck, "A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant, " in Kant's "Prolegomena." ed. 
Beryl Logan. 
1\ R A Mall, Naturalism and Criticism (The Hague: Martinus NijhofJ, 1975), 30. 
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an impression enters the mind. The relation between the force of an impression and 
the resulting belief is governed by a series of natural laws which mirror the laws of 
motion that Newton employed to explain the behaviour of material bodies. 
Explanations of belief, therefore, appeal to an impression as being a sufficient cause 
for the belief, given the state of the particular mind into whieh they entered and the 
universal laws which govern the mind. On the other hand, the belief in causality 
itself, when explained in these terms, is robbed of any pretence to be either true or 
rational. The employment of the concept of causality is justified only on the basis of 
the argument which attributes an irrational origin to this concept. Yet in order to 
explain the origin of the concept in these terms it is necessary to use this very 
concept. 
For our present purposes it is neither necessary to determine whether the 
apparent circularity in the above argument is sufficient to undermine Humc' s 
arguments, nor to come to any final conclusion as to whether Hume was a naturalist 
first and sceptic second or vice versa. 12 The contrast between Kant and Hume can 
be illustrated and 'Hume's problem' can be contextualised without reference to the 
fundamental coherence or the priorities attached to Hume' s scepticism and 
naturalism, because Kant's arguments respond to both of these positions in equal 
measure. With regard to scepticism Kant's claim is that it is Humc's failure to 
distinguish the analytic and the a priori which lead to him dismissing the rational 
justification of the employment of the concept of causality. Hume's naturalism is 
rejected by Kant not only because Hume has been led to it on the basis of what Kant 
considers to be a sceptical misapprehension, but also because Kant argues that it is 
incoherent and even on its own terms unable to provide an account of the origin of 
the concept of causality.13 We shall now tum to a short exposition of both the 
12 Just as there are debates regarding the relative significance of Hume's scepticism and 
naturalism, so there is disagreement concerning the legitimacy which Hume attributes to 
the concept of causality. This debate centres on the question of whether we can ascribe 
causaJ properties to objects with meaning or whether the only possible reference is to the 
subjective feeling of necessity. See Jane Broughton, '''Hume's Ideas About Necessary 
Connection," Hume Studies 13 (1987) for a discussion of this point However, it is agreed 
by all parties in this dispute that, for Hume, there can be no non-naturalistic justification 
for causaJ judgements. It is only Hume' s arguments for this latter point that we shall be 
investigating. 
13 Throughout this chapter we shall be focusing exclusively on the Hume's arguments 
concerning the validity of causal judgements. Causality has been selected in preference to 
the other obvious points of dispute between Hume and Kant, such as the nature of the 
. 10· 
sceptical arguments mobilised by Hume and the naturalistic argument that he 
advances. 
Hume's scepticism with regard to causality proceeds on two fronts. He 
begins with an attempt to trace this idea back to its origin in an impression and 
demonstrates that there is no such impression. He subsequently considers and 
rejects the notion that the proposition that (., Whatever has a beginning has also a 
cause of existence"[f 79] is demonstrably certain on the basis of self-evident 
entailment. TIris opens the way for his alternative account of causation which rests 
upon neither the immediate impressions of the senses nor abstract reasoning, but 
upon the activity of the imagination. Before considering how Kant responds to this 
argument each of the stages will be briefly outlined. 
Hume's sceptical arguments with regard to a possible sensible origin of the 
idea of causality are extremely familiar. 14 The idea of causality could be derived 
from either some particular quality of all those objects of sense which are causes 
(with a reciprocal impression of effect being a quality of the object with which the 
causal object is in relation), or it could involve an impression derived from the 
relationship between objects. In the first case Hume claims that it is evident that 
there is no particular quality which is shared by all the different objects which are 
taken to be causes. The impression that gives rise to the idea of causality is not, 
then, like impressions of colour or size which are determinations of the objects, 
irrespective of their relationship to other objects and according to which objects may 
subject or the existence of external objects, not only because Kant never mentions Hume 
when discussing these other problems, but also because it is here that Hume's argument is 
at its clearest. Hume's retraction of his reasoning about the self IT 635] mitigates against 
the adoption of this argument, and the mechanisms employed to account for the origin of 
the belief in the external world produce a much less c1ear-<::ut answer than they do when he 
explains the concept of causality. Whereas in the latter case we are necessarily led to the 
belief via the harmonious effects of association and impression, in the former case there is 
no impression which generates the belief (as there is in the case of causality), which means 
that it would be problematic to attribute even a subjective necessity to this belief 
Furthermore, in the former case the imagination and reflection have contrary tendencies 
[T 215] which means that the belief produced has less stability than the belief in causality. 
The explanation that Hume provides of causality provides, therefore, the clearest 
ex-pression of his method, and it is for this reason that it is focused upon here. For an 
account of the relationship between Hume and Kant regarding all three of the issues raised 
here see Patricia Kitcher. "Changing the Name of the Game: Kant's Cognitivism versus 
Hume's Psychologism," in Kant's "Prolegomena, " ed Beryl Logan. 
14 Hume's presentation of the arguments outlined in this paragraph and the follo"ing one 
are to be found in T 73-82. 
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be classified. However, upon turning to the relationships which pertain between 
objects Hume only discovers impressions of contiguity and priority. That is, the 
common features of objects which are considered to be in relations of cause and 
effect are those objects being contiguous to one another in time or place, and the 
way in which the object taken to be the cause precedes the other in time. In this case 
the lack of any additional impression of causality is significant because by means of 
the idea of causality we clearly intend to indicate a distinction between those objects 
which are contingently related both in terms of contiguity and priority, and those 
objects where there is "a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration"[T 
77]. Therefore, in the absence of any impression of necessary connection we can 
have no impression of causality. 
The second possible source of the idea of causality, for Hume, lies in the 
relations of ideas. If the proposition that "whatever begins to exist, must have a 
cause of existence"[T 78] is accepted, then the origin of the idea of causality could 
be explained without there being any need to refer to any direct impression of it. 
The mere impression of something beginning to exist would be the source of this 
idea because the idea corresponding to the impression of something coming to exist 
logically entails the idea of causality. However, in order for this account to be valid 
the proposition which attributes a cause to every event must be demonstrably 
certain. Such certainty is not available to us because, Hume claims, there is no 
contradiction in the conception of something coming to exist without it having had a 
cause. There is no necessary relation between these two ideas because they are 
separable in the imagination. Although it might be claimed that such a necessary 
relation does pertain bet\veen cause and effoct because the two terms are correlative 
with each other, this no more establishes that every event must have a cause than the 
correlative nature of the terms husband and wife establishes that "every man must 
be marry'd. "[T 82] 
There are clear weaknesses in both the preceding lines of argument. With 
regard to Hume' s first contention regarding the absence of any impression of 
causality we could, for instance, question whether it is necessarily the case that all 
differences between impressions be consciously recognised. For example, two 
impressions of smell may be distinguishable from one another only in terms of the 
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behaviour that they induce. The different ideas produced by some cases of 
impressions of contiguity and priority could, therefore, lead us to suppose that there 
is indeed some real difference in these impressions, but one which we simply cannot 
consciously detect in the impressions themselves. Hume' s second argument is also 
inconclusive. The criterion employed by Hume to determine whether the idea of 
coming to exist and the idea of having a cause are really distinct is simply that they 
are separable by the imagination. He states that if we can perform this separation 
then there is no "contradiction nor absurdity"[T 80] in thinking the one without the 
other. However, the ability to perform a psychological act of separation is clearly 
not a sufficient guarantee of logical consistency.15 Hume's argument establishes 
only that event and cause are distinct in this first sense and it therefore remains 
possible that the impression of an event is the logical ground for the idea of 
causality. 
Hume's arguments are undoubtedly more subtle than is indicated by the 
above cursory summary. However, we shall not pursue them any further because 
these arguments merely provide the spring-board for Kant's engagement with 
'Hume's problem'. Kant accepts that Hume's arguments demonstrate that the origin 
of the concept of causality cannot lie in either experience or reason. 16 What Kant 
rejects is the alternative account provided by Hume of the origin of this concept in 
the subjective activity of the imagination. The Humean concept of causality is 
famously described by Kant as "'a bastard of imagination, which, impregnated by 
experience, has brought certain representations under the law of Association"[N 
257-8]17. We can see what Kant is referring to here if we turn to Hume's account 
15 See Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge, 1977), 42~8 for an extended discussion 
of this point. 
16 
J7 
"Hume demonstrated incontrovertibly that it was wholly impossible for reason, a 
priori and from concepts, to think such a combination, when this combination 
contains necessity. We cannot at all see why, because something is, something else 
must also necessarily exist, or how the concept of such a connection can arise a 
priori."[IV 257] 
(Er bewies unwidersprechlich: daB es der Vemunft ganzlich unmoglich sei, a priori 
und aus Begriffen eine solehe Verbindung zu denken, denn diese entMlt 
Notwendigkeit: es ist aber gar nicht abzusehen, ",i.e darum, weil Etwas ist, etwas 
anderes notwendiger Weise aueh sein mtisse, und wie sich also der Begriffvon einer 
solchen Verknupfung a priori einfuhren lasse.] 
"ein Bastard der Einbildungskraft sei, die, durch Erfahrung beschwangert, gewisse 
Vorstellungen unter das Gesetz der Association gebracht hat". 
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of the origin of the idea of causality. 
Briefly stated, having dismissed the notion that causality is either a property 
of objects (or the relations between them) or analytically entailed by some such 
property, Hume executes his own Copernican revolution (to use a phrase later 
adopted by Kant [Bxvii]). The origin of this idea lies in the subjective mechanisms 
which the mind brings to bear in its operations on impressions rather than in the 
impressions of the objects themselves. Hume clearly articulates this view when he 
begins his account of the origin of the idea of causality with the suggestion that 
[p]erhaps 'twill appear in the end, that the necessary connexion depends 
on the inference, instead of the inference's depending on the necessary 
connexion. [T 88] 
Hume's point here is that not all objects which are related by contiguity and priority 
are also taken to be causally related. What distinguishes these two cases is that a 
necessary connection is posited between objects which are causally related and it has 
been assumed that it is on the basis of this necessary connection that the inference 
from the first object (upon its presentation) to the second is warranted. However, 
this inference cannot be justified on these grounds for, as we have seen, there is no 
impression of any necessary connection or causal relation between these objects. It 
is Hume' s contention that we make this inference on entirely different grounds and it 
is from this inference itself that the idea of causality, and the entailed idea of a 
necessary connection, arises. 
The inference from one object to the other does not, observes Hume, take 
place if we have only experienced this particular conjunction and succession on a 
limited number of occasions, or if these relations are irregular. Rather the constant 
conjunction of objects leads to the expectation that upon the presentation of the first, 
the second will follow. This expectation is not the product of reason for the repeated 
occurrence of conjunction and succession generates no novel impression of causality 
in the objects themselves, it is merely an idea generated by the repetition of the same 
impressions. Such expectation, then, is produced by the mind's 0\\'11. internal 
propensity to associate impressions which stand in constant conjunction with one 
another. It is this merely subjective union of ideas in the imagination that is the 
source of the idea of necessary connection or causality: 
Thus tho' causation be a philosophical relation, as implying contiguity, 
succession, and constant conjunction, yet 'tis only so far as it is a 
natural relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are 
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able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it. [T 94] 
This illustrates in outline the point of contrast that we shall be dra\\·mg in 
this chapter between Hume and Kant. This consists not in a simple opposition 
between an epistemological scepticism and a defence of objective knowledge, but 
rather a distinction between two different methodologies which are used to explain 
the application of concepts to objects when these concepts are not derived from 
experience or reason. For Hume this explanation has a naturalistic form. That is, 
Hume details the laws governing impressions and ideas, and it is through an account 
of the mind's propensities as subject to these laws that explanations are provided. 
Here the necessarily psychological nature of these explanations does not constitute a 
weakness, but is rather a strength. The psychological need for the attribution of 
causal relations to objects or the fact that these relations are natural is not something 
which is subject to sceptical doubt. Hume' s treatment of the fact of this attribution 
is a genuine advance on the straightforward sceptical denial of the validity of the 
causal judgement because, even within the naturalistic context, Hume can make 
normative distinctions between causal judgements which are well founded and those 
based, for example, on prejudice or indoctrination which are not. 1 g 
4. Transcendental Concepts 
The interpretation of Hume that we have here adopted, in which his 
naturalistic explanations rather than his sceptical doubts are emphasised, is the one 
advocated by Kant. This is clear in Kant's description of 'Hume's Problem' as a 
"question of the origin, not of the indispensable need of the concept"[IV 259f9 of 
causality. That is, Kant takes Hume merely to be doubting whether there can be a 
philosophical justification for the use of this concept and advocating a position 
where it is necessary to step outside of philosophy into psychology. However, 
Hume is not doubting, according to Kant, that we actually do employ this concept of 
causality or that we should continue to do so. In subsequent chapters we shall be 
18 For detailed accounts on the mechanisms by which one leaves the "vulgar" 
epistemological class and joins the "philosophers" [T 132] and, in particular, the role that 
scepticism plays in this transition see Christine Battersby, "Burne's Easy Philosophy" 
(D.Phil. diss., U of Sussex, 1978) and Lome Falkenstein, "Naturalism, Normativity. and 
Scepticism in Burne's Account of Belief," Hume Studies 23 (1997). 
19 "die Rede von dem Ursprunge dieses Begriffs, nicht von der Unentbehrlichkeit 
desselben im Gebrauche". 
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investigating the claim that Kant takes too much for granted in this respect. For the 
moment, however, we shall confine ourselves to providing a general account of 
Kant's non-psychological answer to Hume's problem. 
It is Kant's (perhaps revisionist) claim in the Prolegomena that reflection 
upon Hurne's problem induced him to provide a deduction of those concepts, 
including causality, by which, Kant says, "the understanding thinks the connection 
of things a priori"[IV 260]20. The nature of the task that Kant undertakes in this 
deduction is, as Dieter Henrich has shown, a juridical one. It is the process whereby 
the legal title of possession is established by "explaining its origin, such that the 
rightfulness of the possession or the usage becomes apparent. ,,21 In the opening 
sentence of the chapter entitled "The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of 
Understanding" Kant distinguishes the question which is to be answered by means of 
the deduction, "the question of right (quid juris}", from the '''question of fact (qUid 
facti}" [ A841B 116f2. Both of these questions refer to the source of the acquisition. 
However, what is established in the case of the latter question is who is in 
possession of, and how they came to be in possession of, the disputed article. 
Whether someone came to be in possession of, for example, a particular territory by 
means of inheritance or through invasion provides a sufficient answer, but it leaves 
open the question of who has legal claim to the territory. It is by means of a 
deduction that the right of ownership is established. 
The psychological account of the origin of causality gIven by Humc 
establishes, for Kant, only how we come to be in possession of this concept and 
cannot thereby address the question of the right that we have to it.23 Kant's answer 
20 "durch den der Verstand a priori sich Verkniipfungen der Dinge denkf'. 
21 Dieter Henrich, "Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of 
the First Critique," in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed Eckart Forster (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1989), 35. Henrich provides fascinating background material on the origin 
and purpose of Dedul7ionsschriften. Decisions of the Imperial Courts within the Holy 
Roman Empire concerning legal claims between the independent territories of the Empire 
were reached after each party had submitted a deduction outlining the origin of the claim 
(particularly with regard to territorial disputes) and how this claim had been, by 
inheritance or otherwise, transferred. 
22 "die Frage tiber das, was Rechtens ist, (quid iuris) von der, die die Thatsache angeht, 
(quid facti)". 
23 
"This attempted physiological derivation concerns a quaestio facti , it cannot strictly 
be called deduction~ and I shall therefore entitle it the ex-planation of the possession 
of pure knowledge." [A86-71B1l9] 
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to Home, however, does not proceed on this front alone. The deduction that Kant 
offers attempts to legitimate the claim to the concept of causality on the basis of the 
fact that the origin of this concept is not psychological but rather synthetic a priori. 
There are, therefore, two different contrasts to be made between Hume and Kant. 
The first is in regard to the account of how we come by the concept, and the second 
is in regard to how we justify the concept of causality. 
We have seen how the failure of both experience and reason to act as 
possible sources for the origin of the concept of causality leads Hume to provide a 
naturalistic account of the origin of this concept. However, Kant claims that the 
possible sources of this concept which Home details are not exhaustive. What 
Hume failed to notice, according to Kant, is that the analytic judgements of reason 
and the synthetic judgements of experience do not constitute a simple dichotomy. 
Within this disjunction there lurks another level of complexity which is revealed by 
Kant's well known distinction between the analytic and the a priori and between the 
synthetic and the a posteriori. 
In general terms Kant accepts the view espoused by Hume that a judgement 
IS analytic when the subject and predicate are related in such a way that the 
predicate "cannot be negated without contradiction"[IV 267]?4 Such judgements 
[Diese versuchte physiologische Ableitung, die eigentlich gar nicht Deduction heillen 
kann., weil sie eine quaestionem facti betrifft, will ich daher die Erklarung des 
Be sit z e seiner reinen Erkenntnis nennen.] 
Although Kant does not mention Hume in this context and confines himself to a 
discussion of Locke's "empirical deduction", at other times he does run deductions of 
Locke and Hume together, e.g. B127. 
24 "ohne Widerspruch nicht vemeint werden". 
The complexities and potential contradictions inherent in the account of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction as it is presented by Kant are well documented. One 
significant problem is that the appeal to the principle of contradiction is not the only 
criteria which Kant invokes in order to determine the analytic status of jUdgements. He 
also employs the metaphor of the predicate being "contained in" the subject. A discussion 
of the these criteria can be found in A. T. Winterbourne, The Jdeal and the Real 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 36-44. More generally, of course, the notion that analyticity 
is predicated upon the meaning of terms has been famously questioned by W. v. Quine, 
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in From a Logical Point of View, 2d ed. (London: Harvard 
UP, 1980). 
Complications of a similar nature also arise with regard Hume' s distinction between 
"Relations of Ideas and A/atters of Fact." Where the contrary of any matter of fact is 
possible "because it can never imply a contradiction."[E 25] This distinction (which is 
drawn in different terms in the Treatise, p. 69, although this vocabulary is used elsewhere, 
e.g., p. 458, and in the Abstract to the Treatise) does not appear to rest solely on the 
principle of contradiction, but also draws on a broader notion of conceivability derived 
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are explicative in that they do not extend the knowledge of the subject term but 
merely make explicit what was already thought in it. Synthetic judgements are 
correspondingly ampliative in that they add to the thought of the subject term. The 
criteria used to distinguish between the a priori and the a posteriori are that a priori 
judgements are, firstly, pure and, secondly, necessary and universal. These two 
criteria are mutually reinforcing in that the purity of the a priori separates such 
judgements from those containing anything that is given though sensation, and the 
content given to judgements by sensation can only establish contingent relations 
between the subject and predicate in the judgement. This also captures an aspect of 
judgements that Hume agrees with, in that judgements regarding matters of fact, 
which are dependent upon experience, can never achieve the certainty associated 
with relations of ideas. However, it is Kant's claim that not all matters of fact are 
judgements based on experience: there can be judgements which are not governed by 
the principle of contradiction and yet are necessary and universal. That all events 
have causes is one such judgement. This is, on Hume's position, ampliative or 
synthetic because there is no contradiction involved in its denial, yet it is also a 
priori because it is universally and necessarily true of experience that all events 
have causes. 
As it stands it is merely an assertion on Kant's part that synthetic a priori 
judgements are possible. Mathematics provides him with the clearest set of 
examples, but even with regard to causality Kant's initial contention concerns not so 
much the validity of the judgement but rather merely attempts to demonstrate the 
kind of judgement made. That is, although "every event has a cause" is not analytic, 
the necessity which attaches itself to the judgement is lost if it is treated as a 
generalisation from experience. The solution proposed by Hume, according to Kant, 
from being imaginable rather than an absence of self-contradiction. The difficulties 
inherent in any attempt to distinguish between relations of ideas and matters of fact in 
terms of a straightforward distinction between analytic and synthetic statements are 
highlighted in Elliot David Cohen, "Hume's Fork.," Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 
(1977). For present purposes, however, even if it is accepted that there is a conceptual 
space within Hume's writings which is analogous to Kant's notion of the synthetic a 
priori and if (as we shall see Beck contends, but Hume denies) causality is to be located 
within this domain, it is not necessary to assimilate the positions ofHume and Kant. With 
regard to both the explanation of this intermediate domain and the justification offered for 
the placing of concepts within it, Kant and Hume are radically opposed. It is this latter 
point, insofar as it bears upon challenges posed to the principle of a transcendental 
deduction, that is of concern to us here. 
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changes the nature of the judgement, because rather than being a claim concerning 
the necessary relation between events and causes, it becomes a statement of the 
necessity to attribute causes to events, which is a '"merely subjective 
necessity"[B5]25. Hume' s account explains and justifies the propensity to make the 
judgement; but the judgement itself, when understood to refer to the objective 
relations of event and cause in experience, has no validity. The initial manoeuvre 
that Kant initiates against Hume in introducing the notion of the synthetic a priori 
judgement consists, then, in a clarification of the object over which a right IS 
claimed. What is subsequently necessary is a deduction of legal entitlement. 
The task of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories is to explain 
how the concepts which claim to have universal application within experience ''"can 
refer to objects which they do not obtain from any experience," when no justification 
for their employment is '"obtainable either from experience or from 
reason"[A851B 117]26. The only way to establish that the concepts which claim to 
have empirical reference are, nevertheless, not derived from experience, is to reverse 
the order of the deductions that have previously been attempted. Rather than it 
being the case that the concept is derived from the experience of the object, "'the 
representation alone makes the object possible."[A921B124-5f7 Rather than the 
universality of causal judgements being purely derived from the particular relation 
that they hold to a world of objects (such that a judgement is universal when it 
describes some generalised truth about the world), the Transcendental Deduction 
attempts to establish that such objectivity is determined purely by judgement itself. 
The objective validity of concepts is not to be found in the conditions of objects in 
the world but rather in the subjective condition of thought: 
26 
27 
Pure a priori concepts, if such exist, cannot indeed contain anything 
empirical; yet, none the less, they can serve solely as a priori conditions 
of a possible experience. Upon this ground alone can their objective 
reality rest.[A95] 
[Wenn es also reine Begriffe a priori giebt, so konnen diese zwar freilich 
nichts Empirisches enthalten: sie mussen aber gleichwohl lauter 
Bedingungen a priori zu einer moglichen Erfahrung sein, als worauf 
allein ihre objective Realitat beruhen kann. ] 
"bloB subjectiven Nothwendigkeif' . 
"weder aus der Erfahrung, noch der Vernunft anfiihren kannr.] ... wie diese Begriffe 
sich auf Objecte beziehen konnen, die sie doch aus keiner Erfahrung hemehmen." 
"die Vorstellung ... den Gegenstand allein moglich macht." 
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The manner in which the objective validity of concepts is established cannot 
follow the pattern of an empirical deduction; if the concepts are to have objective 
validity then this needs to derive from their very nature as a priori concepts. The 
subjective quality here attributed to synthetic a priori judgements needs to be 
distinguished from the mere subjective validity which attaches to these judgements 
on the Humean account Synthetic a priori judgements are subjective only in the 
sense that they are said by Kant to constitute a condition of experience that cannot 
be provided by experience. The claim is that experience would not be possible 
unless the concept of causality is applied to that experience. This concept, however, 
cannot be derived from experience and must, therefore, have a subjective source. 
This does not render these concepts merely subjectively valid because it is not the 
case that we must merely regard experience as being subject to the concept of 
causality, but rather that it is an objective condition of experience that it is so 
subject to this concept. 
We have only considered the kind of argument that the Transcendental 
Deduction must be if it is to establish the validity of synthetic a priori judgements 
without attention to the details of the argument that Kant employs. This is not only 
because the Deduction is, as Kant says, a matter of extreme difficulty, but also 
because, while there is a critical consensus regarding the conclusion that Kant must 
reach, his actual argument has been variously described as "a botch,,28 and a 
"disjointed summary of significantly different strategies,029. It is, however, not 
necessary to join the melee of competing interpretations of the Deduction to provide 
some initial clarification of the conflicting ways in which Hume and Kant respond to 
the same problem. 
The general differences in approach can be summarised under the familiar 
labels of psychological and transcendental. These tenns describe both the method 
and object of enquiry. Hume's method is psychological because he appeals to 
general empirical laws governing the relations between impressions and ideas: what 
he seeks to explain is also psychological because it treats the subjective propensity 
to attribute, for instance, causal relations to objects rather than those causal 
relations themselves. A sceptical attitude is maintained with regard to any attempt 
28 Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1966). 100. 
29 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987). 73. 
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to establish the objective nature of these relations. On the other hand, it is precisely 
this latter question that constitutes the topic of Kant's enquiry and the psychological 
method cannot accommodate this goal. The synthetic a priori nature of the 
judgements necessitates that the enquiry proceeds not from experience but rather 
from the conditions under which experience is possible. 
Having presented a brief exegetical account of the difference betwccn the 
Humean and the Kantian projects, we shall now turn to some considerations whic~ 
it is claimed., mitigate against the maintenance of the distinctions as they have been 
presented above. 
5. A Psychological Kant and a Transcendental Burne 
Although Kant and Home both respond to the same problem of justifying 
causal judgements, it has been argued both that the Kantian and the Humean 
programmes are of a fundamentally different nature and that Kant correctly 
identifies this distinction when he characterises Hume' s principle of causality as 
subjectively necessary. Both of these latter points have been challenged by 
interpretations which either assimilate the Kantian transcendental into a form of 
naturalism or identify principles used by Home which are a priori. 
The interpretations that we shall consider here are those advanced by R. A. 
Mall and L. W. Beck. Despite the differences in approach taken by Mall and Beck, 
both agree that Kant misunderstood Home, in that he took Hume to be ultimately 
offering sceptical arguments against the principle of causality. The arguments of 
both Mall and Beck then proceed in a structurally analogous way. They argue that 
once it is understood that Home is advancing his own answer to the sceptical 
problem, then the distinctions between him and Kant begin to disappear. Thus Mall 
claims that "Kant saw in Hume only a critical genius who proposes no solution of 
his own, ,,30 and Beck argues that it is on the basis of the confused and second-hand 
account of Hume provided by Beattie that Kant wrongly concludes that Hume takes 
the principle of causality to be contingent. 31 It will be argued here that it is 
incidental to the relationship between Kant and Home whether the positive principles 
defended by them both are identical or not, and this is because the significant 
30 MaJl, Nahlralism and Criticism, 5. 
~I B~ "A Pmssian Hume and a Scottish Hume," 144 . 
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distinction, which Kant correctly identifies, resides in the way in which the 
principles are defended and interpreted rather than in the principles themselves. 
The point of similarity shared by Hume and Kant that Mall identifies is that 
they both adopt positions which display '"a foundational and fundamental relativity 
to the special constitution of human mind, human nature. ,,32 In the case of Hume 
this "special constitution" refers to the working of the imagination which is 
constitutive of human nature because, as we have seen, it supplements both 
experience and reason to allow, for instance, causal judgements to be made. That is, 
on Mall's interpretation, Hume takes the making of causal judgements to be a 
natural human attribute. Causal inferences, however, are revealed as part of human 
nature by Hume in that he shows that experience alone does not provide the 
sufficient means for the origin of these judgements. It is necessary to posit another 
faculty to co-ordinate the material given in experience and this faculty is then said to 
constitute part of our human nature.33 
There is certainly much evidence ill the first Critique to support the 
attribution of a concern for human nature to Kant. With regard to the forms of 
intuition, for instance, Kant says that they are "not necessarily fitting for every 
being, though certainly, for every human being"[A421B59f4. It is also a peculiarity 
of the human constitution that the understanding and sensibility are the two stems of 
knowledge and other beings will possess only one of these faculties. The categories 
could then be said to constitute a uniquely human attribute [B145]. If one accepts 
this, then it appears as if the differences between Kant and Hume only operate at a 
superficial level; Hume uncovers a human faculty structure on the basis of certain 
natural yet a posteriori judgements, and Kant's programme is distinct only insofar 
as he takes these judgements themselves to be a priori. With regard to this latter 
point Mall argues that the a priori status of these judgements depends on the "more 
32 Mall, f\.i'aturalism and Criticism, viii. 
33 The radicality of Hume's conception of human nature should not be underestimated. It 
constitutes a complete break from traditional metaphysics, since his conception of the 
human completely disinvests the rational at the expense of instinct, propensity or 
inclination which have commonly been associated with animality. For a discussion of this 
point see Wolfgang Rod, "Kant und Hume: Die Transzendentalphilosophie als Alternative 
zum Naturalismus," DiaJectica 49 (1995), 322. 
34 "die auch nicht notwendigjedem Wesen, ob zwar jedem Menschen, zukommen 
muB." 
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or less dogmatic ... recourse to the authorities of the sciences like physics and 
mathematics"35. That is, rather than simply investigating the origin of judgements of 
cause and effect, Mall sees Kant as unjustifiably beginning with a dogmatic 
assertion as to the nature of these judgements. The interpretation of the relationship 
between Hume and Kant proposed by Mall, therefore, recognises that the 
judgements investigated by Kant are distinguished by not being necessary in a 
naturalistic sense, in that they are not a product of our human nature, but also 
necessary in that there is an a priori connection between the subject and predicate of 
the judgements. lbis latter connection is, according to Mall, merely a relation of 
ideas, and hence, for him, an analytic connection that must be rejected as a dogmatic 
presupposition; and, yet, this is not to reject the core of Kant's programme because 
we '"may accept the claims of Kant without necessarily accepting his method of 
justifying and explaining these claims. ,,36 
We can summarise Mall's argument as follows: (1) Kant's analysis of 
human nature begins from the dogmatic assertion that some judgements are logically 
necessary; (2) although the logical necessity which Kant ascribes to these 
judgements must be rejected, they are, nonetheless, necessary insofar as they are the 
natural product of human nature. Therefore, (3) the Kantian programme, with 
dogmatism removed, gives results which are similar to those of Hume. However, 
each stage in this argument constitutes a serious misrepresentation of Kant's 
position. 
Firstly, Mall represents the transcendental necessity which Kant associates 
with some judgements as being merely formal or logical and posits as the only 
alternative to this a necessity associated with human nature.: "the so-called logical X 
and transcendental certainty and necessity which Kant speaks of are either fully 
formal or more or less natural in the Humean sense of the term." 37 This, however, 
35 Mall, Naturalism and Criticism, 56. 
36 Ibid., 58. 
37 Ibid., 57. 
I n contrasting Hume and Kant, Mall repeatedly refuses to accept that there is a 
distinction to be made between the transcendental and the analytic. This point is made 
explicit in his association between the Kantian transcendental and Hume' s relations of 
ideas (which Mall appears to take to be synonymous with analytic). A further example of 
this occurs on p. 26: 
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is merely to beg the question against Kant. It is Kant's contention that there are a 
series of judgements which occupy an intermediate space between the logical and the 
empirical. Furthermore, Kant does not merely dogmatic assert the existence of such 
judgements. Although mathematics provides him with what he takes to be an 
example of a science built upon such judgements, this merely illustrates that it might 
be the case that there are also such judgements to be found within the field of 
philosophy. This question is investigated in the Transcendental Deduction and it is 
here that both the distinctive character of Kant's methodology and his conception of 
what Mall takes to be human nature are revealed. The Deduction aims to establish 
the validity of certain synthetic a priori judgements and does so by showing that 
these judgements form the necessary conditions for human experience. That the 
concepts employed in these judgements are an a priori feature of human nature, 
cannot be separated from the method employed by Kant, because it is only insofar 
as they are constitutive of experience that they form a constitutive element of human 
nature. That is to say, if the method of deduction is eliminated from Kant's 
approach then there is no human nature to be revealed: Kant deduces human nature 
from the conditions of the possibility of experience. This point reveals inadequacies 
in the second stage of Mall's argument. 
Although in very general terms one can describe the positions of Hume and 
Kant as being anthropocentric, this obscures the radically different conceptions of 
human nature that they could be said to be working with. For Hume human nature 
is revealed by what Mall terms the "supplementary" character of the imagination. 38 
That which is given in experience is worked upon by this peculiarly human faculty 
in such a way that judgements can be made that would otherwise have been 
impossible. The possession of this faculty is contingent yet shared by all humans 
and so provides a '"factual foundation,,39 for Hume's naturalism. On the other hand, 
the conception of human nature that we can derive from Kant has a completely 
different character. Human nature does not supplement that which is given in 
experience, but rather this experience itself is uniquely human. The contingency of 
"The deduction Hume would accept would also not be a formal-transcendental one, 
because that would be purely analytic and would mean that the principles should 
belong not to the field of matters of fact but to that of the relations of ideas." 
38 Ibid., 14, 21 and passim. 
39 Ibid., viii. 
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human nature cannot be revealed by considering what is added to a stable field of 
given experience, because everything that falls within this field is determined with 
regards to its form by our nature. Whereas for Hume the contribution of human 
nature can be isolated, this is not possible for Kant because we can draw no 
comparisons (except completely speculatively) between our own beings and that of 
other creatures. 
Mall's claim that there is a "programmatic and architectonic similarity 
between Critical Philosophy (Kant) and naturalism (Hume)'~ is, therefore, only 
remotely plausible if one has first discarded precisely that which is Kantian about 
Kant. It is necessary to reject synthetic a priori judgements, the method by which 
Kant attempts to demonstrate the validity of these judgements, and the conception of 
human nature that results. We have seen that these are not incidental aspects which 
can be disassociated from the results, such as the claim that it is necessary for us to 
employ causal concepts. Precisely what this result is, and in particular what 
'necessity' means in this context, is determined by all those features of Kant that 
Mall dispenses with. 
Turning to Beck's claim that Hume is a Prussian Kant we find similar 
problems. Although Beck's argument runs the opposite direction to Mall's, it 
utilises the same distinction between Kant's results and Kant's method to achieve 
the same end of diminishing the distinctions between Hume and Kant. The 
particular point at issue for Beck is that ''Hume' s implicit account of the causal 
principle is much more like Kant's own than Kant had any reason to suspect. ,,41 
What Beck means by this is that at times Hume calls upon a causal principle which 
is not grounded in the associative mechanisms of the imagination and which he, 
therefore, does not account for in a naturalistic fashion. Beck begins by pointing out 
that for Hume the causal principle manifests itself in two different ways, as either 
"'every-event-some-cause" or "same-cause-same-effect,,42, and shows that Hume 
only establishes the same-cause-same-effect principle. Even if we accept that Beck 
is right in asserting that Hume can only provide evidence for the latter form of this 
principle, and if we also accept that Beck has successfully established that the 
40 Ibid., vii-viii. 
41 Beck, "A Prussian Hurne and a Scottish Hume," 144. 
42 Ibid. 
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former principle (every-event-same-cause) is evoked by Hume when he wants to 
give a causal explanation in the absence of the association necessary for the latter 
principle, then we need not concur that Hume is a Kantian. What makes Hume a 
Kantian for Beck is the directionality of the relationship between the principles. The 
former principle (every-event-some-cause) is more fundamental because it functions 
as an implicit support for the latter principle (same-cause-same-effect) in those cases 
where only an effect is witnessed. If the latter principle alone were operating, then 
we would expect a reduction in our belief in this principle "'upon every diminution of 
force and vivacity of our ideas which occurs when the impression generally 
associated with an idea is lacking,>43. That Hume does not accept this conclusion 
demonstrates for Beck that Hume is implicitly relying on a formulation of the causal 
principle which is not established via association, in order to ground the formulation 
which is so established. 
As Beck points out, the relationship between these two causal principles 
functions in the same manner for Kant. The principle that every effect has a cause 
is established in the Second Analogy, and this supports the regulative principle that 
the same cause has the same effect. Kant and Hume, therefore, both maintain the 
distinction between these t\vo principles and do not attempt to derive the one from 
the other. 44 Furthermore, according to Beck, they both maintain, Hume implicitly 
and Kant explicitly, that the former principle is a priori insofar as it is not an 
induction from experience and is not, therefore, based on association and not 
vulnerable to disconfirmation. However, as was the case with Mall's interpretation 
of Hume and Kant, this similarity in terms of results belies a radical dissimilarity in 
the means by which these results are reached. 
43 Ibid., 146. 
M The relation between these two principles in Kant is considerably more complex than is 
indicated by this brief outline. Some have argued that the evolution in Kant's thought 
from the first to the third Critique indicates an attempt to render the regulative principle 
constitutive; because the a priori concept of causality is not itself sufficient to unify 
experience it is also necessary for there be an a priori determination of nature as 
sufficiently regular for this concept to be applied. For an argument illustrating the 
problems in the relation of these two principles see Burkhard Tuschling, "The System of 
Transcendental Idealism," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 Supplement (1991). A 
more general account emphasising the "looseness of fit" between causality on the 
transcendental and empirical levels is given in Gerd Buchdahl, Afetaphysics and the 
Philosophy o/Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 65J-65. 
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Although Hume does not, as Beck terms it, "'sink,,45 the every-event-some 
cause principle in the same-cause-same~ffect principle as an inductive 
generalisation of it, it is nonetheless only necessary in relation to this second 
principle. Whereas for Kant the first principle may well be necessary for the 
second, it is not said to be necessary as such just because it is a condition of the 
second principle. It is only insofar as the first principle is constitutive of the 
conditions of possibility of experience that it is necessary and a priori. It is 
precisely this dissimilarity that Kant indicates when distinguishing between the 
'subjective necessity' of Hume's principles and the objectivity of his own. Once 
again we can only appreciate the distinction between Hume and Kant by considering 
the differences between the objectives and methods of enquiry. The principle for 
which Hume provides a naturalistic explanation is that the same causes ,viII produce 
the same effect, but Hume takes this principle to describe a subjective propensity 
rather than an objective feature of the relations between the objects of experience. If 
he is implicitly committed to the principle that 'all events have causes' in the course 
of his naturalistic explanation of the principle that 'same causes have same effects', 
then this does not mean that he is committed to the view that it is objectively true 
that events have causes but merely (and inconsistently) to the existence of a beliefin 
this principle. Kant, however, aims to prove the objectivity of this relation and does 
so not by considering what makes belief in the principle possible, but rather by 
demonstrating that the principle itself is constitutive of experience. 
Despite any of the similarities identified by Mall and Beck there remain 
fundamental differences between Hume and Kant in terms of both their objectives 
and methodologies. 
6. Some Dilemmas 
So far we have only considered the question of whether Kant provides a 
response to Hume; it has not been asked if the solution offered by Kant is a 
successful one. This latter question provides the subject matter for the rest of the 
thesis. However, we are already in a position to identify some criteria which a 
Kantian solution must meet. These criteria stem from the problems raised in this 
chapter, in that, if Kant is to reply to Hume in a successful fashion, he must both 
.,,, Beck, "A Prussian Hurnc and a Scottish Humc," 144 . 
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respond to scepticism and do so in such a way that the objectivity of certain 
judgements are defended. There are four criteria that we shall draw from these 
problems: (1) Kant cannot beg any questions against the sceptical opponent; (2) the 
validity of the synthetic a priori as a category must be maintained~ (3) the 
transcendental cannot be assimilated with the psychological; (4) Kant must establish 
that experience is necessarily conceptually mediated. These criteria correspond to a 
set of interrelated problems which challenge the possibility of Kant's critical 
philosophy. Each of them will be dealt with at some length in latter chapters and for 
the moment it will suffice to indicate the problems that they raise. 
The first of these criteria arises naturally from the problem that Kant is 
responding to and it might be felt that it is to obvious to merit consideration. A 
However, the difficulty is immediately apparent when we consider the argumentative 
form employed by Kant. At its most general, Kant's argument is of the fonn that it 
is a necessary condition of X that Y. Clearly X must be something that the sceptic 
himself takes for granted, and this cannot, therefore, refer to the objectivity of causal 
relations. Although the details of Kant's argument are disputed for the moment we 
can simply call X 'self-conscious experience'. Kant intends to establish that such 
experience is only possible if certain synthetic a priori judgements have objective 
validity and he does so by demonstrating the necessity of such judgements for self-
conscious experience. However, it has been an oft repeated mantra of Kant's 
opponents that the most that he could be said to have established is the subjective 
necessity rather than the objective validity of the judgements, and that is because 
Kant cannot distinguish between it being necessary to think that the judgements have 
validity and there actually being valid. 
The distinction between the synthetic a priori and the analytic a priori 
stems from the former being universal and necessary within experience while the 
later is universal and necessary per se. In order to establish that he is detailing 
genuine transcendental conditions rather than merely logical ones, it is, therefore, 
necessary for Kant to make some substantive claim about the nature of experience. 
This appears to create a dilemma. If any such substantive claim is made, then not 
only will it be open to sceptical denial, but it also begs the question of the synthetic a 
priori because it is the sceptic's claim that there are no necessary relations to be 
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found within experience and Kant cannot simply posit such a necessit) in order to 
deduce it. On the other hand, without such an appeal Kant can establish only a 
necessary relation between the concept of event and the concept of cause, '''''hich fails 
to demonstrate that there is anything in experience corresponding to these concepts. 
The criteria which stern from Kant's attempt to distinguish himself from 
Hume's naturalism are equally pressing. The transcendental and the psychological 
cannot be assimilated to one another without, once again, raising the problem of 
establishing the objective nature of the judgements as opposed to their subjective 
necessity. In addition, Kant is committed not merely to establishing the objectivity 
of relations but also to the specifically conceptual nature of these relations. 
As is detailed in the next chapter, with regard to each of these points it has 
been claimed that Kant's project must of necessity fail because it is impossible for 
him to simultaneously defend claims to objectivity without begging the question 
against the sceptic and that if he does not beg any questions then he cannot avoid 
naturalism. In this chapter we have seen that the Kantian and the Humean projects 
cannot be reconciled without the lose of what is genuinely distinctive to Kant's 
position; the question which remains is whether Kant's answer to Hume is possible. 
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Chapter Two 
The Sceptical Response 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter the opposition between the objective and the 
subjective necessity of the concept of causality served to situate the distinction 
between the programmes of Kant and Hume. It was argued that this contrast 
provides a site at which the success of Kant's arguments can be judged. The claim 
to knowledge of objects which Kant wishes to defend cannot merely be a compulsion 
on the part of the subject to make judgements of a certain form, but must also 
compel the conformity of objects with the judgement. A sketch of the stages though 
which this argument proceeds and how it is situated in relation to traditional 
epistemological claims is given in Section 2 of this chapter. We shall then proceed 
to detail a number of different arguments which all aim to establish that Kant cannot 
reach his desired conclusion, because the very form of argument that he employs is 
inherently problematic. 
In the third section it is demonstrated that the initial reception of Kant's 
philosophy was dominated by the claim that Kant had unwittingly advanced a form 
of subjectivism which, without some radical reformulation, can provide no 
conclusive answer to scepticism. The two subsequent sections focus on some of the 
detailed criticisms that have been levelled against Kant. The centrality of the 
objectivity of concepts to Kant's position means that there is a wide and varied 
range of objections to Kant on this specific point. We shall not attempt to provide a 
survey of all the possible responses to Kant, but rather select a small range of 
arguments which have been historically significant to Kant's reception and still exert 
an influence on recent debates on the validity of Kant's arguments. Additionally, the 
arguments considered mount objections which challenge the possibility in principle 
of the argumentative form adopted by Kant. The first account of this issue, in 
Section 4, considers the problems raised by one of Kant's early sceptical opponents 
Gottlob Ernst Schulze, who articulated in 1792, what he took to be a Humean 
response to Kant. Where Schulze takes Kant to be advancing psychological claims 
regarding the constitution of the human mind, more recent critics, discussed in 
Section 5, adopt an anti-psychologistic interpretation of Kant, yet the evaluation is 
in both cases the same. Their claim being that, at best, Kant can only reaffirm the 
subjective necessity of some concepts and, at worst, Kant merely begs the question 
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against Home or lapses into incoherence. 
2. The Objectivity of the Categories 
In order to contextualise the claims of Kant's critics it is necessary to 
provide a short overview of the argument advanced by Kant which he claims 
establishes the possibility of judgements being objective. The intention here is not to 
provide a comprehensive review of Kant's arguments for the objectivity of any 
particular concept, but merely to outline the strategy employed by Kant in his 
demonstration that any claim whatsoever can be justified. This means that we shall 
be concentrating exclusively on the argument contained in the "Transcendental 
Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding" because within this chapter 
of the first Critique Kant displays no commitment to any particular pure concept of 
the understanding, but rather is concerned with the possibility of there being any 
such concepts. If, as Kant's critics claim, his argument can be halted at this point, 
then the subsequent argument for particular concepts, contained in the "Analytic of 
Principles," would be rendered redundant. 
Although the proposed curtailment of Kant's argument removes some of the 
obstacles that would need to be overcome if a complete account of the objectivity of 
the categories were to be undertaken, it still leaves us with an argument that is 
amongst Kant's most complex and is also subject to widely divergent 
interpretations. For the moment much of the subtlety and intricacy of the argument 
will be passed over, and those assumptions that Kant carries over from his 
discussions on the nature of the faculty of sensibility (which are not pertinent to 
criticisms of the form of the Deduction's argument) will not be investigated. In 
particular Kant's justification of the transcendentally ideal status attributed to space 
and time will not be subject to critical interrogation. 
In the previous chapter it was said that the aim of Kant's argument was to 
establish the objectivity of judgement and that this is achieved by reversing the 
relationship between objects and judgements, such that, rather than the nature of 
objects being independent of the judgements that they are subject to, it is through the 
activity of judgement itself that objects first become possible: 
The concept of cause, for instance, which expresses the necessity of an 
event under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on 
an arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us, of connecting certain 
empirical representations according to the rule of causal relation. I 
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would not then be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause 
in the object, that is to say, necessarily, but only that I am so constituted 
that I cannot think this representation otherwise than as thus connected. 
This is exactly what the sceptic most desires. For if this be the situation, 
all our insight, resting on the supposed objective validity of our 
judgements, is nothing but sheer illusion (B168]. 
[Denn z. B. der Begriff der Ursache, welcher die Nothwendigkeit eines 
Erfolgs unter einer vorausgesetzten Bedingung aussagt, wiirde falsch 
sein, wenn er nur auf einer beliebigen uns eingepflanzten subjectiven 
Nothwendigkeit, gewisse empirische Vorstellungen nach einer solchen 
Regel des VerMltnisses zu verbinden, beruhte. rch wfirde nicht sagen 
konnen: die Wirkung ist mit der Ursache im Objecte (d. i. nothwendig) 
verbunden, sondem ich bin nur so eingerichtet, daB ich diese 
Vorstellung nicht anders als so verknupft denken kann; welches gerade 
das ist, was der Sceptiker am meisten wUnscht; denn alsdann ist aile 
unsere Einsicht, durch vermeinte objective Giiltigkeit unserer Urteile 
nichts als lauter Schein]. 
Withill the context of Kant's response to the problem posed by the sceptic, 
'objective' does not refer to a truthful description of objects as they exist 
independently of the judgements that are passed upon them; 'objectivity' is not a 
property of true judgements about things as they are in themselves. The innovative 
nature of Kant's conception of the objective can be quickly illustrated by contrasting 
it with that of Descartes and Hume. 
Whereas for Descartes it IS God that acts as a guarantor of the 
correspondence between the subjective idea and objective reality, for Kant a 
thoroughly secular model of this relationship is all that is required. God is replaced 
with the activity of judgement performed by the subject itself, in that it is the very 
structure of subjectivity that provides for the possibility of knowledge. Hume also 
assumes a godless rendering of, what might be termed, the Cartesian cathedral of 
subjectivity and substitutes in its place a worldly theatre. As was outlined in the 
previous chapter, ,vithill this theatre of the mind impressions are staged under the 
direction of mental laws which can lead the viewer into the illusion that he or she is 
seeing somethillg, e.g. causal interaction, which, in fact, is not there. Although this 
is to dispense with the distinction between the way in which things appear and how 
they are independently of their appearing, which requires that the subject have some 
method of accessing the things that appear without the mediation of its own limited 
faculties, the cost incurred by this is the loss of the objective altogether. All that is 
left for Humc to explain how the illusion of objectivity is generated from the already 
subjective order of impressions. Kant's radicality consists in his claim that he can 
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lay the provisions for knowledge as Descartes wants, without having to step outside 
of the Humean theatre. 
Descartes and Hume both maintain, each in his own way, some distinction 
between reality and appearance. Replying not merely to Descartes but also to the 
empiricist distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Kant's denial that 
there can be any knowledge of things-in-themselves means that knowledge is not a 
function of a correspondence between the subjective states of the human mind and a 
domain of objective reality. There is no aspect of appearances that can give us any 
insight into the nature of the things that affect us in such a way as to give rise to 
these appearances. The nature of this process in its entirety is unknown to us. 
According to Kant, however, this is not to say that we are trapped within a 
subjective theatre of consciousness. The distinction maintained by Hume between 
two different orders of subjective states and the priority attributed to impressions in 
relationship between them, such that the failure to be able to reduce an idea to a 
corresponding impression leads to that idea being designated an illusion, is also 
rejected by Kant. Legitimacy for Hume, just as it was for Descartes, flows from 
some original given which is independent of the secondary and distorting influence 
of the faculties of the subject: error consists in "the disagreement of ideas, 
consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent".[T 415]' 
The relation of correspondence between appearances and things-in-
themselves is denied by Kant in that he maintains that all appearances have a 
temporal or spatio-temporal form which is itself not a property of things-in-
themselves, insofar as the latter are considered '"independently of any reference to 
the form of our sensible intuition. "[A35-61B52f The Humean reworking of this 
distinction is also rejected because, to translate a Kantian claim into Hume's 
vocabulary, our access to impressions is itself only possible via the mediation of 
, This methodological principle is accorded pride of place within the Abstract to the 
Treatise, where Hume explains (in terms which Kant echoes in the opening passage of the 
Deduction [A841B1l6]) that when he "suspects that any philosophical term has no idea 
annexed to it (as is too common) he always asksfrom what impression that pretended idea 
is derived?,,[T 648-9] As we have seen in the previous chapter, it is the lack of any 
impression of causality that opens the way from Hume to maintain that this principle only 
has subjective necessity, in that it is a fictitious idea derived from the natural operation of 
the imagination. 
2 "ohne auf die Foml unserer sinnlichen Anschauung Riicksicht zu nehmen" . 
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ideas. Kant's claim is, therefore, that the objectivity of judgements is not derived 
from the relation that they hold to a pre-constituted source of legitimacy. We cannot 
get outside of space and time to establish a correspondence between things-in-
themselves and appearances, and we cannot set concepts aside to establish a 
correlation between impressions and ideas. It is for this reason that neither the 
Transcendental Aesthetic nor the Deduction answer traditional sceptical questions 
associated with the distinction between appearance and reality. Instead, the grounds 
upon which such questions stand are removed. Where the Aesthetic aims to 
establish that the spatial and temporal determinations of objects are features 
dependent upon the forms of sensible intuition possessed by the subject, Kant's 
claim in the Deduction is that objectivity is itself similarly a contribution of the 
subject. The paradoxical ring of this claim is mitigated by Kant's reversal of the 
priorities in the dichotomy of impression and idea, or intuition and concept. 
Some\vhat loosely stated, if all knowledge of the manifold of intuition must be 
mediated via concepts, i.e., if it is only after the manifold has been taken up by the 
spontaneous activity of the subject that there can be any knowledge of it, then these 
concepts would be legitimate because they are necessary for any knowledge 
whatsoever. 
Kant's argument for this point centres on a distinctive account of the 
constitution of knowledge. According to Kant, it is the ability to append the 'I 
think' to a representation that is constitutive of that representation being an item of 
knowledge. For the moment we shall assume that by this Kant means that if a 
representation is to represent something to me, then it is not only necessary that I am 
aware of the representation but also (potentially) aware of this awareness. More 
controversially we shall also take self-consciousness to be synonymous with 
apperception.3 Hence, his argument attempts to establish an indirect link between 
intuitions and concepts via the necessity of concepts for self-consciousness: without 
the possibility of being able to be self-consciously aw'are of intuitions we cannot be 
said to have any knowledge of them. Thus, if concepts are necessary for all self-
conscious awareness, then all knowledge of intuitions will consequently be mediated 
by concepts. The legitimacy of the application of these concepts to the manifold of 
3 The potential difficulties encountered in running these notions together and the nuances 
of Kant's argument are explored in Chapter 4. pp. 152-165. 
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intuition is thereby assured, because unless the concepts are applied we can have no 
knowledge of the manifold. Hence, the dichotomy which allowed both Descartes 
and Hurne to be sceptical about the possibility of knowledge has been undermined: 
That nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of 
apperception, and should indeed depend upon it in respect of its 
confonnity to law, sounds very strange and absurd. But when we 
consider that this nature is not a thing-in-itself but is merely an 
aggregate of appearances, so many representations of the mind, we shall 
not be surprised that we can discover it only in the radical faculty of all 
our knowledge, namely, in transcendental apperception, in that unity on 
account of which alone it can be entitled object of all possible 
experience, that is, nature. Nor shall we be surprised that just for this 
very reason this unity can be known a priori, and therefore as necessary. 
[Al14] 
[DaB die Natur sieh nach unserm subjectiven Grunde der Apperception 
riehten, ja gar davon in Ansehung ihrer Geset:.zma6igkeit abhangen 
solie, lautet wohl sehr widersinnisch und befremdlieh. Bedenket man 
aber, daB diese Natur an sieh niehts als ein Inbegrifl von 
Erscheinungen, mithin kein Ding an sich, sondern bIos cine Menge von 
Vorstellungen des Gemiiths sei, so wird man sieh nieht wundern, sie 
bios in dem Radicalvermogen aller unsrer Erkenntnill, namlieh der 
transscendentalen Apperception, in deIjenigen Einheit zu sehcn, unl 
deren willen aJJein sie Object alier mogliehen Erfahrung, d. i. Natur 
heillen kann; und ruill wir aueh eben darun1 diese Einheit a priori, 
mithin auch als nothwendig erkennen konnen]. 
At its most schematic Kant's argument can be represented as three claims 
regarding the conditions of self-consciousness: 
1) that the manifold of intuition be synthesised; 
2) this synthesis must be conceptual; 
3) this synthesis must take place a priori. 
Each of these stages to Kant's argument contributes something to establishing his 
overarching commitment to the possibility of objectively valid judgements regarding 
objects of knowledge. With (l) Kant establishes that the object of knowledge is 
presented in a mediated manner. It is necessary for there to be some subjective 
intervention in the manifold of intuition before we can be aware of it and, therefore, 
the Humean notion of given impressions untainted by beguiling associative 
mechanisms can be rejected. Kant has a further commitment, in (2), to the manner 
in which the synthesis takes place. It is here that the claim that concepts can be 
legitimately employed in judgements regarding intuitions receives its validation, 
because if it is necessary for there to be a conceptual synthesis of intuition in order 
for those intuitions to be anything to us, then there is no possible space for sceptical 
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doubt regarding their applicability. It might be felt that (3) follows analytically from 
the preceding points because if a conceptual synthesis has been shown to be 
necessary for any experience, then that synthesis must itself take place prior to any 
experience and is, therefore, by definition a priori. However, the universality and 
necessity of the synthesis would not thereby be guaranteed. It remains possible for 
the manifold of intuition either to be such that it simply cannot be synthesised or that 
concepts employed be subject to variation. Stage (3), therefore, requires 
justification if Kant is to claim that any particular concept has an objective 
application to the manifold. 
3. The Initial Reception of Transcendental Philosophy 
Although it would certainly be wrong to say that the critical philosophy did 
not have any popular success, many of the proponents of this new philosophical 
form found it necessary to advance it only after some (at times idiosyncratic) 
alteration. Such revisions were deemed necessary because Kant's philosophy was 
regarded as subjectivist. Having withdra\\1fl the right to establish the validity of 
judgements by reference to things-in-themselves, it was argued that all of Kant's 
efforts to reconstitute this notion were open to sceptical rebuttal. 
The Garve-Feder review was amongst the first and most provocative replies 
to the first Critique.4 The main charge of this review concerns an alleged lack of 
distinction between reality and illusion; since representations are '"modifications of 
ourse1ves,,5 and the criteria used to distinguish the objective from the subjective are 
themselves merely subjective, there is no way to differentiate between the kind of 
experience that we have while dreaming from that which we have while awake. The 
only criterion that Kant offers is that of being ordered according to the rules of the 
4 [1. G. Feder and Christian Garve), review of Der Kritik der reinen Vernunjt, Gottinger 
Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen Supplement vol. 1 (1782); reprint Rezensionen zur 
kantischen Philosophie J 781-87, ed. Albert Landau (Bebbra: Landau, 1991). A 
translation by James C. Morrison is provided as appendix C in Johann Schultz, Exposition 
of Kant's "'Critique of Pure Reason" (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1995). Page 
references are to the Landau edition. The review was published anonymously in January 
of 1782. It was the work of Christian Garve, a figure respected by Kant for his work in the 
Aufklarung. Garve, however, disowned the review because of emendations that had been 
made to it by the editor, J. G. Feder, of the journal in which it was published; it is Feder 
who makes explicit the accusation that Kant has merely reformulated Berkeley's idealism. 
For a historical account of the controversy which surrounds this review see Frederick C. 
Beiser, The Fate of Reason (London: Harvard UP, 1987), 172-7. 
5 (Feder and Garve], Review, 10. 
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understanding, but since we are conSCIOUS of our dream states these too must 
constitute an objective experience; all experience is then reduced to a dream. A 
second early criticism is related because it also rests upon the notion that a set of 
representations is given to consciousness and synthesised to produce objective 
experience; here the point at issue is whether Kant relies upon a notion of unified 
experience in order to establish what the transcendental conditions for such 
experience are. Such an assumption is deemed to be necessary because, without it, 
Kant would merely be repeating the very argument advanced by Hume that the 
experience we think that we have of causation is merely illusory. Upon reception of 
unsynthesised representations the mind finds it necessary to connect these 
representations to one another according to certain formal criteria. The criteria 
identified by Kant and Hume certainly differ, but this is irrelevant to the sceptical 
conclusion drawn by Hume; such criteria are merely necessary conditions for how 
the mind thinks about experience, but not necessary conditions for that experience as 
such. This line of criticism is best summed up by another of Kant's early critics, 
Solomon Maimon: 
Kant takes it as indubitable that we have propositions of experience 
which express a necessity, and from this proves their objective validity, 
since he shows that without them experience would be impossible; 
experience, however, is possible, because according to Kant's 
presuppositions it is real, and these concepts consequently have 
objective reality. .. . Things could stand in this relationship to one 
another; but whether they in fact are in these relationships remains in 
question. 6 
Kant specifically responds to the charges made by Garve and Feder in the 
Prolegomena, judging it merely to be a case in which the very metaphysics that the 
first Critique calls into question is used to pronounce judgement upon the Critique. 7 
Notwithstanding the fact that Kant judged this review to be philosophically inept, it 
induced him to rewrite some significant portions of the first Critique in order to 
make his position clearer. 
6 Solomon Maimon, Versuch uber die Transscendentalphilosophie mit einem Anhang 
uber die symbolische Erkenntnis (Berlin: Friedrich V06, 1790); reprint, Gesammelte 
Werke, ed. V. Verra, vol. 1 (Hidesheim: Georg Olms, 1965), 186-7. Page references are 
to the original edition. 
7 "the reader from his own metaphysics pronounces judgement on the Critique of Pure 
Reason, which was intended to investigate the very possibility oftbis metaphysics" 
"der Leser aus seiner Metaphysik liber die Kritik der reinen Vemunft (die allererst 
die Moglichkeit derselben untersuchen soIl) ein Urteil faJlt"[IV 3721 . 
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In the Prolegomena the charge that Kant's transcendental idealism is a 
disguised form of subjective idealisIl\ and indistinguishable from the position 
adopted by Berkeley, is disputed by reinforcing the doctrine that appearances are the 
way in which things-in-themselves are presented to us, although the actual nature of 
these things-in-themselves remains unknowable:8 
Idealism consists in the assertion that there are none other but knowing 
beings; all other things which we believe are perceived in intuition are 
only representations in the thinking beings, to which nothing external to 
the sensible object corresponds. On the contrary, I say that things as 
external and sensible objects of our senses are given to us, but we know 
nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their 
appearances, ie., the representations which they cause in us by affecting 
our senses. [IV 288-9] 
lDer ldealismus besteht in der Behauptung, daB es keine andere als 
kennende Wesen gebe, die ubrige Dinge, die wir in der Anschauung 
wahrzunehmen glauben, waren nur Vorstellungen in den denkenden 
Wesen, denen in der That kein auBerhalb die sen besinnlicher 
Gegenstand correspondierte. Ich dagegen sage: es find uns Dinge als 
auBer und befindliche Gegen.stiinde unserer Sinne gegeben, allein von 
dem, was sie an sich selbst sein mogen, wissen wir nichts, sondem 
kennen nur ihre Erscheinungen, d. i. die Vorstellungen, die sic in uns 
wirken, indem sie unsere Sinne afficiren.] 
There is no doctrine within the entire critical philosophy more widely disputed and 
flatly rejected as self-contradictory than this positing of an unknowable entity as the 
cause of our sensations. 9 
Within the immediate aftermath of the senes of attacks upon Kant's 
references to things-in-themselves, there were those only to willing to drop this 
notion and carry on the Kantian programme without it; throughout the 1790s 1. G. 
8 The association with Berkeley, which Kant takes extreme objection to, constitutes little 
more than a passing reference within the review itself. See [Feder and Garve], Review, 
11. 
9 Another early and lasting criticism of Kant centres on the supposedly contradictory 
nature of Kant's commitments to the notion of a thing-in-itself This debate was sparked 
by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, David Hume iiber den Glauben oder Idealismus und 
Realismus (Breslau: Loewe, 1787); reprint, Werke, ed. F. Roth and F. Koppen, voL 2 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellscha.ft, 1976),222-3. Page references are to the 
original edition. Jacobi's argument can be summed up in the slogan the thing-in-itself is 
necessary if one is to enter into the Kantian system, but once inside there is no place for 
this notion. The most sustained treatment of this issue is presented by Gerold Prauss, 
Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974). It should also be noted 
that the Prolegomena passage [IV 288-9) is not without ambiguity. It is not entirely clear 
that it is Kant's claim that it is things-in-themselves that are affecting our senses. Another 
possibility, and one which is advocated by Prauss in his interpretation of this passage, pp. 
201-4, is that Kant is merely referring to empirical affection by empirical things. 
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Fichte, J. S. Beck and Maimon all do this to different extents and in different ways. I 0 
This is not simply to say that the first step in the development of German idealism 
after Kant came with the acceptance that Kant was Berkelian. Rather it appears 
that the first post -Kantian idealists realised something concerning the natu re of 
Kantian idealism that, judging from his response in the Prolegomena, Kant himself 
appears to be largely oblivious to, namely, that the very structure of the critical 
system, based as it is on the notion of the synthetic a priori, is sufficient to 
differentiate Kant from Berkeley. The universal and necessary nature of the 
conditions of possibility of experience means that problems concerning the 
ontological status of the objects of our experience or the source of such experiences 
become redundant. As even Kant is keen to stress, the ontological question is 
derivative of an epistemological one; he says that his '"so-called idealism concerns 
not the existence of things ... but merely the sensible representation of things. "[IV 
293] II The discoveries made in the investigation of the conditions of such 
representation, as we have already seen, render the introduction of an external 
arbiter for the reality of such experiences unnecessary; the objectivity follows from 
the necessary features of our experience given the faculty structure that we possess. 
Within the context of the argument advanced in the Deduction, it would appear that 
Kant simply makes a blunder by appealing to the thing-in-itself. 
If the first wave of post-Kantian idealists embody a response to the charge 
of subjective idealism, then the same can be said of their attitude toward the 
(inextricably related) problem of scepticism. Indeed the notion that Kant has failed 
in this regard provides one of principles from which Maimon takes his departure and 
10 See J. G. Fichte, Fichtes samtliche Werke, ed. 1. H. Fichte, vol. 1, Zur theoretischen 
Philosophie J (Berlin: Veit, 1845); reprint, Fichtes Werke (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1971), 
480-90. Page references are to the reprint edition. Jakob Sigismund Beck, "The 
Standpoint from which Critical Philosophy is to be Judged," edited, annotated and 
translated by George di Giovanni, in From Kant to Hegel: Texts in the Development of 
Post-Kantian Idealism, ed. George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, (Albany: SUNY, 1985), 
230-2. Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, 205, 219, passim. Secondary material on 
this issue is to be found in Beiser, Reason, Chapters 4 and 10; Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Die 
Grenzen der Vernunft (Weinheim: Beltz, 1995), Chapters 2a and 3a; Ingrid M. Wallner, 
"A New Look at J. S. Beck's 'Doctrine of the Standpoint'," Kant-Studien 75 (1984): 
passim; and Samuel Atlas, From Critical to Speculative Idealism: The Philosophy of 
Solomon Afaimon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), Chapter 2. 
II "sogenannte Idealism betraf nieht die Existenz der Sachen ... sondern bIos die 
sinnliche Vorstellung der Sachen". 
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guides his search for a rationalistic reconciliation between the conditions of thought 
and the conditions of intuition in the mind of God. In the case of Fichte we find that 
the sceptical challenge motors his philosophical developmentl2; this applies equally 
to the question of whether Kant appeals to a notion of experience as a premise which 
is open to sceptical challenge, and the question of whether the logic of the Deduction 
simply proves that the categories are necessary for thought but not for experience. 
With regard to the first of these problems the solution is to be found in the discovery 
of a first principle from which it is possible to deduce logically a system of 
philosophy13, and the second is dissolved though the denial of anything external to 
this first principle. Fichte draws this second point from the rejection of the notion of 
the thing-In-itself; the subject of experience is not merely presented with a given 
material to be synthesised and determined according to the categories, but rather 
"determining [Bestimmen] and producing [Produzieren] always go together"rf 
384]. It is certainly true (and Fichte frequently reiterates the point) that Kant says 
no such thing, but that is not to rule out the possibility that it may be consistent with 
Kant's own position. Furthermore, if Kant is to escape the coils of scepticism we 
should, perhaps, interpret Kant in this manner. Fichte states his case by claiming 
that Maimo~ in questioning the relationship between the categories and objects 
[Objekte] , creates a problem that is not there, and hence opens the door to 
scepticism: 
12 
13 
The error, which the letter of Kant confirms but is in complete 
contradiction to his spirit, merely lies in the fact that the object is 
supposed to be something other than a product of the imagination. To 
assert this is to be a transcendent dogmatist and to remove oneself 
completely from the spirit of the critical philosophy. [F 388] 
On the basis of what has so far been said, it can already be seen that Fichte 
"The author of this treatise, through his reading of the new sceptics, in particular 
Aenesidemus and the excellent writings ofMaimon, has become convinced of 
something that already seemed highly probable to him. Philosophy, even after the 
most recent efforts of the most quick-witted of men, has not yet been raised to the 
level of a clearly evident science [Wissenschaft]." [F 29] 
"This idealism proceeds from a single basic law of reason ... If the idealism's 
assumption is correct, and correctly followed in the derivation, then, as a final result, 
as the embodiment of all the originally accepted conditions, the system of all 
necessary representation or the whole of experience, a comparison not to be employed 
within the philosophy itself, but only afterward, ~ill be produced. 
For idealism does not ha,'e this experience in mind as an already known goal at 
which it must arrive; in the course of its proceedings it knows nothing of 
experience. "[F 445-6] 
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has some justification in claiming that his first principle, "I am"[F 95], "is indicated 
by Kant to be the absolutely basic principle of all knowledge [Wissen I in his 
deduction of the categories"fF 99]. Kant certainly expresses himself in different 
terms. However, pure or original apperception is identified by Kant with self-
consciousness [B 132] and could indeed be said to function as a first principle of the 
Deduction. The conditions under which representations can belong to this pure 
apperception are the conditions of possibility of those representations representing 
something. As has already been outlined, the argument for the necessity of 
categories (as the conditions under which representations can represent) begins with 
an investigation into the conditions of apperception. The possibility of the faculty of 
the understanding itself rests upon pure apperception; the unity in the object of the 
understanding, brought about through synthesis and concept application, is simply 
the unity of pure apperception [B137]. Furthermore, Kant repeatedly stresses 
[B135,BI38] that this principle is analytic: it is analytic that all representations must 
belong to one self-consciousness; in so belonging the representations must be 
synthesisable. Within this synthesis, representations are unified under concepts, and 
this unification involves a judgement upon the representations, relating them 
conceptually. Representations are thereby "brought to the objective unity of 
appercepti on" [B 14 1]14. This argument is deductive in the logical sense, as required 
by Fichte, and (given the Table of Judgements) leads us directly to the categories. 
Upon initial inspection Fichte's second point looks to have much less 
application within the Deduction; Kant expends several sections on the denial that 
the understanding can know any object through the categories alone, much less 
produce the objects of knowledge - "to think an object and to know an object are 
not the same."[B146]15 This, however, is not to invalidate completely the point that 
Fichte makes, for Kant too places the imagination at the service of the 
understanding. The imagination is introduced as "the faculty of representing in 
intuition an object that is not itself presenf'[B151f6. Taken empirically this is 
completely familiar, but the transcendental imagination does not simply have the 
14 
15 
16 
"zur 0 b j e c t i v e n Einheit der Apperception zu bringen". 
"Sich einen Gegenstand den ken, und einen Gegenstand e r ken n en, ist also nicht 
einerlei. " 
"das Vennogen, einen Gegenstand auch 0 h ned e sse n G e g en war t in der 
Anschauung vorzustellen". 
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task of re-presenting a once-given object, rather it synthesises the pure fonTIS of 
intuition. It carries out this task by means of the categories of the understanding 
such that the a priori manifold of sensible intuition is determined a priori "'in 
respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception"[B152f 7• Such a 
determination creates no objects ex nihilo, but it is nonetheless productive. 
If it is this that distinguishes the position of Kant from that of Fichte, then 
Fichte would appear to have the stronger argument, since Kant seems to be relying 
on an appeal to some notion of a thing-in-itself. The object which gives rise the 
intuition cannot itself be an object of knowledge, since objects of knowledge are 
themselves a categorical synthesis of intuitions and, as such, are the form though 
which intuitions are presented. However, the intuition does not arise through its 
presentation as an object of knowledge. Instead, for Kant, the source of intuitions 
appears simply to be that object which is the cause of intuitions, an object itself 
outside of the field of knowledge - an object which introduces a gamut of problems 
that Fichte dissolves. 
The charge of subjectivism, and way in which Kant's response to this in the 
Prolegomena was interpreted" induced the generation following the publication of 
the first Critique to attempt to set the critical philosophy upon new foundations. 
Each of these charges picks up on a common theme that the claims that Kant makes 
for objectivity have no grounds. The first and least sophisticated of these arguments 
proposes that because reality is reduced to appearance, a mere modification of 
ourselves, Kant has no grounds to distinguish between the objective and the illusory. 
Kant's apparent reliance of the notion of things-in-themselves in response to this 
charge does little to dissipate the impression of sophistry. However, the other 
objections do not rely on the blunderbuss of the thing-in-itself to problematise the 
objective status attributed to concepts: rather the subjectivism arises because, it is 
claimed, the application of the transcendental concepts to experience cannot be 
established. The accusation against Kant is that, within his attempt to demonstrate 
the objective validity of the categories, Kant implicitly assumed a certain form of 
experience, namely experience as categorised. It is further claimed that without this 
assumption Kant could only show the subjective necessity of these concepts. In the 
17 
"den Sinn seiner Form nach der Einheit der Apperception gema6 bestimrnen kann" . 
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following sections we shall tum to a more detailed investigation of the arguments 
rallied against Kant. 
4. The Scepticism of Aenesidemus 
Aenesidemus, or Concerning the Foundations of the Philosophy of the 
Elements issued by Prof Reinhold in Jena, together with a defence of Scepticism 
against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason l8 w-as published anon)'mously in 
1792 and marks a turning point in the popularity of Kant's philosophy. All of the 
earlier attacks on Kant had come from sources which were predictable, mainly (in 
Kant's terms) rationalists and enthusiasts. Given that these were the very people 
that Kant had subjected to rigorous criticism, the counter claims that they made 
carried little weight. Aenesidemus, however, came from an unexpected source and 
challenged not only Kant but the possibility of a critical system of philosophy. 
Rather than arguing that Kant had failed to refute the claims to knowledge that are 
made within other systems of philosophy, Schulze accepts these points but refuses 
Kant's claim to be able to establish objective knowledge claims. That is, the critical 
method is accepted, but the critical system is rejected. 
The main thrust of the attack that Aenesidemus makes against Kant is the 
sceptical claim that, at the present moment, it is not possible to make claims to any 
knowledge of things-in-themselves, but it nonetheless remains a completely open 
question as to whether it might be possible for us to obtain knowledge of them in the 
future. The absolute limits that Kant is judged to have placed on human knowledge 
are challenged; and this challenge takes on a critical form, because the question that 
Schulze asks of Kant is 'how is it possible to make the judgement that we can never 
have any knowledge of things-in-themselves?'. Kant obviously thinks that the 
question has already been answered with the Transcendental Expositions of the 
forms of space and time and with the Deduction. What Schulze is therefore 
claiming is that, in the very presentation of the arguments establishing the limits to 
18 [GottJob Ernst Schulze], Aenesidemus oder uber die Fundamente der von dem Herrn 
Professor Reinhold in Jena geliejerten Elementarphilosophie (N.p.: 1792); reprint, ed. A. 
Liebert (Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, 1911). Partial translation by George di Giovanni 
as "Aenesidemus," in From Kant to Hegel, ed. di Giovanni and Harris. Page references 
are to the original edition. The name Aenesidemus is taken from the sceptical follower of 
Sextus Empiricus. Further information on Schulze can be found in Beiser, Reason, 
Chapter 9 and George di Giovanni, "The Facts of Consciousness," in From Kant to Hegel, 
cd. di Giovanni and Harris, 20-7. 
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experience, Kant is going beyond these limits. Schulze is not questioning the criticaJ 
philosophy from the outside, but rather presenting an immanent critique, in a 
language that the critical philosophy has justified, and this is why Schulze's 
criticisms presented such a problem. 
The bulk of the criticisms that Schulze makes about critical philosophy are 
directed at the most renowned Kantian of the time, K. L. Reinhold. 19 Schulze rightly 
acknowledges that there are differences between Kant and Reinhold, but our 
attention will be directed toward the places where he deals specifically with Kant. 
The main point that he has to make in this regard is to challenge the inference that is 
made from experience to the subject of that experience. In other words, the focus of 
Schulze's attack is the argument of the Deduction which attempts to show that there 
could be no experience of objects without a transcendental subject of that experience 
- a transcendental subject that synthesises the manifold of intuition by means of the 
categories,zo The argument is here taken by Schulze to be one which moves from 
the assumption of the possession of coherent experience to asking the question of 
how that ordered experience is possible. Assuming that the manifold of intuition is 
19 Karl Leonhard Reinhold was the first populariser of Kant's critical philosophy. 
However, he was not content with the task of underlabourer and also argued that the first 
Critique, because it fails to justify its o\VTI procedures and assumptions, is nothing more 
than an analysis of a hypothetical justification of metaphysics. Like pre-critical 
metaphysics, the critical philosophy uses concepts which cannot be subject to analysis 
within its own domain. Thus, for example, Reinhold argues that, in investigating the 
conditions under which knowledge is possible, Kant employs the genus concept of 
representation without any investigating of its conditions. It is, therefore, Reinhold's 
claim that, in addition to the first principle of metaphysics, we also need a first principle 
of the critical philosophy which could account for representation. The supposedly self-
evident principle from which philosophy must begin - the Proposition of Consciousness 
- consists in a definition of representation: "Representation is that which is distinguished 
in consciousness by the subject from object and subject, and is referred to both." See his 
t/ber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (Jena: Widtmann und Mauke, 1791); 
reprint, ed. Wolfgang H. Schrader (Hamburg: Meiner, 1978), 81. Partial translation by 
George di Giovanni as "The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge," in From Kant to 
Hegel, ed. di Giovanni and Harris. Background material on Reinhold is provided by 
Daniel BreazeaJe, "Between Kant and Fichte: Karl Leonhard Reinhold's 'Elementary 
Philosophy'," Review o/Metaphysics 35 (1982), passim and Beiser, Reason, Chapter 8. 
20 Although Kant does not employ the term 'transcendental subject' regularly, and not at 
all within either version of the Deduction, it usefully captures the psychological nature of 
Schulze's understanding of Kant. This consists in the identification of the locus of 
synthetic activity with the subject that is self-consciously aware. It is precisely at this 
point that the modem logical interpretation, outlined in the following section, disagrees. 
The conditions of self-consciousness, lvhich it is meaningful to investigate, are analytic 
and give no insight into how it is that the conditions are fulfilled. 
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not gIven as ordered, this order must come from elsewhere, from an act of 
spontaneity. The transcendental subject, the I, is therefore introducing law and 
objectivity to the manifold. Schulze feels that there are three problems with this. 
( 1) The notion that the transcendental subject orders the manifold is illegitimate 
because, in drawing the inference from regularity to a regulator, the objectivity of 
causal laws is presupposed, and it is precisely to prove the objectivity of 
causality that this manoeuvre is carried out in the first place: 
Obviously the writer of the critique of reason arrives at his answer to the 
general problem - How are necessary synthetic propositions possible in 
us? - only by bringing the principle of causality to bear on certain 
judgements that we make after experience. That is, he subsumes these 
judgements under the concept of the effect of something, and, in 
accordance with this subsumption, assumes and discloses that the mind 
[Gemuth] is their effective cause. (Aen 137] 
(2) If the inference is not to be considered one tracing a cause from an effect, then 
all that has been proved is that the existence of the subject of experience is 
necessary for thought, it has not been shown that such a subject is real: 
from the constitution of representations and thoughts in us, the critique 
of reason infers the objective and real constitution of what is external to 
our representations. Alternatively, it proves that something must be 
constituted in some manner or another, because we cannot think of it in 
any other way. It is the validily of exacUy this kind of inference that 
Hume doubted. [Aen 140] 
(3) Even if the argument could legitimately be made from experience to the 
subject of experience, this presupposes a set of experiential facts which must be 
explained by reference to the subject of that experience. In Kant's case he 
presupposes synthetic a priori knowledge, and yet it is Kant's intention to prove 
that we do in fact have experience of this kind - Kant, as Maimon also claims, 
is therefore begging the question: 
It is completely false that these [necessary synthetic] judgements must 
be thought of as available a priori and as originating in the mind in 
order for them to be thought of as possible. ... One can certainly think 
that aU our knowledge [Erkenntnip] originates from the efficacy of 
objects present realiter on our mind (Aen 142-3]. 
It is clear from even this brief outline of the arguments that Schulze has a 
psychological reading of Kant: his claims rest upon an understanding of Kant as 
either making empirical claims about the subject of experience, or about the nature 
of the experience of that subject. This does not make the arguments redundant. 
Rather they serve to give focus to some of the morc obscure and difficult 
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consequences of the critical philosophy, and it was in bringing these obscurities to 
the forefront that Aenesidemus had an effect, at least insofar as they caused Fichte 
to reflect upon them and develop an explicit account of them. 
Throughout the first Critique Kant devotes relatively little attention to 
developing an account of the subject of experience, or as Schulze would have it, the 
mind. Schulze argues, echoing criticisms already advanced by Reinhold,21 that in 
order to understand how it is possible for this undeveloped notion to function as a 
support for the critical syst~ it needs to be filled out in greater detail. [t is already 
clear from possible relationships that can hold between that which determines (the 
transcendental subject) and that which is determined (the manifold of intuition), as 
laid out in the first and second criticisms that Aenesidemus makes, that the options 
will be the following: 
The mind, insofar as according to the critical philosophy it is supposed 
to constitute the source of the necessary in our knowledge, is either to be 
understood as a thing-in-itself, or a noumenon, or a transcendental idea. 
(Aen 154] 
All the possible options open to Kant are divided up into either something 
real or something intellectual. If the transcendental subject is something real th~ 
because it is not an object of experience for us, it is automatically a thing-in-itself 
By thing-in-itself Schulze simply means something that is not conditioned 
intellectually and something that we have no experience of, so his point here is for 
him true by definition. If it is not something real but rather something intellectual, 
then there are two possible ways in which the transcendental subject can be 
understood. If this intellectual I is understood to be a real condition of experience, 
then it is a noumenon (by which Schulze means "intelligible object"[Aen 159] as 
opposed to the real but unknowable thing-in-itself), and if it understood to be merely 
necessary for us to think the I as intellectual, then it is a transcendental ( regulative) 
idea. On the basis of understanding the I as a thing-in-itself, it is understood to be 
"a real and objectively actual thing"[Aen 155]; and this is thought to be necessary 
because it is assumed that the 
real existence [Dasein] of something presupposes the real existence of 
something else, which is the ground of it, and the first can only be 
explained by the second insofar as the ground constitutes something 
existing [Existierendes] realiter. [Aen 154] 
21 Reinhold, Fundarnent, 67~8. 
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On this interpretation of the I it is clear, as Schulze is keen to point out, that 
the notion of causal connections (which are established on the basis of the 
relationship that holds between the transcendental subject and the experience of that 
subject) would have been presupposed before the objective validity of such 
relationships had been established. However, there is no evidence that Kant thinks 
of the conditioning relationship between the I and experience as a causal one. And 
this interpretation forces the I into the position of a thing or entity, which is a point 
that runs directly against the little that Kant does say. On this point we can 
therefore agree with Aenesidemus that Kant would be betraying his own critical 
principles if he were to derive the presence of synthetic a priori judgements in us 
from the I qua thing-in-itself. 
When Schulze turns to consider whether the I could be a noumenon, much 
the same considerations apply, in that this would also make Kant's position self-
contradictory. It is acknowledged that there can be no knowledge of noumena, and 
if the I were to be interpreted in this way then Kant would be "promoting an empty 
thought object [Gedankding] ". to the source of a constituent component of our 
knowledge."[Aen 159] A similar argument is produced in Aenesidemus with respect 
to the I as a transcendental idea. In this case, the I would merely be of regulative 
employment and serve as an a priori unity which experiential knowledge needs in 
order to be, as far as reason is concerned, perfect. No objective reality of the idea 
would be possible, because a regulative idea is not something that is constitutive of 
experience; it must merely be something that serves to produce a coherent 
understanding of experience. Again Kant is perfectly clear that if the regulative 
transcendental ideas are treated as constitutive of experience, then this generates a 
transcendental illusion. Given that a substantial portion of Kant's work (especially 
in the Dialectic) is directed at exposing such illusion for what it is, he would again 
be falling into a contradictory position if this is what he takes the I to be. 
Having outlined these alternatives and having illustrated that each of them is 
internally self-contradictory Schulze acknowledges that nowhere in the '"Critique of 
Pure Reason has Kant declared himself clearly and expressly on this matter."[Aen 
165-6] Rather than this lack of clarity in any way diminishing the force of the 
points that Aenesidemus has made, he feels that it merely strengthens it. Kant was 
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forced into a position of obscurity on this matter because all of the possibilities that 
are open to him are clearly inadequate. 22 
There is a final and significant point that is made in Aenesidemus with 
regard to both of the last two options: 
according to the critique of reason it is a mere illusion., if the 
understanding believes itself, through thought, to have reached the 
objectively actual being [SeinJ, and if it believes that the composition of 
being follows from the determinations proper to thought. Furthermore, 
it is also considered an illusion, arising from the understanding's lack of 
self-knowledge, if one believes oneself to have discovered the proper and 
real ground of necessity, just because the ground of necessity can only be 
thought of as contained in the mind. [Aen 172] 
This point has a more general application in that it forces the I into the position of 
being a thing-in-itself, but as it has already been illustrated this is not a tenable 
position for Kant to hold. Therefore, if this point is right, the whole of the critical 
enterprise is impossible. The fault that he is pointing to is that if, as Kant wants, the 
distinction is maintained between what can be thought and what there can be, then 
the I cannot be elevated to the status of anything other than a condition \vhich we 
think of as necessary for objective experience, and this fails to establish the reality 
of this condition. Without this final stage in Kant's argument, it is not possible to 
move from the I to objective experience and experience would remain subjective. 
Rather than being the condition of possibility for experience in general, the I would 
be the condition of possibility for how we must think about that experience. The 
fact that we need to regard experience as conditioned by the I would not tell us 
whether or not that experience was, in actual fact, so conditioned - and yet this, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, is precisely what is at issue for the Humean sceptic 
and, indeed, for Kant. 
To provide an answer to the question of qUid juris on this subjective basis 
would not give us a right to regard the I as an actual condition of experience, but 
rather it would be merely illustrate that there was an indispensable need or a 
subjective necessity for such a concept. To do other than this would be to fall into 
22 A more recent and influential account of the ambiguities surrounding the Kantian 
subject, which draws conclusions similar to those of Schulze, is given by Peter F. 
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen., 1966), 170-4, 247-9. The 
relationship of Schulze's criticisms to problems raised within recent secondary literature, 
interpretations which avoid these difficulties. and the ambiguities within Kant's own 
account of the subject in the first Critique are detailed throughout Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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error that Kant himself points out in the Transcendental Dialectic: of hypostatising 
the conditions of thought as a being, positing an entity that corresponds to the 
thought-object. Alternatively, if critical consistency were to be maintained, then the 
discussion would turn away from discussing real conditions of possibility and 
become merely an exercise in conceptual analysis without any real content. This is 
a potentially devastating criticism because, 
if all grounds, which the critique of reason offers for the origin of the 
necessary synthetic propositions in the mind, are to be merely subjective 
grounds, which one and all stem from the already present 
determinations of our mode of thought, ... then one can indeed ask: 
What could the results of these grounds be other than a semblance 
[Schein], appropriate for and corresponding to the laws of our 
knowledge? And this semblance is meant to lead to a true insight into 
the explanation of our entire knowledge? (Aen 175] 
Kant seems to have been placed between a rock and a hard place: either it is 
admitted that the I is not merely subjective and it can therefore serve as an objective 
ground of experience - in which case Kant would be claiming to have knowledge of 
a thing-in-itself- or, if Kant is consistent in not claiming to have any knowledge of 
things-in-themselves, then the I is merely subjective and formal ground for 
experience - in which case the objective reality of the categories has not been 
established. In terms of our previous outline of Kant's argument, the objections 
proposed by Schulze target the contention that the knowledge that Kant lays claim to 
in accounting for the conditions of self-consciousness does not constitute a 
knowledge of the mind as it is in itself. Schulze's claim is that the transcendental 
can only be elucidated on the presupposition that we have knowledge of the mind as 
it is in itself. Thus, in a manner reminiscent of Jacobi's objection to the role that 
things-in-themselves play for Kant, Schulze makes knowledge of the mind as it is in 
itself necessary for the objective validity of the categories. Although this contradicts 
both the spirit and letter of transcendental philosophy, without this knowledge all 
claims to have justified synthetic a priori judgements must be relinquished. 
5. Transcendental Arguments as Subjective and Circular 
The objections raised in Aenesidemus are not merely a matter of historical 
interest. During the last thirty years there has been a vocal debate concerning the 
possibility of, what has come to be called, 'transcendental arguments'. This debate 
was largely triggered by the claims made for these arguments by P. F. Strawson in 
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Individuals and reinforced in his The Bounds of Sense. Strawson was concerned to 
advance a particular kind of anti-sceptical argument which is summed up in the 
claim that the sceptic '"pretends to accept a conceptual scheme, but at the same time 
quietly rejects one of the conditions of its employment. ,,23 Within this context the 
purpose of the transcendental argument is to demonstrate that the position of the 
sceptic is inherently self-contradictory, because the ground of his scepticism is only 
possible on the assumption of the very thing that he rejects: the sceptic, in effect, 
denies the existence of the tree which supports the branch upon which he sits. The 
clearest case of an argument with this form in Kant is to be found in the Refutation 
of Idealism, presented in the second edition of the first Critique, where it is claimed 
that the sceptical denial of an experience of outer objects is incoherent because this 
experience is a condition of possibility of the inner experience to which the sceptic 
lays claim. 
An argumentative strategy such as this suffers from the problem that it 
establishes only that there exists some inconsistency within a particular set of 
propositions rather than establishing the necessity and validity of a particular set of 
concepts. Hence, it provides an answer to a sceptic, but not to sceptics or 
revisionary metaphysicians in general. Indeed, it is argued that the same objection 
has equal applicability to the argument advanced in the Deduction. 24 At its most 
general, the objection is that Kant cannot successfully demonstrate that any concept 
has objective validity; the most he can do is to describe the necessary relations 
inherent in some conceptual scheme without establishing the necessity of that 
scheme itself. This contention has manifested itself in two principal forms. The 
first is advanced by Barry Stroud and consists of the assertion that the claims to 
objectivity advanced within transcendental arguments, can be reduced to the 
application of a verification principle.25 The second form is raised by Moltke S. 
23 Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), 35. 
24 This line of criticism is pursued in most detail and in a form that we shall not be 
concentrating on by Stephan Komer, "The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions," 
in Kant Studies Today, cd. L. W. Beck (La Salle, lllinois: Open Court, 1969); Rudiger 
Bubner, "Kant, Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Deduction," Review of 
Metaphysics 28 (1975); Richard Rorty, "Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments," 
Nous 5 (1971) and "Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and Pragmatism," in 
Transcendental Arguments and SCience, cd. Peter Bieri, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and 
Lorenz KrUger (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979). 
25 Stroud's argument takes a number of different forms and is advanced in numerous 
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Gram who argues that there is nothing distinctive about transcendental arguments 
and that they are merely deductive arguments which contain some question-begging 
. . . 26 
eplstennc premIse. There is no internal conflict between these objections, they are 
both ways of describing how transcendental arguments fail: they can either fail by 
relying on the questionable use ofverificationism, or they can fail by being circular. 
The requirement of a transcendental argument to employ some 
verificationist principle issues from the demand that these arguments establish the 
objectivity of some concept or set of concepts. 27 Within the debate surrounding 
transcendental arguments it is generally supposed that the advocates of 
transcendental arguments take this objectivity to follow from the necessity of 
concepts. That is, if a concept can be shown to be a necessary condition of 
experience or, since the discussion has also migrated into Wittgensteinian territory, a 
necessary condition of language, then that concept has objective validity. The 
problem posed by Stroud is that this by itself does not constitute an answer to the 
sceptic because the sceptic can 
plausibly insist that it is enough to make language [or experience] 
possible if we believe that S is true, or if it looks for all the world as if it 
papers. See, for example, Barry Stroud, "Transcendental Arguments," Journal of 
Philosophy 65 (1968); "Transcendental Arguments and "Epistemological Naturalism'," 
Philosophical Studies 31 (1977); "Kant and Skepticism," in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. 
Myles Burnyeat (London: U of California Press, 1983); The Significance of Philosophical 
Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), Chapter 4; "The Allure of Idealism." Supp. Proc. 
Aristotelian SOCiety 58 (1984). 
26 Moltke S. Gram, "Transcendental Arguments," Nous 5 (1971); "Must Transcendental 
Arguments be Spurious?" Kant-Studien 65 (1974); '''Must we revisit Transcendental 
ArgumentsT' Philosophical Studies 31 (1977). 
27 Stroud's definition of verificationism is that it maintains that some sentence is 
meaningful "if and only if it is verifiable or falsifiable at least to some degree, and the 
confirmation or disconfirmation ultimately comes from sense~xperience," Philosophical 
Scepticism, 171. The conflict between verificationism and transcendental arguments 
arise, however, from the distinction made by R Carnap between questions internal and 
external to a "linguistic framework." See, for example, his "Empiricism, Semantics and 
Ontology," in Meaning and lvTecessity, 2nd ed. (London: Chicago UP, 1956), 206. 
Carnap, for Stroud, stands opposed to Kant because the questions which the 
transcendental argument is meant to answer, such as those concerning the existence of 
external objects, are not theoretical questions answerable within a linguistic framework, 
but rather practical decisions regarding the choice of framework. It is thereby, according 
to Carnap, meaningless to propose to provide any theoretical justification for the belief in 
external objects because "'there is no such belief or assertion or assumption, because it is 
not a theoretical question" ibid., 208. A sympathetic discussion of the relationship 
between Carnap's notion of a framework and Kant's notion of the transcendental is 
provided by Graham Bird, "'Kant's Transcendental Idealism," in Idealism P~.,{ and 
Present, ed. Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982),87-92. 
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is, but that S needn't actually be true.28 
If the sceptic can undermine a transcendental argument in this fashion, then 
the most that can possibly have been established is that some concepts possess 
subjective necessity, but not that there is any correlation between the concepts and 
whatever it is that they are applied to. It is at this point that it becomes necessary 
for the transcendental argument to introduce some kind of verificationism in order to 
establish a link between the satisfaction of the subjectively necessary criteria and the 
knowledge that those criteria have application. With regard to the main target of 
Stroud's analysis, Strawson's argument for the continued existence of unperceived 
objects,29 this means that it is necessary for Straws on to draw not merely upon the 
capacity for identification and re-identification of objects, but also to assume that we 
can know that the application of this capacity can be successful. The employment 
of a transcendental argument is thereby rendered redundant because it is from the 
initial premise that we can successfully re-identify objects that the argument 
proceeds, and it can proceed deductively from this point to the conclusion that 
objects continue to exist unperceived. 30 
Stroud himself does not attempt to provide any detailed account of how 
verificationism manifests itself in Kant's own arguments, but if we consider the 
schematic account of the conditions that Kant is imputing to self-consciousness, then 
we can see at \vhich point it is supposed that Kant's arguments fail. 31 Upon first 
glance it looks as if the application of Stroud's objection to Kant is somewhat 
tenuous. Regarding the overarching claim that the conditions of self-consciousness 
themselves have been satisfied, it is not at all clear that any meaningful distinction 
could be drawn between the belief and the fact of self-consciousness. 
Similar considerations apply to the condition that the manifold of intuition 
be synthesised. This first condition can be glossed with the argument that if each 
representation in the manifold of intuition were to be discretely apprehended, then 
28 Stroud,. "Transcendental Arguments," 255. 
29 Strawson, Individuals, passim. 
30 For a defence of Strawson's argument against Stroud see Eckart Forster, "How are 
Transcendental Arguments Possible?" in Reading Kant, ed. Eva Schaper and Wilhelm 
Vossenkuhl (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 14-18. However, Strawson in his later Skepticism 
and Naturalism (London: Methuen, 1985), 5-10, 20-22, appears to accept the limitations 
placed on transcendental arguments by Stroud. 
31 See above p.36. 
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the consciousness of this manifold would itself be discrete. Such awareness could, it 
is further supposed, never constitute self-consciousness because this requires that 
one be conscious of oneself as the subject of multiple representations. It is, 
therefore, necessary that there be some relations which pertain within the manifold 
of intuition for the 'I think' to be able to accompany any of the representations 
within the manifold. A consideration of the validity and detail of this argument can 
be postponed for the moment, because all that is at issue, for the present, is whether 
it is possible to draw a distinction between an apparent and a real synthesis of 
representations. The separation of the real and the apparent in this case cannot be 
maintained, because the conditions under which it is possible for it to seem as if 
there is a synthesis, or a belief in a synthesis to arise, are the same as the conditions 
under which a real synthesis also takes place. That is, if we take it that in order to 
believe in synthesis it is necessary for there to be an awareness of more than a single 
discrete item, i.e., one must also be aware of something that it is taken to be 
synthesised with or aware of some manifold that it has been synthesised from, then 
some synthesis must really have taken place simply insofar as multiple items are 
held together in a single consciousness. 
Regarding the other conditions, however, it does appear as if they are 
vulnerable to Stroud's objection that some form of verification is required for Kant's 
argument. Kant's reasoning behind the claim that the manifold of intuition must be 
subject to a conceptual synthesis is amongst the most opaque parts of the already 
murky argument of the Deduction. Between the first and second editions of the 
Critique the argument is subject to substantial revisions, and, furthermore, it is 
mediated by the widely dismissed distinction, introduced in the Prolegomena, 
between judgements of perception and judgements of experience.32 In both editions 
Kant appears to introduce the need for concepts on the basis of an analytic 
relationship between objects and concepts: "an object is that in the concept of which 
the manifold of a given intuition is united."[B137]33 A partial reconstruction of an 
32 For an overview of the secondary literature dealing with this problem see Theodore E. 
Uehling Jr, "Wahrnehmungsurteile and Erfahrungsurteile Reconsidered," in Kant's 
"Prolegomena, ., ed. Be!)'l Logan. 
33 "0 b j e c t aber ist das, in dessen Begriff das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen 
Anschauung v ere i n i g t ist." 
The corresponding argument in the A-edition is found at A103-4. 
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argument by which Kant could justify this claim can be seen in the distinction that 
Kant makes between the objective and the subjective unity of consciousness 
[B139].34 
Kant appears to hold that there is a subjective unity of consciousness which 
can arise from the association of intuition, without the need for any categorical 
intervention. Exactly what Kant has in mind is difficult to determine, except to say 
that it is possible for there to be some associations between representations in the 
manifold, and that this is taken to introduce some regularity into the manifold. Here, 
however, there is no consciousness of the intuitions as representations of objects 
within which the subjective associations are united: e.g., a bright-type intuition is 
associated with a wann-type intuition, without there being the recognition of an 
object with the properties of being warm and bright - '';the perceptions find 
themselves customarily so combined," but have no objective relationship or 
"necessary connection" to one another. [IV 301f5 If this is the case, then not only is 
there no distinction to be made here between intuition and the object represented in 
the intuition, but there is also no distinction between the representation and the 
subject to which that representation occurs. This is for the reason that there are only 
discrete associated items without an awareness of the association. Whereas within 
the objective unity of consciousness, the consciousness of the association itself 
unites the discrete associated intuitions. Furthermore, this is to judge them to be 
something and to unite the intuitions under a concept. 
Although this is merely presents the broad outline of an argument, we can 
already see that that it remains possible for Stroud to object that all that has been 
shown is that it is only necessary for us to employ concepts, not that this 
employment is, in fact, the source of the unity which allows for self-consciousness. 
In other words, it is not necessary that the employment of concepts actually does the 
work of synthesising the manifold. It is enough that it seems as if concepts can be 
applied to experience, because the unity of the manifold is necessary, but such unity 
does not establish that concepts actually are employed, because the source of the 
unity could lie elsewhere. 
34 This point is subject to more detailed investigation in Chapter 3, pp. 91-95. 
35 "die Wahrnehmungen finden sich nUT gewohnlich so verbunden .... noth ,,,c ndig 
verknupff' . 
·55· 
If we cannot be guaranteed that the synthetic unity of the manifold of 
intuition follows from the result of a conceptual synthesis, then the necessity which 
Kant attributes to this synthesis also cannot be certain. It could, for example, 
merely be a fortunate accident that the manifold is given in such a unified and 
regular manner that self-consciousness is possible, but this unity and regularity 
cannot be legislated for in advance.36 
Similarly, the criticism levelled by Gram is also aimed at showing that Kant 
cannot close the gap between concepts and intuitions. It is Gram's contention that 
Kant must either beg the question by invoking a premise which assumes that the 
objects of experience have already been subject to a conceptual synthesis, or if what 
he terms a weaker notion of experience is employed, then the need for there to be 
any concept application, which would open the way for the objectivity of the 
categories, cannot be established. This objection stems from Kant's description of a 
proposition which lays claim to a transcendental status as having the peculiar 
character "that it makes possible the very experience which is its own ground of 
proof'[A7371B765]. In the proof of such a proposition it is therefore necessary to 
employ a premise like "S knows (perceives) that p. ,m 
The first point made by Gram is that the conclusion cannot follow merely 
from the subordinate clause of such an epistemic premise, because this would result 
36 As Rorty points out in his "Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and 
Pragmatism," 90-5, the defence of transcendental arguments undertaken by Jay F. 
Rosenberg in his "Transcendental Arguments Revisited," The Journal of Philosophy 72 
(1975) and "Reply to Stroud," Philosophical Studies 31 (1977), does little to mitigate the 
objections raised by Stroud. Rosenberg conceives of the task of a transcendental argument 
as defending a particular conceptual core against a competing one by means of a 
comparison as to there success in contributing to some epistemic end. See 
"Transcendental Arguments Revisited," 620-2. This could legitimate the practice of 
transcendental arguments even as Stroud conceives them, but cannot provide any 
definitive answer to the question of whether a Kant is right to claim that the categories are 
universal, necessary and objectively valid. A rather different approach which also 
divorces transcendental arguments from claims regarding the relationship between 
conceptual schemes and an independent reality is presented by Ralph C. S. Walker, 
"'Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism," in Reading Kant, ed. Eva Schaper and 
Wilhelm Vossenkuhl. 
37 Gram, '''Must transcendental Arguments be Spurious?," 305. Gram calls premises such 
as this one "epistemic' and, in "Transcendental Arguments," 22, they are defined as 
claims "about how we know something under a certain description." This is spelt out by 
Gram, ibid., 'with regard to the example of Kant's Refutation of Idealism: 
"The existence of something that is permanent through time does not, then, follow 
merely from the existence of successive perceptions. It must follow, if at a1l, from a 
fact about how we know these perceptions." 
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in nothing more than an elucidation of the implications of the ""concepts involved in 
describing what we perceive". 38 Given that any of the results of this analysis could 
equally well be arrived at via a consideration p without reference to the epistemic 
main clause, it cannot be Kant's intention to prove the validity of synthetic a priori 
propositions in this fashion. The argument must therefore centre on an epistemic 
aspect of the premise: on how something is known, rather the description of what is 
known. As Gram points out, Kant employs the tenn 'experience' [Erfahrnng] in 
two distinct ways.39 It can refer either to the awareness of objects as appearances 
subsumed under a necessary synthesis according to the categories, or to the objects 
presented in intuition without any conceptual mediation. 40 Neither of these 
alternatives allows us to reach the conclusion that concepts can have objective 
validity in a satisfactory manner because, Gram argues, if the first strong sense of 
experience is employed, then Kant will have produced nothing more than a definition 
of an object ,\rithout demonstrating that anything correlates to this definition. 
Alternatively, if the weak notion of experience is used, then Kant can only 
demonstrate that it is a subjective condition of our experiencing that we employ 
concepts without showing that objects themselves confonn to the concepts (i.e. the 
concepts are subjectively necessary but without objective validity). In this case 
there remains a gulf between "what can be shown about the conditions of knowing 
something and the characteristics of what is knO\\'I1'>4I. The only possible arguments 
that Kant can advance on this reading are, therefore, either circular or establish only 
the subjective necessity of concepts.42 
38 Gram, "Must transcendental Arguments be Spurious?," 305. 
39 See also Michel Meyer, "Why Did Kant Write Two Versions of the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories?" Synthese 47 (1981), for an analysis of the problems that 
Kant encounters because he, allegedly, employs the tenn experience in two conflicting 
ways. 
40 The two distinct notions of experience first arise on the first paragraph of the second 
edition introduction. A clearer contrast, however, is to be found between B 161 and 
A911B123. 
41 Gram, "Must transcendental Arguments be Spurious?," 313. 
42 In "Transcendental Argunlents: Gram's Objections," Kant-Studien 68 (1977), 71-4, 
Oliver Leaman responds to the Gram by claiming that the distinction that he makes 
between a strong and a weak sense of ex.'Perience is a spurious one because the weak sense 
is already conceptually invested and, therefore, that there are valid transcendental 
argUDlents cannot be ruled out. Leaman's argUDlent, however, does not extricate Kant 
from the charges levelled by Gram. Leaman's claim is that the notion of perceiving an 
object makes no sense in the absence of some conceptual rendering of that experience. It 
is, hO"wever, precisely Gram's point that from subjective need for us to regard experience 
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In a more recent article by Quassim Cassam the danger of the Kant's 
arguments acting as a confirmation of Hume rather than a refutation is explicitly 
thematised.43 The point made by Cassam is that the place where Kant oversteps the 
boundary of acceptable argumentation is precisely the point at which he seeks to 
determine the nature of the synthesis that the manifold of intuition is subject to, and 
the point at which Kant claims to establish that this synthesis is universal and 
necessary. The difficulties raised by both Stroud and Gram centre around the 
problems that Kant faces in moving from an analysis of the subjective conditions of 
experience to the objective validity of the categories. If Kant can only successfully 
delineate the subjective conditions of experience, then it would remain possible for 
him to argue that one of the conditions is that there is degree of unity within the 
manifold of intuition, but what he cannot establish is that there is unity because this 
is a condition of experience. This is perfectly compatible with the, as Cassam calls 
it, "broadly Humean,,44 perspective which attributes a principle of union to ideas, 
such that when 
ev'ry individual of any species of objects is found by experience to be 
constantly united with an individual of another species, the appearance 
of any new individual of either species naturally conveys the thought to 
its usual attendant. rT 93] 
This principle lies, according to Hume, at the basis of our reasoning concerning 
cause and effect, but there is no a priori guarantee that objects will present 
themselves in such a way as to be compatible with this princIple. We can neither 
know that there will be species of objects nor that there will be any constant union 
between them. All that we can say is that if we have experience it will be ordered. 
6. Burne and Kant Revisited 
In the previous chapter it was argued that the maintenance of the objective 
as conceptualised nothing follows regarding the nature of that experience. The response 
to both Stroud and Gram offered by A. C. Genova in "Good Transcendental Arguments," 
Kant-Studien 75 (1984), which broadly accords with the interpretation of the Deduction 
advanced in later chapters, is discussed on pp. 68-70. The defence offered by Bird, 
"Kant's Transcendental Arguments," in Reading Kant, ed. Eva Schaper and Wilhelm 
Vossenkuhl, who reviews the debate surrounding transcendental arguments, and in 
particular the pertinence of the relationship between Kant and Hume in this regard, is 
discussed in the same place. 
".~ Quassim Cas sam, "Transcendental Arguments, Transcendental Synthesis and 
Transcendental Idealism," The Philosophical Quarter~y 37 (1987). 
44 Ibid., 370. 
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validity of the categories was essential for an understanding of the distinctiveness of 
Kant's position in relation to Hume. However, we have now turned full circle. If 
the objections to Kant's programme presented in this chapter cannot be assuaged, 
then the only valid arguments that Kant can present also undermine any means by 
which Hume's arguments can be advanced upon. This can be made clear bv 
reconsidering the criteria suggested at the end of the previous chapter which Kant 
must meet if he is to be successful in providing an answer to Hume's problem. 
These were that (1) Kant cannot beg any questions against the sceptical opponent; 
(2) the transcendental cannot be assimilated with the psychological; (3) the validity 
of the synthetic a priori as a category must be maintained; (4) Kant must establish 
that experience is necessarily conceptually mediated. 45 
The problems raised in this chapter have a thematic unity, in that each 
presents an argument to the effect that unless Kant falls foul of (1) then at least one 
of the other criteria cannot be fulfilled. Although each of the objections can be seen 
to have pertinence to at least one the criteria, we can, in the interest of clarity, 
present a ledger of the debts that Kant will incur if he does not beg the question 
against the sceptic. By associating each of the major objections raised with one of 
the other criteria, we see that in the case of Aenesidemus the pay-off is between (1) 
and (2), with Stroud it is (1) and (3), and for Gram it is (1) and (4). 
With regard to Schulze the conflict arises because he disallows the 
supposition that we can know that experience already has a form prescribed by the 
transcendental concepts. Schulze then regards it as necessary to appeal to some 
knowledge of how the mind is in itself, in order to differentiate between the cases of 
it merely being necessary to think the manifold as categorised and it actually being 
so categorised. In this case, the method by which Kant moves from the subjective 
claim regarding how we must think about experience to the objective nature of that 
experience, is mediated by a claim to knowledge which is itself dismissed by Schulze 
as illegitimate in terms of the critical philosophy. We can only know that the 
manifold is categorised because we know something about our own minds, namely, 
that the mind as it is in itself acts as the cause of the synthetic unity of the manifold 
45 See Chapter 1, p. 28 for the original discussion. The order of the presentation of the 
criteria is slightly altered here for the sake of a clear mapping to the order of objections as 
they have arisen in this chapter. 
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of intuition. 
The reasoning behind Stroud's objection is similar, in that it also arises out 
of the difficulty in moving from subjective necessity to objective validity. Here, 
however, an alternative account of the problem presents itself. Rather than seeing 
Kant as making invalid psychological claims, Stroud takes Kant to be elucidating a 
set of fundamental propositions which are logically entailed by non-theoretical 
commitments to a particular linguistic framework. If this is correct, then conflict 
arises between (I) and (3) because it is not possible for Kant to establish anything 
about the real nature of experience from within the linguistic framework. This 
means that if Kant is to claim the universality and necessity of the categories, he 
must simply be assuming that the framework and the manifold are congruous. Kant, 
then, has simply misconstrued the nature of the necessity dealt with by 
transcendental arguments; he can establish necessary commitments within a 
linguistic framework but not, as he wishes to, the necessity of the framework itself. 
To make such a claim is to beg the question that the sceptic poses. 46 
In highlighting the distinction between the conditions of knowing and the 
conditions of the known, Gram is also demonstrating that there is a conflict benveen 
the criteria which Kant attempts to fulfil. Unless the epistemic premise of the 
transcendental argument already contains some question-begging reference to 
experience as conceptually ordered, the necessity for concepts remains restricted to 
the domain of subjective validity. In the absence of such an ordering, it remains 
possible for Kant to propose some delimitation as to the nature of the experience 
that it is possible for us to have (given that it must be sufficiently ordered that the 
subjective conditions can be met), but Kant goes astray in equating the source of the 
order with the subjective conditions. The validity attributed to the categories also 
follows from Kant's confusion regarding the domain of the necessities in experience 
that he can account for. In this case the subjective necessity that we think 
experience as conceptually mediated is confused with the claim that the manifold 
must be so ordered that these subjective conditions can be met. Kant attempts to 
legislate for the nature of the manifold, and this he cannot do without making 
46 For an analysis that also proceeds along these lines, although using a distinction 
between uniquely a priori and non-uniquely a priori statements, see KomeL "The 
Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions," 234--6. 
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presuppositions as to what its nature is in itself 
Each of these accounts reinforces the single point that, insofar as Kant 
manages to distinguish himself from Hume and to provide an answer to Hume's 
problem, his position becomes in some way or other incoherent. We have seen that 
the difficulties faced by Kant's proposed solution are neither recent nor transitory, 
but rather embedded in the reception of the Kantian philosophy from its very 
inauguration. In the next two chapters an interpretation of the Transcendental 
Deduction is advanced. This interpretation is specifically orientated around the 
question of whether Kant successfully establishes that it is possible for concepts to 
have objective validity rather than being merely subjectively necessary. We shall be 
dividing our analysis into two parts. Within the first (Chapter 3) the problems 
associated with Stroud and Gram are tackled, and it is shown that the argument of 
the Deduction is not limited in scope by making question-begging assumptions 
regarding the framework or nature of experience. This analysis, however, raises the 
questions posed by Schulze regarding the nature of the subject of experience. In the 
second part of the analysis (Chapter 4), the coherence of Kant's account of the 
subject is investigated. Eventually we shall conclude that the apparent oscillation 
between begging the question with regard to the nature of experience, and begging 
the question \\ith regard to the nature of the subject, rests on mistaken 
interpretations of the Kantian subject. A detailed analysis of the Transcendental 
Deduction is, however, necessary before this can become clear. 
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Chapter Three 
Kant's Transcendental Deduction 
1. Introd uction 
The conclusion that we have reached on the basis of both of the preceding 
chapters is, on the one hand, that it is Kant's argument that concepts have objective 
validity that provides the crucial point of demarcation in the relationship between 
Kant and Hume and, on the other, that there is a weight of argumentation to suggest 
that it is precisely at this point that the Kantian project is at its weakest. The first 
section of this chapter considers the claim advanced by both Kant's detractors and 
advocates that the argument for the objective validity of the categories has been 
deemed to be a failure without considering the context of transcendental idealism in 
which the argument is advanced. The remainder of the chapter, however, presents 
an account of the Transcendental Deduction where Kant draws only minimally upon 
the tenets of transcendental idealism. It is argued that the Deduction offers a 
coherent and defensible argument for why associationism must be supplemented by 
an a priori conceptual synthesis. Contrary to the arguments of Stroud, Gram and 
Cassam, it is concluded that the Deduction successfully establishes that this 
synthesis of the manifold of intuition is a transcendental condition of the possibility 
of experience and that Kant neither draws on a question-begging notion of 
experience nor limits himself to how experience must, as a matter of subjective 
necessity, be regarded. 
Our reconstruction of the Deduction divides Kant's argument into four 
steps. The first step, outlined in Section 3. 1, consists simply in an description of 
what is designated by Kant's notion of the manifold of intuition. It is Kant's initial 
claim that there must be some synthesis of the manifold of intuition if there is to be 
the requisite diversity of representations upon which associationism can build. 
Kant's point here is entirely general in scope and indicates that the diversity of 
intuitive content can only be experienced under the condition that the manifold of 
intuition has already been subject to a synthesis which relates it across time. As 
such, Kant's answer to the question of how intuitions came to be united is different 
from the answers that the associationists - and Hume - provided. 
The remainder of Kant's argument is an attempt to demonstrate, firstly, that 
the representation of this synthesis cannot be accounted for on the basis of 
associationism and, secondly, that concepts can be validly employed in this 
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representation. In the second step of the argument, described in Section 3.2, Kant 
shows the representation of objects requires a unity of consciousness. That is to 
say, if the manifold of intuition is subject to a synthesis which ascribes an objective 
ground to the resultant unity of the manifold, then it must be possible for the -I 
think' to accompany the representation. The significance of this claim becomes 
apparent in the third step, presented in Section 3.3, where it is argued that it is only 
under the condition of the employment of a conceptual synthesis that objective 
representation is possible. Together these points constitute an argument to the effect 
that there is a correlation between what Kant terms the objective unity of 
consciousness and the experience of objects, and that it is only under the condition 
of a conceptually determined synthesis that either of these can arise. However, it 
remains to be established whether the employment of concepts itself has any 
validity, i.e. the attribution of an objective ground to the synthesis of the manifold 
may be illegitimate. It is only in the final step of the argument, undertaken in 
Section 3.4, that the possibility that a conceptual determination is mistakenly or 
invalidly applied to mere association is ruled out. Kant establishes this point by 
showing that the synthesis described in the first step can be legitimately represented 
by concepts. In total, therefore, the argument demonstrates that the awareness that 
we have of the diversity of the manifold of intuition upon which associationism 
builds can only occur under the condition that the categories have objective validity. 
2. Transcendental Idealism and Objectivity 
Although the point is made in different ways, Stroud, Gram and Cas sam 
each raise the question of whether Kant's Transcendental Deduction can establish 
that the pure concepts of the understanding have objectivity. We have seen that with 
Stroud the problem is posed in terms of his distinction between the necessity for a 
belief in a concept and the necessity that the concept relate to some objective fact; 
with Gram the distinction is between the conditions under which something is known 
and the characteristics of the known; and with Cassam the distinction is between a 
conditional and an unconditional necessity of the synthesis of the manifold of 
intuition. Rather than challenging the need for there to be some synthesis in order 
for experience to be possible, each of these distinctions only has pertinence to 
questions regarding the nature or manner of the s}nthesis which is necessary for 
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expenencc. 
As was outlined in the previous chapter, Kant is not merely claiming that it 
is necessary for us to be able to employ concepts if we are to ha\e any self-
conscious experience. l He also intents to establish that this conceptualisation is 
legitimate, and not merely a subjective necessity. because it is this capacity \\·hich 
guarantees that the manifold of intuition will display sufficient characteristics of 
unity that are the condition of us having a self-conscious awareness of that manifold. 
In other words, Kant is committed to the view that the unity of the manifold is a 
condition of our being self-consciously a\\"are of it, and that this unity must have a 
specifically conceptual form. It is \vith regard to this latter point that Stroud, Gram 
and Cassam raise the challenge of hmv Kant can support the claim to conceptual 
unity. Stroud's objection is that it is necessary for Kant to invoke some 
verificationist principle~ Gram's is that Kant must either simply assume the 
conceptual nature of the unity or admit that the ability apply concepts to experience 
is merely a subjective condition of that experience: and Cassam' s is that Kant has 
not provided an answer to Hume' s problem. 
The difficulty that Kant is said to encounter in each case can be made 
clearer by considering the distinction, drawn by Cas sam. between a "Conceptual" 
and a "Satisfaction Component" of Kant's argument.2 In C.assam·s terms. on the 
basis of a conceptual analysis of the notion of e:x.rperience the Conceptual 
Component of an argument establishes claims regarding that which is constitutive of 
experience. In other words, the Conceptual Component makes the claim that it is a 
necessary aspect of experience that \\'e be able to apply some particular concept to 
expenence. The Satisfaction Component, on the other hand. describes the 
conditIOns that must pertain if it is to be possible for the conditions outlined in the 
Conceptual Component to be met. When this distinction is applied to the argument 
of the Deduction, CassanI finds that the Conceptual Component is the claim that 
"for experience or knowledge to be possible. individual e:x.rperiences must belong to a 
unified consciousness". On the other hand, the Satisfaction Component is that, 
for the unity of consciousness to be possible. appearances must display 
such unity and interconnectedness as is possible only if they arc 
appearances of objects. That is. only experience of objects could provide 
I See. Chapter 2. pp. 55-56. 
2 Cassaro, 'Transcendental Arguments:' 357 . 
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a basis for the unity of consciousness.3 
The difficulty that Cassam raises with regard to this argument is not that 
there is any inherent problem with it such that we can rule out the possibility of such 
an argument ever being valicL but rather the particular manner in which Kant 
advances the argument places an impossible demand upon it. As we have already 
saicL it is not sufficient for Kant that it is a merely contingent fact that the , .... orld is 
such that conditions outlined in the Satisfaction Component are met. 4 It is not only 
conditionally necessary that intuitions be unified in order that we can have any 
experience, but it is also necessary that they be unified per se. According to 
Cassam, Kant provides no actual argument for this latter point in either the 
Deduction itself or elsewhere. Kant's commitment to the unconditional necessity of 
the unity derives, rather, from his overarching commitment to transcendental 
idealism.s According to Cassam's interpretation, Kant intends to form a bridge 
between the Conceptual and the Satisfaction Components with the assertion that the 
world described in the Satisfaction Component is not the world of things as they are 
in themselves, but rather the world of appearances.6 From this assumption, it is 
possible for Kant to claim that we can be guaranteed that the conditions of the 
Satisfaction Component will always pertain precisely because they are provided by 
the Conceptual Component. The world must conform to the conditions under which 
we can experience it because these conditions are, at one and the same time, the 
conditions of the world. The point at which problems arise for Kant, therefore, is 
the point at which he attempts to step beyond the description of conditions of 
possibility of experience and attempts to ascribe an unconditional necessity to these 
conditions being satisfied. That Kant does this is clearly evident in passages such as 
the following: 
Now if this unity of association had not also an objective ground which 
makes it impossible that appearances should be apprehended by the 
imagination othen\1.se than under the condition of a possible synthetic 
unity of this apprehension, it would be entirely accidental that 
appearances should fit into a connected whole of human knowledge. 
For even though we should have the power of associating perceptions, it 
would remain entirely undetermined and accidental whether they would 
themselves be associable; and should they not be associable, there might 
3 Ibid., 361. 
4 See, for example, Chapter 2, pp. 58 and 60. 
S A similar point is also made by Stroud, '"The Allure of Idealism," 249. 
6 An example of this would be the Al 14 passage quoted on p. 36. 
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exist a multitude of perceptions, and indeed an entire sensibility, in 
which much empirical consciousness would arise in my mind, but in a 
state of separation, and without belonging to a consciousness of myself. 
This, however, is impossible. [AI21-2) 
IWiirde nun aber diese Einheit der Association nicht auch einen 
objectiven Grund haben, so daB es UIlIIlOglich ware, daB Erscheinungen 
von der Einbildungskraft anders apprehendirt wfirden, als unler der 
Bedingung einer moglichen synthetischen Einheit dieser Apprehension, 
so wtirde es auch etwas ganz Zufalliges sein, dafi sich Erscheinungen in 
einen Zusammenhang der menschlichen Erkenntnisse schickten. Denn 
ob wir gleich das Vennogen hatten, Wahrnebmungen zu associiren, so 
bliebe es doch an sich ganz unbestimmt und zufaIlig, ob sie auch 
associabel waren; und in dem Falle, daB sie es Dicht waren, so wfirde 
eine Menge Wahrnehmungen und auch wohl eine ganze Sinnlichkeit 
moglich sein, in welcher viel empirischen Bewu6tsein in meincm 
Gemuth anzutreffen ware, aber getrennt und ohne daB es zu e i n e m 
Bewu6tsein meiner selbst gehorte, welches aber unmoglich ist.] 
If Kant's argument rests upon the claim that there is an objective ground to 
the unity displayed in experience, then Cas sam judges this to be a failure. 7 Cassam 
correctly points out that the objective ground of association is provided by \vhat 
Kant terms a 'transcendental' or 'productive' synthesis. Such a synthesis is 
distinguished from the merely associative or empirical synthesis in that it unites 
intuitions in such a way that it becomes possible for any given intuition to be 
associable with some other intuition. Borrowing from Strawson, Cassam, therefore, 
characterises the task of transcendental synthesis as producing the "connectedness 
of perceptions. ,08 Given that Kant does not intend to imply that this synthesis 
produces perceptions as connected, i.e., it is not the case that Kant thinks of 
transcendental synthesis as productive "rjth regard to the matter of intuition itself, he 
must, according to Cassam, assume that the matter of experience has a peculiarly 
characterless nature, such that it is in every case possible for the transcendental 
s}nthesis to introduce the possibility of connections within it. In other words, if 
Cassam's view is correct, Kant must simply assume that matter is given in a 
sufficiently characterless state that it can never interrupt the work of the 
transcendental synthesis. As Cassam points out, there appears to be no justification 
7 For a similar argument regarding this point, see Paul Guyer, "Kant on Apperception 
and A Priori Synthesis," American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1980): 205-9. An 
extended defence of Kant's argument in the A-Deduction is given by Philip McPherson 
Rudisill, "Circles in the Air, Pantomimics and the Transcendental Object = X," Kant-
Studien 87 (1996). 
8 Cassam, 'Transcendental Arguments," 371. The phrase is used by Straw son in The 
Bounds a/Sense, 94. 
·67· 
for making the assumption that the matter of experience is always characterless. 
Thus, it appears to be the case that Kant is open to the charge that he requires yet 
another faculty to guarantee this. The alternative is that it is necessary for the 
content of experience itself to be a product of transcendental synthesis. 9 
There appear, therefore, to be compelling reasons for rejecting the validity 
of transcendental arguments, at least in their Kantian form, where the claim is made 
that what would otherwise be subjective conditions of thought are rendered objective 
by virtue of the fact that they stipulate conditions that must pertain in the world. 
This is due not merely to the defects identified in the previous chapter, but also to 
the fact that even if one accepts the presuppositions of transcendental idealism 
(which, as we shall see, is often claimed not to be supported by the argwnent of the 
Deduction), then independent difficulties arise concerning the way in which the 
objective ground provided by transcendental synthesis can be guaranteed unless the 
content of experience itself is produced. 1O 
Although it is their intention to praise rather than to bury Kant's claim to 
have provided an answer to Hume' s problem, Bird and Genova's defences of Kant 
against Stroud and Gram also draw away from the Transcendental Deduction and 
focus, instead, on Kant's transcendental idealism. It is claimed by both Bird and 
Genova that the criticisms raised by Stroud and Gram are misdirected because they 
mistakenly assume that Kant intended the Deduction itself to constitute a fully 
formed and self-contained argument for the objectivity of the categories. This, 
according to Bird and Genova, leads the critics to point to a fault in Kant's 
argument where there is none. The weakness that critics such as Stroud and Gram 
find in the Deduction, therefore, does not constitute any inherent failing within the 
argument itself, but is rather a consequence of the critics' own failure to place the 
argument within the wider context of transcendental idealism. I I According to BireL 
9 Cassam, "Transcendental Arguments," 371-2. 
10 Kenneth R Westphal, "Affinity, Idealism, and Naturalism: The Stability of Cinnabar 
and the Possibility of Experience," Kant-Studien 88 (1997), 139-40, expresses the same 
point when he says that "Kant's views on transcendental affinity show that there are 
transcendental, but non-subjective, conditions for the possibility of unified seif-<x>nscious 
experience which are both material and formal (though not intuitive or conceptual)." 
II Bird, ·'Kant's Transcendental Arguments," 34-8; Genova "Good Transcendental 
Arguments," 485-88. and "Kant's Notion of Transcendental Presupposition in the First 
Critique," in E..<iisays on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason, -" ed. 1. N. Mohanty and R W 
Shahan (Norman: U of Oklahoma Press, 1982), 121-5. 
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the way in which this problem manifests itself in Stroud's argument is that the 
Deduction is interpreted as an attempt to disarm some completely general or global 
scepticism regarding the relationship between the subjective conditions of thought 
and some domain of objective reality. Yet, the very question that Stroud takes the 
Deduction to answer is, for Kant, not one that can even coherently be posed, because 
it assumes a realist position incompatible with transcendental idealism.12 Similarly, 
Genova defends the Deduction on the basis of the claim that '''Kant's Copernican 
reorientation [is] the metaphilosophical context within which his TO 
[Transcendental Deduction] achieves relevance and validity.,,13 
We can see, therefore, that there is, in fact, some consensus amongst both 
the opponents and defenders of the Deduction. The consequence that we can draw 
from this is that the Deduction provides no solution to Hume' s problem, because the 
argument can only work upon the presupposition that there exists some objective 
ground for the unity of the manifold of intuition - and yet this is precisely the point 
at which a disagreement between Kant and Hume arises. In short, whereas from 
Hume's perspective "we cannot penetrate into the reason of the conjunction" but 
"'only observe the thing itself, and always find that from the constant conjunction the 
objects acquire an union in the imagination" [T 93], we can know the objective 
ground of conjunction for Kant simply because this is a consequence of his idealism 
or Copernican revolution.14 
It is Bird's contention that although the Deduction itself does not provide a 
solution to Hume's problem, there, nonetheless, remain substantive points of 
disagreement where it could be said that Kant provides an answer to Hume. The 
Second Analogy, according to Bird, is just one such place. However, it has already 
been argued that the Second Analogy by itself does not provide sufficient grounds 
12 Bird, "Kant's Transcendental Arguments," 35. 
13 Genova, "Good Transcendental Arguments," 486. 
14 An alternative perspective is offered in Henry E. Allison, "'Transcendental Affinity -
Kant's Answer to Hume," in Kant's Theory of Knowledge, ed. Lewis White Beck 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, (974). The manner in which Allison takes Kant to be responding to 
Hume are similar to the account that we present, i.e., that the unity of consciousness X 
required for the representation of association has as its transcendental condition of 
possibilit)1 the conceptual synthesis of the manifold Within this paper Allison presents 
only a broad sketch, as the details are filled out in Kant '51 Transcendental Idealism 
(London: Yale UP, 1983) differences between his approach and the interpretation offered 
here emerge. 
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for Kant to distinguish himself from Hume. 15 It is, once again, only when this 
argument is placed in the context of the wider debate concerning whether the 
subjective conditions of thought have any objective validity that the real 
disagreement between Kant and Hume - and the one that Kant himself is concerned 
with - is brought into focus. Previously, this point lead us to draw criteria that it 
would be necessary for Kant to satisfy if he were to be successful in his attempt to 
answer Hume. We have now seen that serious questions have been raised regarding 
the extent to which Kant is successful in meeting the criteria. Furthermore, we have 
found that a defence of Kant is mounted on the basis that it is not actually necessary 
for him to provide an argument which establishes that he has satisfied the criteria 
because success in this regard, supposedly, follows directly from the idealist 
perspective. Furthermore, the argument presented by Cassam regarding 
transcendental synthesis suggests that this already weak defence of Kant's claim to 
have answered Hume suffers from internal difficulties which render it incoherent 
even its own terms. 
3. The Argument of the Transcendental Deduction 
We have reached the conclusion that there is some consensus regarding the 
fact that the only justification that Kant can give for his claim that it is not merely 
contingent that appearances have the prerequisite unity which is required for 
experience, is derived from his overarching commitment to transcendental idealism. 
It is further maintained that this is not actually a part of the argument that Kant 
advances in the Deduction, but rather stems from the experiment undertaken in the 
critical philosophy of prioritising epistemology over ontology and idealism over 
realism, in order to re-establish the good name of philosophy and withdraw from the 
battlefield of speculative metaphysics. 
The contention that will be made in the remainder of this chapter is that, at 
the very least, within the Deduction Kant does attempt to provide a specific response 
to the problem of how the subjective conditions of thought have objective validity, 
and that, although this argument draws on some of the resources of transcendental 
idealism, it constitutes a coherent defence of the objectivity of this position. 16 We 
IS See the discussion of MaJI and, in particular, Beck presented in Chapter 1, pp. 21-27. 
16 Within this chapter, however, we shall not be providing any conclusive evaluation of the 
success of the Deduction. Thus, for instance, the problems raised by Schulze regarding 
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shall, therefore, be investigating the Deduction with the specific purpose of 
establishing what material it contains that can contribute an answer to Hume's 
problem. The major steps of the argument that we shall be most concerned with are 
those that were outlined in Chapter 2: that the manifold of intuition be synthesised; 
that this synthesis must be conceptual; and that this synthesis must take place a 
priori .17 Our analysis of these three points will draw almost exclusively on the 
second edition version of the Deduction, reverting to the A-Deduction when a more 
detailed account of the same point is presented by Kant there than is contained in the 
B-Deduction. It is, however, necessary to begin with the first edition because it is 
there that Kant provides his clearest answer to the question which must precede any 
discussion of the nature of synthesis: the question as to the nature of that which is 
said to be subject to this synthesis, the manifold of intuition. 
3.1 Step One: The Manifold of Intuition 
Within this section it is our intention to demonstrate that the manifold of 
intuition is not some obscure Kantian presupposition derived from transcendental 
idealism, but rather a restatement of a fundamental tenet of Kant's empiricist 
opponents. That is to say, if it is part of the problematic of empiricism to explain 
how ideas become associated, then the empiricist must begin by positing diversity. 
By considering the notion of the manifold of intuition, we shall see that the challenge 
that Kant raises against Hume is a question concerning the very conditions of 
diversity from which Hume begins:8 Thus, Kant's claim will not be that the 
association of ideas is inadequate to the task of accounting for experience because it 
the status of the mind or subject within the Deduction will not be considered until the 
following chapter. 
In addition to the secondary literature already introduced we shall also be engaging with 
the interpretations of the Deduction offered by Paul Guyer and Allison. Guyer's Kant and 
the Claims of Knowledge and Allison's Kant's Transcendental Idealism are the two most 
highly regarded and widely debated interpretations of the first Critique of recent decades. 
The Transcendental Deduction figures large and is given highly divergent interpretations 
by both of them. The most recent interpretative innovation comes from Patricia Kitcher, 
Kant's Transcendental Psychology (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990). 
17 The original discussion is to be found in Chapter 2, p. 36. 
18 In considering the relationship between Kant and Hume, what falls outside of the scope 
of our investigation are the challenges offered to the (broadly speaking) empiricist premise 
that there is some manifold which needs to be synthesised or associated. For an 
exantination of Kant with respect to this point see, for example, Robert Stern. Hegel, Kant 
and the Structure of the Object (London: Routledge, 1990). 
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fails as account of how unity is introduced into experience. Indeed, on this level 
Kant has no objection to associationism. The problem, however, that Kant does 
identify is that for the conditions of associationism to be met, such that it is possible 
for there to be any self-conscious awareness of the association, it is also a 
requirement that a transcendental synthesis should take place. The A-Deduction., 
however, begins with a discussion of matters to which the italicised restriction does 
not apply. The initial point of investigation is intended merely to demonstrate why 
some kind of synthesis is necessary for all experience of the temporal or spatio-
temporal diversity of intuitions. The scope of both 'synthesis' and 'experience' is 
broad. Rather than taking place by means of categories, the synthesis could be 
based simply on association; and the experience need not be self-conscious. 19 In 
other words, if the data of sense are to be subject to discrimination on the basis of 
any temporal or spatial properties, then the manifold of intuition must be 
synthesised. 
That Kant will be concerned with the conditions under which a temporal 
diversity of experience can arise is apparent in one of the first sentences that follow 
the preamble to the A-Deduction: 
Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as 
a manifold only insofar as the mind distinguishes the time in the 
sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, 
insofar as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but 
an absolute unity. [A99] 
[Jede Anschauung enthillt ein Mannigfaltiges in sich, welches doch 
nicht als ein solches vorgestellt werden wtirde, wenn das Gernuth nicht 
die Zeit in der Folge der Eindrticke auf einander unterschiede: denn a Is 
in einem Augen blick en thalten kann jede Vorstellung niernals 
etwas anderes als absolute Einheit sein.] 
Kant is not arguing that intuitions take place in time, that they have relations of 
being before or after one another in time and, therefore, must be temporally 
distinguishable. Nor is he just making the point that it is impossible for there to be 
simultaneous yet distinct representations. Both points would involve the denial of 
the possibility of simultaneity: that, for example, there cannot be either a 
19 In order to maintain the distinction between the general point that we are attributing to 
Kant within this first step of the Deduction and the specific claims that Kant makes 
regarding the conditions under which it is possible for us to have a self-conscious 
awareness of representations, the term 'ex'Perience' [Erfahrung] will be used within this 
section to cover both the case of conscious or unconscious representations. 
·72· 
representation or an intuition of red and white at the same time, or perhaps that the 
intuition of white and the intuition of a star shape are somehow temporally distinct 
or can be temporally distinguished. But then it is not clear what point Kant is 
making. As Kitcher says, '"Kant's reasoning in this passage is very dark "2G 
If we take Kant's points individually, however, his reasoning can be 
elucidated. Whatever the details of the process involved, intuitions are the result of 
objects affecting the senses, yielding bodily sensations which are represented in the 
mind in terms of the qualities of objects - its "impenetrability, hardness, colour, 
etc."[A2~ l1B35]21 Given the problems associated with this empiricist explanation 
of the source of sensations, Kant is not committed to any particular account of the 
origin of this intuitive information, but he does have clear commitments regarding its 
nature: including the claim that intuitions contain a manifold. This is indeed one of 
Kant's :fundamental assumptions, but it is not one that the empiricist sceptic would 
deny. It might be thought that due to the synthetic a priori nature of space and time 
that whatever is intuited must, minimally, have duration and extension; and, given 
that Kant argues that space and time, as the forms of intuition, are both infinitely 
divisible it would, therefore, seem possible to draw the conclusion that all intuitions 
are manifold. They are manifold in the sense that they are divisible. 
Kant seems to be making this point in the Transcendental Aesthetic: 
Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, as well as the general 
concept of spaces in general, rest solely on limitations. [A251B39] 
[Der Raum ... ist wesentlich einig, das Mannigfaltige in ibm, mithin 
auch der allgemeine Begriff von Raumen uberhaupt beruht lediglich auf 
Einschrankungen. ] 
If, however, we take this to the sense of manifold that Kant is employing at A99 then 
it would, in fact, be false to say that it was necessary for the mind to make temporal 
distinctions, because the manifold of space is only intuitable because the intuitions 
themselves are temporally distinct. To illustrate this point, the representation of, for 
example, a flag, such as the Stars and Stripes, can only contain a diversity of 
intuitive elements (in this case colours) insofar as these intuitions have occurred one 
after the other. Thus, there is a representation of red and white stripes (as opposed 
to a representation of pink?) only because the mind makes a distinction between the 
20 Patricia Kitcher, Transcendental Psychologv, 149. 
21 "Undurchdringlichkeit, Harte, Farbe etc." 
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different times at which these intuitions have occurred. Otherwise, the claim would 
be, there is simply an intuition of red, then one of white, then one of red, th(..'D. one of 
white; in such a case the mind would be in a kind of eternal present, and in that 
present either red or white could be intuited, but never the combination of red and 
white. There are, however, immediate and obvious problems with this 
interpretation: what area of colour is intuited at an instant? Could we not make the 
strips of colour sufficiently small that they can be intuited together?22 
While the infinite divisibility of the forms of intuition is indeed an issue for 
Kant, the manifold nature of intuition is not simply a reference to this. Rather, we 
are aware of the manifold of intuition as being not just divisible but diverse. In 
other words, intuition can contain a manifold without that manifold being 
represented in time. The logic of Kant's argument here is quite straightforward. 
Within the empiricist tradition the diversity of intuitions is not taken to be a problem 
or a premise which in itself requires explanation. 23 On the contrary, for the 
empiricists the problems lie in explaining how the diversity of intuitions, its manifold 
nature, can relate to objects. 
Kant's account of the synthesis of apprehension as outlined in the A-
Deduction can, then, be regarded as a direct engagement with Hume. In Kant's 
terms, Hume shows that there are merely subjective relations between intuitions 
which are brought about via the association of impressions. According to Hume, 
this is (at least in part) due to the temporal relations of contiguity and succession, 
but he never considers that the experience of the manifold of intuitions as a manifold 
could be at all problematic. Kant's point is that in representing matter in this way, 
the manifold must be represented, at least minimally, according to the form of time 
- it must be represented as either simultaneous or successive in time. While the 
manifold can be associated merely according to the properties it possesses as 
diverse, the association of the manifold with regard to contiguity or succession 
22 It is possible that this reading was adopted by Maimon, and accounts for his 
reintroduction of the Leibniz inspired notion of infinitesimals of sensation. See, for 
example, Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, 22, and Atlas, Critical to Speculative 
Idealism, 109-23. 
23 At the very beginning of the Treatise, for instance, Hume says that 
"Tho' a particular colour, taste, and smell are qualities all united together in this 
apple, 'tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but arc at least distinguishable from 
each other."lT 2] 
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requires the representation of the manifold in time. Such representation presupposes 
a synthesis, because the manifold itself has no intrinsic temporal quality; s(;:nsations 
do not bear, as it were, any temporal stamp and yet the representation of them 
requires that they are represented in time. When representing this manifold it is, 
therefore, necessary for there to be a synthesis of the manifold bringing non-
temporal qUalities into a temporal relationship. 
The case is clearest with regard to the representation of succession. For 
Hume the abstract idea of time is derived from the "perceivable succession of 
changeable objects."[T 35f4 In order to be able to perceive the succession of 
changeable objects, what is required is that the perceptions themselves are 
synthesised in time, they must be run through and held together. If this did not 
happen, what would be experienced would be a succession of perceptions rather 
than what we take to be a succession of states of an object. Similarly with regard to 
the simultaneity, the simultaneous perception of the manifold is not a perception of 
the manifold as simultaneous, i.e., not an awareness of a diversity occurring together 
in time, but rather some singular grouping of sensations. 
This point is clear if we return to the earlier example of the flag. In this 
case we experience a manifold of intuition (e.g., red, white, blue) not as a manifold 
but as a unity (e.g., flag); but if we now place the flag against the backdrop of 
another colour, what do we then experience? A flag on an orange field or an orange, 
red, white and blue picture? Kant's argument is that there is nothing in the manifold 
of intuition itself which connects the latter three colours together in contradistinction 
to the first; that is to say, there is, exactly as Hume had argued, no experience of 
connections between the manifold of intuition - there, simply, is the manifold of 
intuition. If this manifold is experienced as it is in a single moment, then there is a 
single experience of all that is manifold; there is a single experience of orange-white-
red-blue. This diversity is experienced as one, the experience is an absolute unity; 
that is to say that at any particular moment in time, if it were to be taken in 
isolation, the experience of this manifold would not divide the manifold, there would 
be no red-white-blue-flag-experience as distinct from the orange-field-ex.1'erienced. 
If, however, we consider not merely the intuition of the manifold at a particular 
24 It should be noted that the account of the origin of the abstract ideas of space and time is 
only to be found in the Treatise. 
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instant, but also how it persists though time, or indeed fails to do so, then we can 
experience the manifold as manifold. The orange field is replaced by a green field, 
now a distinction can be made between the experience of the flag and the experience 
of the field, because there is a connection which exists between the manifold of the 
flag in contradistinction to the rest of the manifold, a connection which rests upon 
"sequence of one impression upon another". 
What Kant has identified is a process which must be occurring in order for 
the empiricist problematic of the association between intuitions in terms of 
contiguity and succession to arise at all. In order for the universally acknowledged 
representation of the manifold as, for instance, successive to occur a the manifold is 
"run through and held together"(A99)25. Rather than all the impressions at any 
moment being represented as an absolute unity, the impressions which are intuited 
together in time are unified. 
3.1.1 Step One: Summary 
The first step of the Deduction consists not so much in an argument as in a 
general observation: 
all our knowledge is thus finally subject to time, the formal condition of 
inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into 
relation. This is a general observation which, throughout what follows, 
must be borne in mind as being quite fundamental. [A99] 
[alle un sere Erkenntnisse [sind] zuletzt doch der formalen Bedingung 
des innem Sinnes, namIich der Zeit unterworfen, als in welcher sie 
insgesammt geordnet, verkniipft und in Verhiiltnisse gebracht werden 
mfissen. Diese ist eine allgemeine Anmerkung, die man bei dem 
folgenden durchaus zum Grunde legen muB.] 
The scope of this observation is not limited to syntheses which take place according 
to the categories, or to syntheses the result of which we can become self-conscious, 
it merely notes that, insofar one is committed to the general tenets of empiricist 
epistemology, it is necessary for there to be some kind of synthesis of the constituent 
matter of experience which brings elements into a temporal relationship with each 
other. 
3.2 Step Two: The Analytic Unity of Consciousness 
It is important immediately to acknowledge and re-emphasise that Kant's 
25 "das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung desselben " 
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attempt to undermine the assumptions of associationism is limited in scope. The 
objection could be raised against him that it is of absolutely no concern whether at a 
single moment there is an absolute unity or not, all that is pertinent to whether 
association occurs or not is diversity as it occurs across time. We can, for example, 
construct cases where association can occur, at least in so far as we can knm.v that it 
has occurred, because it manifests itself in behaviour, merely by virtue of a bio-
chemical process.26 
It would certainly be something of a reductio ad absurdum of the 
Transcendental Deduction if it were to be a consequence of Kant's argument that the 
transcendental unity of apperception and the capacity for self-consciousness is 
attributable to invertebrates. Kant's point, however, is not made as an objection to 
associationism at this level; his claim is that association of representations does not 
constitute a sufficient condition for the representation of association and that 
whenever such a representation can occur it has objective validity. Although this 
claim is weaker than the initial one, it is nonetheless forceful. This is because, in 
order for there to be any self-conscious awareness of, or representation of, 
association, associationism must be supplemented and, at the very least, in the 
context of Hume' s argument for the origin of the idea of causality precisely in such 
awareness, Kant's point is pertinent - if he can establish the objective validity of 
this representation. The limited nature of the claim is made explicit by Kant when 
he says that association can occur but would be in vain without synthesis. 
Empirical association requires a transcendental ground: 
It is a merely empirical law, that representations which have often 
followed or accompanied one another finally become associated, and so 
are set in a relation whereby, even without the presence of the object, 
one of these representations can, in accordance with a stable rule, bring 
about a transition of the mind to the other. [AlOO] 
[Es ist zwar en bloB empirisches Gesetz, nach welchem Vorstellungen, 
die sich oft gefolgt oder begleitet haben, mit einander endlich 
vergesellschaften und dadurch in eine Verknupfung setzen, nach 
welcher auch ohne die Gegenwart des Gegenstandes eine dieser 
Vorsteliungen einen Ubergang des Gem-Oths zu der andem nach einer 
bestlindigen Regel hervorbringt.] 
The introduction of rules into the law of association which occurs in this 
26 See, for example, the discussion of "Skinnerian" or behaviourist creatures, which places 
this kind oflearning in the conte:\.1 of Hume 's associationism, in Daniel C. Dennett Kinds 
ofA1ind~ (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1996), 112-5. 
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passage is not an illegitimate intellectualisation of the process of association but 
merely a restatement of it. The associations are not merely rando~ for if they were, 
then it would not be an association. There is nothing then to prevent this law from 
being merely statistical: it is merely describing the relationship which exists between 
the presence of a representation and the other representations which arise in the 
mind. We are dealing with the empirical and contingent regularity of which Cassam 
speaks. Kant immediately goes on to make the claim that, 
this law of reproduction presupposes that appearances arc themselves 
actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of these 
representations a coexistence or sequence takes place in conformity with 
certain rules. [AlOO] 
[Dieses Gesetz der Reproduction setzt aber voraus: daB die 
Erscheinungen selbst wirklich einer solchen Regel unterworfen seien, 
und daB in dem Mannigfaltigen ihrer Vorstellungen eine gewissen 
Regeln gemaBe Begleitung oder Folge start finde] 
It would appear that Kant is making the straightforward point that there 
would be no association if nothing were associated; which is to say, that the 
regularity which is to be found in the order of representations is not introduced by 
the law of association, but is rather found there by the empirical reproductive 
imagination. However, Kant's argument is subtly different. From the mere 
observation that oranges are orange it would be impossible to derive a 
transcendental condition for the empirical fact of the orangeness of oranges. It does, 
indeed, appear that Kant is saying exactly this with his infamous example: 
If cinnabar were sometimes red., sometimes black, sometimes light, 
sometimes heavy . . . my empirical imagination would never find 
opportunity when representing red colour to bring to mind heavy 
cinnabar. [AlOO-l] 
[Wfirde der Zinnober bald roth, bald schwarz, bald leicht, bald schwer 
sein, . . . so kannte meine empirische Einbildungskraft nicht einmal 
Gelegenheit bekommen, bei der Vorstellung der rothen Farbe den 
schweren Zinnober in die Gedanken zu bekommen]. 
It seems to be the case that Kant is identifying the tautological point that association 
requires regularity, yet the conclusion which he draws is that there 
must then be something which, as the a priori ground of a necessary 
synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible. 
[A101] 
[muB also etwas sein, was selbst diese Reproduction der Erscheinungen 
moglich macht, dadurch daB es der Grund a priori einer notwendigen 
synthetischen Einheit derselben ist.] 
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The reference here to the necessary synthetic unity of appearances makes it 
clear that Kant is not drawing a conclusion regarding the transcendental necessity of 
a regular pattern of representations in order for the empirical faculty of the 
imagination to have material with which it can work, hence creating associations 
between representations - as is the case on the empiricist account. 27 It is not the 
regularity of representations which is a transcendental condition for the reproduction 
of representations, but rather the unity of appearances themselves that is the 
condition. It is not the case that we can simply substitute the unconditional for 
conditional necessity as Cassam would have it. It is not a mere prejudice on Kant's 
part that he claims that there must be an a priori ground of association, because it is 
not an a priori claim regarding the nature of the regularity of the manifold but rather 
a claim regarding the conditions under which any regularity is representable. 
Assuming that a conditional regularity happens to pertain in the world or in the 
order of appearances does not obviate the problem of how any such regularity is 
represented as such. Kant states this explicitly in two of the above quotations: the 
"law of reproduction presupposes that appearances are themselves actually subject 
to such a rule", there is an "a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of 
appearances [which] makes their reproduction possible. ,"28 
It does, however, remain obscure why the synthesis of representations 
required for the representation of synthesis or association cannot itself be provided 
through association. In order to place definite limitations on what can be achieved 
27 "It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or 
ideas of the mind., and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they 
introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity." [E 23] 
28 Kitcher, Transcendental Psychology, 78, makes the valuable observation that, as it 
stands at this point, Kant's argument is incomplete: 
"Even if the law of association operates on representations, Empiricists could reply 
that something like this law explains how various cognitive states are united in 
representations. When cognitive states occur together, they tend to become 
associated, and through this association produce representations of objects and 
properties. " 
The defence that Kitcher provides of Kant's argument is that the kind of association to 
which the empiricists refer for support is that of spatio-temporal contiguity, but this fails 
to provide a convincing account of how objects are represented because there are very 
many spatio-temporal contiguities that do not become associated. Although this defence is 
clearly an argument that Kant presents, and it could be employed to critique the law of 
association, it is not the one that Kant himself is presenting in his account of the synthesis 
of reproduction. The reproduction of representations is not ""hat distinguisbes an object 
from an event. 
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through association, Kant moves on from the initial observation that, unless there is 
synthesis, the manifold can be nothing other than an absolute unity. He now goes on 
to consider the conditions under which the representation of this synthesis can occur. 
It is at this point that Kant demonstrates that any account which takes this 
representation of synthesis to be based upon a merely "empirical law" must be 
inadequate. Kant's argument for this point is two-fold. Firstly, he claims that in 
any representation of synthesis it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany the 
representations synthesised and, secondly, that association does not provide 
sufficient conditions for the 'I think' to be able to accompany representations.29 
The first point is advanced in one of Kant's most notorious and disputed 
statements: 
It must be possible for the '1 think' to accompany all my representations; 
for otherwise something would be represented in me which could nol be 
thought at aU, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation 
would either be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. [B 131-
2] 
[Das: Ich denke, muB aile meine Vorstellungen begleiten konnen; 
denn sonst wiirde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nieht gedacht 
werden konnte, welches eben so viel heillt als: die Vorstellung wiirde 
entweder unmoglich, oder wenigstens fUr mich nichts sein.] 
This opening statement is gradually elucidated throughout the course of § 16 
of the B-Deduction, but it is worthwhile pausing here just to establish the general 
parameters of the argument. As Kant makes clear, "representation" [Vorstellung] is 
his most general term for any kind of mental or cognitive state: be that state 
conscious or unconscious, objective or subjective, intuitive or conceptual, empirical 
or pure, it will fall under the genus of representation.30 The very generality of such 
29 The latter point constitutes what we are calling step 3 of the Deduction. 
30 "The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Subordinate to it stands 
representation ~ith consciousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to 
the subject as the modification of its state is sensation (sensatio), an objective 
perception is knowledge (cognitio). This is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel 
conceptus.) The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter 
refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in 
common. The concept is either an empirical or a pure concept."[A320/B376-7] 
[Die Gattung ist V 0 r s tell un g uberhaupt (repraesentatio). Unter ihr steht die 
Vorstellung mit Bewu6tsein (perceptio). Eine Perc eption, die sich lediglich auf 
das Subject als die Modification seines Zustandes bezieht, ist E m p fin dun g 
(sensatio), eine objective Perception ist E r ken n t n i 6 (cognitio). Diese ist ennveder 
An s c h a u u n g oder Beg riff (intuitus vel conceptus). Jene bezieht sich 
unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand und ist einzeln, dieser mittelbar, vermittelst eines 
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a claim raises an immediate difficulty, in that not everything that falls under the 
definition of representation does in fact constitute a representation of something. 
Thus, for example, sensation is an affection of an object on the faculty of sensibility, 
is but not a representation of the object.31 Neither, however, is sensation nothing to 
me: non-representative representations can contribute to the representation of 
something to me. This fits with Kant's claim that empirical intuitions are "in 
relation to the object through sensation."[A201B34]32 In what follows, then, it will 
be necessary for Kant, if he is to avoid this apparent contradiction, to provide some 
account of the relationships between representations - what it means for an 
intuition to relate to an object though sensation - such that non-representative 
representations are, in some sense or another, representations of something. Such an 
account is necessary for the simple reason that, as it stands, his opening statement of 
Section 16, B edition, is incoherent: there are representations which are something to 
me, yet do not represent, 33 
The main point does, nonetheless, appear to be clear: that unless it is 
possible to become conscious of a representation then that representation cannot be 
a representation of something. This does not involve Kant in the denial of 
unconscious representations as such, it is merely that he is - as Allison and others 
have put it - committed to the "necessity of the possibility,,34 of consciousness.35 
Clearly implied in this, however, is the denial of modes of knowledge which are not 
just non-conscious, but which are, in principle, unconscious. The opposition 
betw'een the, in principle, unconscious and the potentially conscious representations 
raises questions as to how and under what circumstances is it possible for the 'I 
think' to accompany representations. That is to say, Kant needs to provide an 
answer to the question of wherein the possibility of consciousness lies, for othenvise 
Merkmals, '\\'l1S mehreren Dingen gemein sein kann. Der Begriff ist entweder ein 
empirischer oder reiner Begriff]. 
31 It is this point which leads Kitcher to translate "Vorstellung" as "cognitive state" and 
"Erkenntnis" as "representation". See Kitcher, Transcendental Psychology, 66. 
32 "sich auf den Gegenstand durch Empfindung beziehf'. 
33 It will also be noted that this is a position that Kant is not committed to in the A-edition; 
as stated there there are representations given which do not fall within consciousness. but 
''''hich are brought to consciousness ,ia the process of synthesis. 
34 Allison,. Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 140. 
35 For Kant's discussion of representations which arc not accompanied by consciousness 
(dunkle Vorstellungen) see XII, 135-{). 
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there is no way in which a distinction can be drawn between the representations 
which are unconscious in fact, and those which are unconscious in principle. This, 
in turn, raises a problem with regard to the statement as a whole: if representations 
are possible that we are never conscious of, i.e. if the consciousness of these 
representations is never actualised, then what is it that makes the possibility of the 
accompaniment of the 'I think' decisive?36 
What is the difference between a representation which could possibly be 
brought to consciousness but is not, and one which cannot ever be brought to 
consciousness? More generally we could question where the emphasis is placed in 
the quotation. Is it the case that the 'I think' must be able to accompany all 
representations which are something to me, or that it must be able to accompany all 
representations which are something to me? Paul Guyer makes the claim, which 
supports Cas sam' s argument, that Kant is committed to the former emphasis 
because it is only here that the notion of an imposition of order on nature, or 
transcendental synthesis, can be coherent.3i If the stress is placed on the 'to me', 
then it remains possible for there to be representations which it is not possible to 
bring to self-consciousness simply because they fail to meet whatever conditions 
Kant wishes to claim are necessary for this consciousness?8 Kant, however, wants 
to argue that it is an unconditional necessity that all representations conform to these 
36 Discussions of some of the difficulties raised by the apparent counter-example of 'blind-
sight' - a perceptual consciousness which is not attributed to a subject - are to be found 
in Hector-Neri Castafie~ "The Role of Apperception in Kant's Deduction of the 
Categories," lv'ous 24 (1990): 153-5, and Susan Hurley, "Unity and Objectivity," in 
Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of ConSCiousness, ed. Christopher Peacocke 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994), 51-4. Although an issue of some complexity, we shall 
aSSUDle that no straightforward contradiction of Kant's position is entailed by blind-sight 
Kant certainly allows for consciousness without the possibility of self-consciousness - he 
attributes this state to animals (see below, note 81, p. 107). Furthermore, perceptions can 
also be brought into some contrastive relations (of identity and difference) without 
requiring the objective unity of consciousness which allows for the possibility of the 'I 
think. '[IX 65] In these cases there is no consciousness of the relation itself, and 
presumably only imagination rather than understanding is required. 
3i Guyer, "Kant on Apperception and a priori Synthesis," passim. The same point is also 
raised by Robert Howell, "Apperception and the 1787 Transcendental Deduction," 
Synthese 47 (1981): 388-9. 
38 "If the a priori certainty of self-identity is understood only as the conceptual truth 
that whatever representations one ascribes to oneself must be ascribed to the same 
continuing set of representations to which belong all other representations ascribed to 
oneself, in accordance ~ith the rules for constructing such sets, it would not imply 
any a priori synthesis." Guyer, "Kant on Apperception and a priori Synthesis," 208. 
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conditions and he must, therefore, be committed to the former view: but this is far 
from the analytic proposition that Kant seems to take it to be.39 In other \vords, 
while it is acknowledged that it might be possible for Kant to establish that there are 
certain conditions which must be met by intuitions if it is to be possible for the '[ 
think' to accompany them, this would not show that all of the intuitions which I have 
(or the whole of my experience most broadly construed) conform to these conditions. 
However, unless this more general point is established, the categories (if they are 
necessary for the '[ think' to accompany representations) remain merely subjectively 
necessary, in that they provide a condition under which experience must be regarded, 
but are irrelevant in relation to the nature of experience as such. 
Kant begins to answer these questions with the introduction of the reciprocal 
relation between the '[ think' and a synthesis of representations:40 
This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is 
given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible 
only through the consciousness of this synthesis. [B133] 
[NamIich diese durchgangige Identitat der Apperception eines in der 
Anschauung gegebenen Mannigfaltigen enthillt eine Synthesis der 
Vorstellungen und ist nur durch das Bewufitsein dieser Synthesis 
moglich.] 
This is both a qualification and an explanation of his introductory statement. The 
"thoroughgoing identity of apperception" qualifies the notion of the . I think' being 
able to accompany representations, because it is now clear that it is the ability to 
accompany representations with an identical '[ think' which provides the criteria of 
representations being able to represent. In other words, Kant is not (yet) advancing 
the synthetic proposition attributed to him by Guyer, but is rather only concerned 
39 This leads Guyer to claim that there is confusion on Kant's part as to which kind of 
argument he is employing in the Deduction. See pp. 110-113 for a discussion of Guyer's 
dissection of the Deduction. A clear discussion of the of Guyer's point is given by Allison, 
"Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction," Grazer Philosophische Studien 44 
(1993):234-6. 
40 The reciprocal relationship between apperception and synthesis is also central to the 
account of the Deduction that Allison presents; in Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 144, 
he speaks of the ·'reciprocal connection between the transcendental unity of apperception 
and the representation of objects". The analysis presented in this section regarding the 
relationship between apperception and synthesis is broadly in accord \\'ith Allison's 
discussion of this issue. But there is an important difference. Rather than relying on 
Kant's definition of an object to account for the specifically conceptual nature of the 
synthesis necessary for the transcendental unity of apperception, we shall draw this 
conclusion from Kant's distinction, to be discussed in the Section 3.3, between an 
objective and a subjective unity of consciousness. 
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with a restricted class of representations, those of which there can be any self-
conSCIOusness. 
The precise nature of the proposition that Kant is advancing can be 
discerned from Kant's discussion of the nature of the representation • 1 think'. The 
empirical consciousness of oneself - that is, the representation of oneself as being 
in a certain state - is distinguished from the empty representation 'I think' which 
"in all consciousness is one and the same"[B132r1• This notion of the identity of 
apperception is somewhat weak, in that the identity consists in the -1 think' not being 
a representation of something from which any other representations could differ, 
unless, of course, they were actually representations of something, in which case 
that representation would not be the representation <I think'. 42 This weakness is, 
however, compensated for by two factors. Firstly, if this account is coherent, then 
the problem identified by Hume - that when he considered his experience he could 
find no experience of himself - would be made consistent with Kant's own position 
without involving him in the denial of the validity of Hume' s observation.43 
Secondly, the representation 'I think' is produced, with regard to its nature, by the 
unity of apperception. It is not merely then that there are multiple simple, empty 
representations, < 1 think', which are the same, but rather that all instances of the -[ 
think' are "one and the same." This is brought out in relationship between the 
identity of apperception and the synthesis of representations: 
41 
42 
43 
For through the '1', as simple representation, nothing manifold is given; 
only in intuition, which is distinct from the T, can a manifold be given; 
and only through combination in one consciousness can it be thought. 
[B135] 
[Denn durch das Ich rus einfache Vorstellung ist nichts Mannigfaltiges 
gegeben; in der Anschauung, die davon unterschieden ist, kann es nur 
gegeben und durch Ve r bin dun g in einem Bewufitsein gedacht 
werden.] 
The consciousness of the manifold of intuition cannot in itself be manifold 
"in aHem Bewufitsein ein und dasselbe ist". 
"1 say that I think something as completely simple, only because I have really nothing 
more to say of it than merely that it is sometbing."[A400] 
[Ich sage nur, daB ich etwas ganz einfach denke, weil ich wirklich nichts weiter als 
bios, daB es Etwas sei, zu sagen weill.] 
"when 1 enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or 
pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe any thing but the perception." [T 252] 
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since, if it were, it would be merely be the consciousness of the constitutive elements 
of the manifold as an absolute unity rather than an awareness of the manifold as 
such. Each of these individual states of consciousness is '"without relation to the 
identity of the subject"[B 133]44 in the sense that it is only possible to represent the 
identity of the subject, or indeed identity as such, insofar as there is a consciousness 
of more than one manifestation of this representation. TIris follows as a direct 
consequence of the lack of any intuition of the subject and is expressed by Kant in 
the statement that "the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the 
presupposition ofa certain synthetic unity."[B133]45 The representation 'I think' is 
a common property of a diversity of other representations, a somewhat peculiar 
general concept, and it is only though the representation of the 'I think' as something 
common to a diversity of other representations that it itself can first be represented, 
since, as Kant makes clear through his example of "red in general"[B 133t6, the 
unity of the representation consists in it remaining invariant throughout 
representations which have it in common.47 
To extend Kant's example, the representation of red is common to the 
representation of post boxes, cinnabar and (portions of) the Star Spangled Banner, 
but not equivalent to any of these representations. Furthermore, and most 
significantly for Kant's argument, the representation of general concepts lies not 
merely in the fact that they are common to, or can accompany, diverse 
representations, but rather in the requirement that those diverse representations of 
which red, for example, is a common property need to be synthesised, such that red 
can be represented as a common property. The argument, then, is that if it were 
somehow impossible for the various representations with the shared property of red 
to be thought together and synthesised, then the representation of the analytic unity 
of red would also be impossible. 
If we consider the result of this argument with regard to the analytic unity of 
consciousness, then some of the puzzles of Kant's opening statement of Section 16 
44 "ohne Beziehung auf die Identit.at des Subjects." 
45 "die analytische Einheit der Apperception ist nur unter der Voraussetzung irgend 
einer synthetischen moglich." 
46 "r 0 t. h uberhaupC. 
47 See, Ra1f Meerbote, "Apperception and Objectivity." The Southern Journal of 
Phi losophy 25 Supplement (1986): 116-8, for another account of this point which accords 
with our own. 
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can be resolved. Having made clear that synthesis of representations is a necessary 
condition for the representation of the analytic unity of consciousness, we can 
provide an account of why a representation which could not be accompanied by the 
"J think' would indeed be nothing to me. A representation which could not be so 
accompanied would be a representation which could not be synthesised with any 
other representations. This follows as a direct consequence from the discussion of 
what it is for there to be an identity of apperception, namely a synthesis of 
representations. The original synthetic unity of apperception is, in fact, nothing 
other than a necessary synthesis of representations. 48 This original synthetic unity of 
apperception allows for the generation of the representation 'I think' because all 
synthesised and synthesisable representations have, as their most general and 
common feature, the fact that they are synthesisable, and that they belong to, or 
indeed constitute, the original synthetic unity of apperception. This feature is 
identified as the representation 'I think' .49 
The absence of the ability of the 'I think' to accompany any representation 
means then that the representation would lack all features that are attributable to it 
on the basis of synthesis, because synthesis is a necessary condition for the 'I think' 
being able to accompany a representation. 50 We have already seen precisely what 
48 "I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations, which 
is entitled the original synthetic unity of apperception"[B135] 
[ich mir einer nothwendigen Synthesis derselben a priori bewuBt bin, welche die 
urspriingliche synthetische Einheit der Apperception heillt] 
Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 140, points out a curiosity in Kant's phrasing 
when considering A116 which is also to be found in this passage, namely, "conscious a 
priori". We are in full agreement with his reading of this as "referring to the awareness of 
something as necessarily the case." 
49 It might be objected that this attribution somewhat jumps the gun. After all, why not 
the representation "we think", "mind" or something else entirely. However, given the role 
that unity plays and that this unity is a result of syntheses which are not a feature given in 
the manifold of intuition, Kant has some justification. Unfortunately, it also open up the 
possibility for reading Kant as providing an, at least, semi-Cartesian argument. This point 
",ill be developed in the chapter on the subject. For a discussion on this see also Howell, 
"Apperception and the 1787 Transcendental Deduction," 409-13. 
50 There is considerable debate within the secondary literature regarding the status of this 
claim. This debate centres on the twofold issue of whether it is an analytic or synthetic 
proposition that the 'I think' can accompany representations If analytic, then the extent to 
which Kant's argument can proceed on the basis of this claim is also questioned. Within 
recent discussions Guyer, Henrich and Allison all regard it as analytic but disagree as to 
whether this constitutes a flaw within the Deduction, and Kitcher regards it as synthetic. 
An overview of the disagreements is given by Allison, "Apperception and Analyticity in 
the B-Deduction," passim. See Chapter 4 of this thesis, pp. 120-124, for a discussion of 
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aspect of synthesis Kant has in mind the previous discussion of the property 'red': 
If I think red in gener~ I thereby represent to myself a property which 
(as a characteristic) can be found in something, or can be combined with 
other representations [Bl33] 
rwenn ich mir roth uberhaupt denke, so stellte ich mir dadurch eine 
Besehaffenheit vor, die (als Merkmal) irgend woran angetroffen, oder 
mit anderen Vorstellungen verbunden sein kann] 
That is to say, that if a representation could not be connected v.;th other 
representations, it will correspondingly be impossible for it to represent anything -
such a representation would be "nothing to me". 1bis constitutes a second step in 
the argument against associationism. The first point established by Kant was that 
the manifold of intuition needed to be synthesised if it was to be anything but an 
absolute unity. The second point is that any such absolute unity cannot constitute a 
representation of anything to me. What Kant must now demonstrate is that it is only 
a synthesis of representations according to concepts, as opposed to an association 
between them, that provides the conditions under which it is possible for the 'J think' 
to accompany those representations. 
3.2.1 Step Two: Summary 
The claim that Kant advances here concerns the relationship between the 
analytic unity of consciousness and the synthesis of representations: we can become 
conscious of a representation, attach the 'I think' to it, only under the condition that 
there has been a synthesis of representations. This is an analytic proposition 
because the representation 'I think' is a general concept abstracted from the 
synthesis of representations. Synthesis is, therefore, the necessary condition of thc 
analytic unity of consciousness. This, however, does not imply that synthesis in 
general is a necessary and sufficient condition of the analytic unity of 
consciousness; it may be the case that there are both synthesised or unsynthesised 
representations which the 'I think' cannot accompany. It thus remains possible to 
advance Guyer's objection that Kant has fuiled to demonstrate that all 
representations which I have meet the conditions required for the 'I think' to be able 
to accompany them. Furthermore, Kant has not even successfully been shown that 
in every case where synthesis has occurred the 'I think' can accompany the 
this issue. 
. 87· 
representations. 
3.3 Step Three: Synthesis and Concepts 
The remainder of Kant's argument proceeds with remarkable speed toward 
his conclusion that "the manifold in a given intuition stands necessarily under 
categories"[B143]51. There has been no mention of the categories since the 
introductory section (§lS) of the Deduction until this conclusion is drawn, and Kant 
legitimates it through the link between functions of judgement and the categories. 52 
Within the Deduction itself, however, the stage in the argument which bears the 
weight is the following: 
That act of understanding by which the manifold of given 
representations (be they intuitions or concepts) is brought under one 
apperception in general, is the logical function of judgement [B143] 
(Diejenige Handlung des Verstandes aber, durch die das Mannigfaltige 
gegebener Vorstellungen (sie mogen Anschauungen oder Begriffe sein) 
unter eine Apperception uberhaupt gebracht wird, ist die logische 
Function der Urtheile.] 
We have already considered Kant's argument for the necessity of a 
synthesis of representations if these representations are to represent anything; the 
additional argumentative step is, then, to demonstrate that this synthesis is, 
necessarily, judgmental. The manifold of intuition is united through the judgement 
that it is something: 'it is a -'. That it is in such judgements alone that the 
manifold of intuition is related to an object is a definitional point for Kant; an object 
[Objekt] is simply that "in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is 
united."rB 13 7f3 Although it is absolutely crucial that this definition be convincing, 
Kant provides no explicit support for it: his assumption would appear to be that it is 
self-evident. The significance of the definition for the Deduction lies in the fact that 
51 "steht also das Mannigfaltige in einer gegebenen Anschauung nothwendig unter 
Kategorien. " 
52 Exactly where Kant thinks he has established this link is somewhat confusing. In the 
Deduction itself he simply says: 
"Now the categories are just these functions of judgement, insofar as the manifold of 
a given intuition is determined in relation to them (cf §13)."[B143] 
[Nun sind aber die Kategorien nichts andres als eben diese Funktionen zu urteilen, so 
fern das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung in Ansehung ihrer bestimmt ist. 
(§ 13») 
The situation is confused because in § 13 there is no reference to the relationship 
between the categories and judgements. It is, however, possible that Kant had his short 
discussion at the end of § 14 (unnumbered in the first printing of the B-edition) in mind. 
53 "in dessen Begriff das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung \ ere i n i g t ist." 
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it is here, and only here, that a link is established between the unity of the s)TIthesis 
of the manifold and concepts. As we have seen in the preceding section, the 
argument that a synthesis of representations is required proceeds without any 
reference to the conceptual nature of the unity. Indeed, on the basis of his previous 
argument it is not obvious that such conceptual unity is required. There It was 
merely the s)TIthetic unity of apperception which functioned as a condition of 
representation, and on the basis of the evidence provided in the same paragraph in 
which concepts are introduced, Kant would appear to hold that the s)TIthetic unity of 
apperception is not only a necessary condition for representation, but a sufficient 
one as well: "it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of 
representations to an object."[Bl37]54 It would appear that Kant affirms the unity 
of consciousness as the sole condition which must be satisfied for there to 
representations of objects, and simultaneously introduces a further condition: a 
concept in which representations are united.55 Superficially, this constitutes a direct 
contradiction of the argument outlined in stage two. 
One possible solution to this problem lies in the preVIous identification 
which Kant has made between the faculty of apperception and the understanding. 56 
54 "ist die Einheit des Bewufitseins dasjenige, was allein die Beziehung der 
Vorstellungen auf einen Gegenstand". 
55 Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 145, notes this change from necessary to 
sufficient condition, but he does not regard the introduction of the need for concepts to be 
problematic because he argues that the notion of object that Kant is employing throughout 
the first part of the Deduction is a logical one. That is to say, an object is simply the 
subject of a judgement This does, however, beg the question as to whether Kant is 
entitled to use this conception of an object, since what is at issue is whether representation 
requires concepts. Kitcher, Transcendental Psychology, 8 L points out that this 
assunlption is a point of dispute among Kant's contemporaries and provides the following 
quotation from Tetens questioning this assunlption: 
"Nevertheless the major issue in the dispute over the existence of mere 
representations is not yet decided ... Are there representations in us that are regarded 
as images and signs, sufficiently articulated, and sharply enough separated from 
others in the imagination, so that they themselves and though theIl\ their objects, can 
be differentiated from others?" J. N. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche uber die 
menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung, vol 1, (Leipzig: M. G. Weidmans EIben 
und Reich, 1777),266. For the sake of consistency with Kemp-Smith, Kitcher's 
translation has been altered. 
56 "the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point, to which we must ascribe all 
use of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, 
transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty is the understanding itself."[B l34) 
[ist die synthetische Einheit der Apperception der hochste Punkt, an dem man allen 
Verstandesgebrauch, selbst die ganze Logik und nach ihr, die Transscendental-
Philosophie heften mufi, ja diescs Vermogen ist der Verstand se1bst.) 
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This claim, however, rests upon the argument that the s)nthetic unity of 
apperception is a necessary condition of analytic unity. Such analytic unity is found 
in concepts, which, as we have seen, are representations combined with a diversity 
of other representations from which they can be isolated (as in Kant's example of 
red). Kant's argument establishes the possibility of a representation being 
accompanied by the 'I think' as the general condition of representations 
representing. If representations can be so accompanied, then they are thereby 
unified in one consciousness. His argument, however, makes no reference to any 
further conditions which have to be met by the representations themselves, such that 
the 'I think' can accompany them. That is to say, at the point at \\'hich Kant 
identifies the faculty of apperception and the understanding, there is only one 
"conceptus communis"[B134] which is required for representations to be unified, 
and that is the 'I think'. His claim, then, that representations are not merely united 
under the analytic unity of consciousness but also under the concept of an object, is 
clearly introducing an additional and unargued for condition. Yet it is upon this 
very condition that this first part of the B-Deduction rests. 
A solution to this problem can be arrived at, however, through a 
consideration of the distinction, which Kant draws in the subsequent pages of the 
Deduction, between an objective and a subjective unity of consciousness. In the 
passage under consideration Kant fails to make this distinction and refers simply to 
the unity of consciousness - which "alone constitutes the relation of a 
representation to an object". The opening of the next section (§18) bears witness to 
the need for the distinction: 
The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all 
the manifold given in an intuition is united in the concept of the object 
It is therefore entitled objective, and must be distinguished from the 
subjective unity of consciousness [B139]. 
[Die tran sscendentale E in he it der Apperception ist diejenige, 
dUTCh welche alles in einer Anschauung gegebene Mannigfaltige in 
einen Begriff vom Object vereinigt wird. Sie heillt darum 0 b j e c t i v 
und mull von der subjectiven Einheit des Bewufitseins 
unterschieden werden]. 
In Kant's presentation of this distinction he is assuming that the need for concepts in 
the presentation of objects is already established, and the subjective unity of 
consciousness is so called because it does not employ concepts in the synthesis of 
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representations. However, this could constitute an indirect argument for the need for 
concepts. If he can illustrate that no objects are represented though the subjective 
unity (and of particular value to this argument is the fact that Kant provides an 
account of the subjective unity which ties it to the association of representations, as 
opposed to conceptual connection), then the need for a conceptual synthesis would 
follow from the failure of the alternative account. In other words, this step of the 
argument would establish that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 'I 
think' being able to accompany any representation are that the synthesis of 
representations is conceptual. In this case, however, the domain of our self-
conscious awareness would be completely isomorphic with representations 
synthesised according to concepts. 
3.3.1 The Subjective Unity of Consciousness 
Kant's discussion of subjective unity in the B-Deduction is confined to three 
short passages, none of which are a model of clarity. However, it will be argued 
that together they constitute a coherent doctrine. The first passage consists in the 
statement that the subjective unity of consciousness, 
is a determination of inner sense . ... Whether I can become empirically 
conscious of the manifold as simultaneous or as successive depends on 
circumstances or empirical conditions. Therefore the empirical unity of 
consciousness, through association of representations, itself concerns an 
appearance, and is wholly contingent. [B139-40] 
L cine B est i m m u n g des inn ere n Sin n e s ist ... Ob ich mir des 
Mannigfaltigen als zugleich, oder nach einander empirische bewufit scin 
konne, kommt auf Umstande oder empirische Bedingungen an; daher 
die empirische Ei"eit des Bewufitseins durch Association der 
Vorstellungen selbst eine Erscheinung betriffi: und ganz zufallig ist.] 
Although there is a somewhat confusing array of vocabulary employed in this 
passage the point that Kant is attempting to get across is clear. The subjective unity 
of consciousness consists in the relations that pertain between representations on the 
basis of the properties that they possess as determinations of inner sense - and the 
form of inner sense is time.57 It follows from this that the subjective unity will 
merely be a matter of the temporal relations of the manifold - in particular, 
57 
"Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and 
of our inner state. " [A331B49] 
"Die Zeit ist nichts anders als die Form des innero Sinnes, d.i. des Anschauung 
unserer selbst Imd unsers innero Zustandes." 
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simultaneity and succession. 
The contingency to which Kant refers is further explicated by the empirical 
unity of consciousness being tied to association. It is a completely contingent and 
empirical matter as to whether the manifold given in inner sense presents features 
which are associable. That is to say, it is not a priori determinable whether the 
manifold of intuition will be such that the subjective unity of consciousness, which is 
present in the association of representations, is realised. Thus far the argument is 
clear and works with empiricist assumptions; but it still remains unclear why this 
unity of consciousness, although merely empirical and contingent, should only 
involve the association of representations and not the representation of that which is 
associated. 
In the above-quoted passage this claim is made through the statement that 
the "empirical unity of consciousness, through association of representations, itself 
concerns an appearance". An appearance, as an "undetermined object of an 
empirical intuition"[A20fB34]58, is to be contrasted with modes of knowledge 
[Erkenntnisse] which "consist in the determinate relation of given representations to 
an object"[B 137]59. There is no determination of the object of an appearance and, 
hence, nothing represented thereby. On one level, Kant's reasonmg is clear: 
association does not involve a conceptual determination, hence it concerns 
appearances as opposed to modes of knowledge. Despite this apparent clarity, 
however, Kant has not yet provided sufficient justification for the claim that 
association does not represent in a non-conceptual manner. If there is association 
then there is a subjective determination, simply in that intuitions are associated, but 
the determination of intuitions through concepts is equally subjective in the sense 
that conceptual determination is performed by the subject.60 However, in the 
58 "unbestinunte Gegenstand einer empirischen Anschauung". 
59 "bestehen in der bestinunten Beziehung gegebener Vorstellungen auf ein Object." 
6() Later in the passage under consideration Kant presents an unsatisfactory method of 
making the distinction between the subjective and objective unity: 
"Only the originaJ unity is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception, upon 
which we are not here dwelling, and which besides is merely derived from the fonner 
under given conditions in concreto, has only subjective validity. To one man, for 
instance, a certain word suggests one thing, to another some other thing~ the unity of 
consciousness in that which is empirical is not, as regards what is gi-ven, necessarily 
and universaJly valid. "IE 140 I 
Ilene [urspriingliche] Einheit ist allein objectiv gilltig; die empirische Einheit der 
Apperception, die wir bier Dichl ern-agen. und die auch nur von der ersteren unler 
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discussion on judgements Kant does present a more convincing case, which both 
illustrates the difference between subjective and objective unity, and presents an 
argument for why it is that an account of the representation of objects by means of 
association is inadequate. When connections are made according to the law of 
association, 
all that I could say would be, 'If I support a body, I feel an impression of 
weight'; I could not say, 'It, the body, is heavy', which is the same as to 
say, that both representations are combined in the object.[B142] 
(wiirde ich nur sagen kennen wenn ich einen Korper trage, so fiilile ich 
einen Druck der Schwere; abeT nicht: er, der Kerper, ist schwer; welches 
so viet sagen will als: diese beide Vorstellungen sind im Object ... 
verbunden] . 
The account of judgement is intended to explain how "modes of knowledge are 
brought to the objective unity of apperception"[B 141 ]61 - although this phrasing is 
slightly misleading, since without being brought to the synthetic unity of 
apperception representations are not modes of knowledge. Indeed, the point under 
investigation is how it is possible for a representation, merely as a determination of 
inner sense, to function as a representation of an object; how properties, attributes, 
the manifold of intuition, are brought together and unified. The question is not one 
as to whether there are such unities, since both association and concepts provide a 
method for providing them, but rather whether these unities can have 
representational status. 
In the case of association what we have are representations which have been 
found through the course of experience to have been in constant conjunction, in this 
case, 'bodies' and 'heaviness' .62 The unity of these representations consists in the 
gegebenen Bedingungen inc 0 ncr e t 0 abgeteitet ist, hat nur subjective Gii.ltigkeit. 
Einer verbindet die Vorstellung eines gewissen Worts mit einer Sac he, der andere mit 
einer anderen Sache; und die Einheit des BewuBtseins in dem, was empirisch ist, ist 
in Ansehung dessen, was gegeben ist, nicht nothwendig und a1lgemein geltend. ] 
This provides no solution to the problem at hand, because the argument for the original 
synthetic unity of consciousness has been presented (so far) without any further argument 
devoted to the need for some further conceptual determination. We can argue that the 
subjective unity is a concrete instantiation of the original unity, i.e. that it is possible to 
accompany particular given intuitions with the 'I think', but still maintain that there are 
no further necessarily and universally valid features. Indeed, that the mere fact that we all 
employ a concept of, say_ causality is itself an empirical feature of our constitution. It is a 
concept which (in all cases considered) is universal, but not thereby necessary. 
61 '"'Erkenntnisse zur 0 b j e c t i v en Einheit der Apperception zu bringen". 
62 We can assume that if association in this case is able to form a unity which is 
representational, then it is equally well able to form the unities which go to make up this 
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relation between two states of consciousness. Upon the representation of 'body' 
being given, the representation of 'heaviness' follows without there being any need 
to actually weigh the body. It is this division of the representation of an object into 
two separate states that Kant problematises. The representation of a 'body' and the 
representation of 'heavy' are not equivalent to the representation of a 'body as 
heavy' . This follows straightfonvardly from the previous discussion of the original 
unity of apperception. It was established there that one of the conditions for a 
representation representing is the ability of the 'I think' to accompany it. In the case 
of association, there simply is no representation which the 'I think:. could be said to 
accompany, but rather two separate representations. It may indeed be possible for 
us to be 'aware' of the association in the sense that upon the presentation of the first 
representation we act - or, better, react - accordingly. In this case, however, it is 
not a representation of unity of the associated representations in an object, but 
merely a consequence of a contingent and subjective unity of representations in inner 
sense. 63 
subsequent unity, i.e. 'body' and 'heavy'. 
63 In Kant's discussion of subjective unity Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 148-
58, finds in the B-Deduction a residue of the distinction, drawn in the Prolegomena, 
between judgements of experience and judgements of perception. Judgements of 
perception only have a subjective validity, and do not require any categorical 
determination. A return to this doctrine would be problematic in the context of the first 
Critique where all judgements about objects require that there be an objective unity of 
consciousness. Were it possible, within this context, for there to be a subjective unity of 
consciousness through which objects were represented, then the whole argument of the 
Deduction for the transcendental status of the original synthetic unity of apperception 
would be bypassed. This would no longer be a necessary condition for representation. 
Allison argues that Kant has fallen into this incoherence through the identification of 
the subjective unity of consciousness with a unity of self-consciousness. That is to say, the 
only legitimate sense of subjective unity is the association that occurs, since this does not 
involve the use of concepts; but as soon as there is an awareness of the association itself 
then there is an awareness of an object of inner sense, and hence an objective unity. 
Allison's diagnosis, on p. 156, is that "the subjective unity of consciousness is here being 
identified with the consciousness or representation of one's subjective states rather than 
with the subjective states themselves." 
However, on the basis of the interpretation that has been proposed here, the unity 
introduced by separate representations being accompanied by the '1 think' is not a 
sufficient condition for these representations together representing something - whether 
that be an object of inner or outer sense. That is to say, it is possible to be aware that I am 
aware of representations without this reflective awareness being a representation of 
something, because all that the non-reflective representations have in common is the fact 
that I am aware of them. In this case, there need be no further conceptual detemtination. 
Without this conceptual determination the awareness does not constitute the representation 
of an object, it is merely the subjective unity of consciousness. 
·94· 
On the negative side, therefore, Kant does provide grounds for rejecting any 
account of self-conscious representation which employs association, and, positively, 
concepts would provide the requisite unity for representation. Concepts unify 
intuitions under them: thus, heaviness, extension, etc., are synthesised and 
represented under the concept of "body'. The 'I think' can only accompany the 
representations if the latter are unified in the representation of an object 
3.3.2 Step Three: Summary 
In step two we saw that, if the manifold of intuition is to represent 
something to me, then it is necessary that the manifold be unified in such a \vay that 
the 'I think' is capable of accompanying it. Kant's claim now is that association 
provides a mechanism of synthesising the manifold of intuition in inner sense and 
that it is possible for there to be a subjective unity of consciousness. However, what 
associationism fails to account for is the unity attributed to the manifold in the 
representation of the association when an objective ground is posited as a correlate 
of the subjective association. In other words, in order to be able to account for the 
distinction between an association of properties, e. g. heaviness and extension, and 
the attribution of a unity to these properties in the representation of an object, e. g. a 
body with extension and weight, it is necessary to go beyond association and employ 
concepts in the synthesis of the properties. This move establishes a correlation 
between the 'I think' being able to accompany representations and the employment 
of concepts in the synthesis of representations. Only where there is a conceptually 
determined relationship betvv'een representations is it possible for those 
representations to be anything to the I, because it is only then that the 
representations satisfy the conditions of unity under which the 'I think' can 
accompany them. 
3.4 Step Four: A priori Conceptual Synthesis 
From the interpretation of the first part of the Deduction it is clear that Kant 
still has a significant way to go before the challenges of the Stroud, Gram, etc., are 
The interpretation provided here not only enjoys more textual support than that of 
Allison, in that it can account for the references which link subjective unity and self-
consciousness, but it also makes, as we will see in the next section., the task of the second 
half of the Deduction comprehensible. 
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met and Hume's Problem answered. Even at this stage in the argument Kant has not 
yet demonstrated that Hume was wrong in denying the objective validity of 
conceptual synthesis. It remains possible that there is no underlying objective 
ground for the conceptual synthesis of the manifold of intuition, but rather merely a 
subjective unity of consciousness constructed from association. It is here that we 
find an answer to the commonly asked question as to why the second half of the 
Deduction is required. Within the contemporary secondary literature it is now 
commonplace for the actual structure of the argument to be brought into question. 
This follows from Henrich's notion that the B-edition offers a 'two-steps-in-one-
proof,.64 Henrich points out that about half way through the B-Deduction Kant 
appears to signal that he has completed his argument when he draws the conclusion 
that "the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to categories"[B 143t5, 
but he then goes on to say that with this only a "beginning is made of a deduction of 
the pure concepts of understanding"[B144]66 This throws up the interpretative 
puzzle as to what, if anything, is added by the latter half of the Deduction. Although 
there is a general consensus - following Henrich's suggestion - that this divide 
within the Deduction corresponds to two steps within a single unfolding argument, 
as opposed to two separate arguments toward the same end, there is little agreement 
as to what these two stages of argumentation actually are.67 
64 Dieter Henrich, "The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction," in Kant on 
Pure Reason, ed. Ralph C. S. Walker (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982),68. 
65 "Also steht auch das Mannigfaltige in einer gegebenen Anschauung nothwendig 
unter Kategorien." 
66 "ist also der Anfang einer Deduction der reinen Verstandesbegriffe gernacht". 
67 An excellent review of the both the criticism levelled by Henrich against previous 
accounts of the Deduction and the adequacy of Henrich's own proposal is provided by 
Hoke Robinson, "Intuition and Manifold in the Transcendental Deduction." Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 22 (1984). For further discussion see also Allison. "Reflections on 
the B-Deduction," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 Supplement (1986); Viktor 
Nowotny, "Die Struktur der Deduktion bei Kant," Kant-Studien 72 (1981); Hans Wagner, 
"Der Argumentationsgang in Kants Deduktion der Kategorien," Kant-Studien 71 (1980); 
and 1. Claude Evans, "Two-Steps-in-One-Proof: The Structure of the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories," Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1990). An 
exhaustive review of the debate is provided by Peter Baumanns, "Kants transzendentale 
Deduktion der reinen Verstandsbegriffe (B). Ein kritischer Forschungsbericht," Kant-
Studien 82 (1991): 329-48 and 436-55; Kant Studien 83 (1992): 60--83 and 185-207. 
Henrich's proposal is that in the first half of the Deduction Kant is restricting the 
applicability of the categories to the manifold where the manifold is given through single 
intuitions. If intuitions already contain some element of unity, then the categories have 
application. The task of the second half of the Deduction is therefore to show that insofar 
as intuitions are given in accordance with the forms laid out in the Aesthetic, then they do 
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The interpretation provided here attempts to illustrate how the second half 
of the Deduction demonstrates the validity of the objective unity of consciousness by 
showing ~ given the modes of our intuitive faculty, it is necessary for the 
intuitions themselves to be categorised. In other words, the condition for the 
representation of synthesis is not that the resultants of the synthesis are able to be 
conceptualised, but rather that intuitions have been subject to an a priori conceptual 
synthesis. The manifold of intuition can be something to me precisely because of 
this synthesis and not because of any characteristics or order that it possesses 
independently of this synthesis. Furthermore, any manifold of intuition can be 
subject to this synthesis because it applies to intuition by virtue of its mere form 
and, therefore, I can have no intuition which cannot be accompanied by the "I think' _ 
This is made explicit by Kant at the beginning of §21; he there provides an account 
of what he has already established and of what he hopes to establish in the argument 
to follow. What has been established is that in order for the manifold of intuition to 
be represented as belonging to the necessary unity of apperception, a concept is 
employed in this representation [B 144], and what will be shown is that the unity of 
the intuition itself is that of the categories [BI44-5].68 
Kant has established a set of conditions for the understanding of any object, 
but he goes on to point out that the understanding and sensibility are cleaved; this 
raises the challenge that these intellectual conditions may not be met, and there 
would, therefore, be no valid knowledge of objects. The conceptual understanding 
possess the necessary unity. On the reading presented here, Kant advances from the claim 
that if a representation is to be something to me, then it must be conceptually synthesised, 
to the claim that all intuitions can be something to me because space and time must 
themselves be conceptually synthesised and aU intuition is limited to these two forms. 
68 The clam1 that Kant advances is stronger than the one that we shall be defending. The 
link between judgements and the categories has, for Kant, already been established in the 
MetaphysicaJ Deduction and it is because of this that he claims to have demonstrated that 
the categories are necessary for the objective unity of consciousness. The controversial 
nature of both the Table of Judgements and its relationship to the Table of Categories is 
notorious and we shall not be dra\\'ing upon the this portion of Kant's argument. Our 
reconstruction of the Deduction defends only the weaker claim that concepts can have 
objective validity. For some indication of the problems contained in the MetaphysicaJ 
Deduction see, for example, Arthur O. Lovejoy, "Kant's Classification of the Forms of 
Judgment," in Kant: Disputed Questions, ed. Moltke S. Gram (Chicago: Quadrangle, 
1967). 
For a discussion of the role of synthesis within the Metaphysical Deduction and Kant's 
Logic see, Michael 1. Young, "Synthesis and the Content of Pure Concepts in Kant -5 First 
Critique," Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1994): 33l-57. 
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that we think we have of objects may be illusory, for as Hume made clear, it may be 
that concepts, such as cause, may be employed to describe events, but this has no 
bearing on the question as to whether we have any awareness of causes or not. Kant 
agrees that 
if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept 
would still be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be 
without any object. [B 146] 
[konnte dem Begriffe eine korrespondierende Anschauung gar nicht 
gegeben werden, so ware er ein Gedanke der Form naclt, aber ohne 
allen Gegenstand, und dUTCh ihn gar keine ErkenntniB von irgend 
einem Dinge moglich). 
Thus, it ought to be clear how Kant answers the questions as to why it is necessary 
to provide a second stage for the argument of the Deduction, and why with the first 
part of the Deduction only "a beginning is made of a deduction of the pure concepts 
of understanding"[B 144]69. 
Although the necessity for a conceptual synthesis of representations is 
established if there is to be an objective unity of consciousness, intuitions may 
simply fail to be sufficiently regular for there to be either any subjective or objective 
unity of consciousness. Furthermore, nothing that Kant has said demonstrates that 
the order that intuitions have such that they can be conceptually s)nthesised is itself 
a conceptual order. In other words, if intuitions happen to display successive 
features such that a subjective unity of consciousness is possible, then this does not 
imply that they are actually related according to the relation of cause and effect. 
Kant has shown only that if we are to have any self-conscious awareness of these 
intuitions, then they must be understood in accordance with conceptual relations; but 
whether the attribution of conceptual determinations to intuitions is legitimate or not 
remains an open question - although subjectively necessary, they may not have any 
objective validity. 
3.4.1 Figurative Synthesis and Synthesis of Apprehension 
The first step that Kant takes in relating what he now calls "synthesis 
inteliectualis"[B 151] to sensible intuition is accomplished via the introduction of the 
transcendental synthesis of the imagination (or figurative synthesis) and has the 
appearance of an argument by fiat. He simply claims that since we have a priori 
69 
"'ist also der Anfang einer De due t ion dcr reinen VerstandesbegrifIe gemachC. 
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fonTIS of sensible intuition: 
the understanding, as spontaneity, is able to determine inner sense 
through the manifold of given representations, in accordance \\ith the 
synthetic unity of apperception [B150]. 
[kann der Verstand als Spontaneitllt den inneren Sinn durch das 
Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen der synthetischen Einheit der 
Apperception gemiill bestimmen]. 
The figurative synthesis does not function with regard to any of the specific 
properties of intuitions as they appear to us, but rather bears upon the ways in which 
such intuitions can be synthesised given the nature of our sensible faculty. 
The explication of this notion is aided by recalling our earlier discussion of 
the synthesis of apprehension as Kant presented it in the A-Deduction. We saw 
there that whatever the particular characteristics of the manifold of intuition are, 
whether there is any regularity to the sequence of intuition or whether they are 
completely disordered, the manifold is nonetheless subject to the a priori condition 
that it conforms to time as the form of intuition. The scope of this claim is restricted 
only by the consideration that awareness of anything other than absolute unity, be it 
self-conscious or not, requires that intuitions are synthesised or associated in time. 
Rather than synthesising particular intuitions according to their specific properties, 
the figurative synthesis is a synthesis of the form of the intuitions; intuitions are 
synthesised merely according to the temporal relationship that they have with one 
another and the figurative synthesis is, therefore, "'able to determine sense a priori in 
respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception"[B 152fo. 
The figurative synthesis is able to determine intuition a priori because it is a 
universal and necessary feature of intuitions that they possess a temporal form, and 
we shall see that this figurative synthesis can be in accordance with the unity of 
apperception. In other words, Kant is making the claim that this synthesis can be 
conceptual, because of the unitary nature of time. Furthermore, we can begin to see 
how a convergence of the unity of apperception and figurative synthesis can provide 
an argument for the objective validity of conceptual synthesis. If it can be shmvn 
that it is only under the condition of an a priori conceptual figurative synthesis that 
it is possible for the 'I think' to accompany any intuition, then it is not the case that 
70 
"a priori den Sinn seiner Fonn nach der Einheit der Apperception gemaB bestirnmen 
kann", 
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there is something given to the mind which is then subject to the categories. ~~ 11te 
manifold of intuition is made subject to the categories in an a priori \vay simply by 
virtue of being given in space and time, because space and time are themselves 
subject to a conceptual synthesis. Kant's argument at this point eradicates the 
notion that there is an original complexity unconsciously received and subsequently 
rendered coherent though the application of the categories to it. The distinction 
between space and time as forms of intuition and space and time as formal 
intuitions provides the basis of this argument. 7 2 
On the basis of what Kant says within the first Critique, the distinction 
between "forms" and "formal" remains somewhat opaque. He merely indicates that 
"the form of intuition gives only a manifold, the formal intuition gives unity of 
representation."[B160]73 In the latter case we are told that the form of intuition is 
represented as an object and that this consists of the "'combination of the manifold 
. .. in an intuitive representation"[B 160f4. This point is crucial for Kant~ he not 
only wants to establish that there is a combination of the manifold such that the form 
of intuition can be represented as an object, but that he thinks that in confirming this 
he will have reached the point of having proved that the conceptual synthesis of the 
manifold of intuition has objective validity. 
We can give an initial gloss of this argument by again recalling our original 
discussion of the synthesis of apprehension in the A-Deduction. We have seen that, 
71 For an analysis which proceeds along these lines see Michel Meyer, "Why did Kant 
Write Two Versions of the Transcendental Deduction?" passim. 
72 Patricia Kitcher, "Connecting Intuitions and Concepts at BI60n," The Southern Journal 
o/Philosophy 25 Supplement (1986), presents an interpretation of this passage which also 
emphasises its significance for the Deduction as a whole. We are in complete agreement 
'\\'ith her claim, p. 146, that "B160 and B160n show that, because space and time are the 
fomlS of human intuition, it will always be possible to subsume the varied contents of our 
intuitions - whatever they might be - under spatial and temporal judgements. The 
Principles are then to show that these judgements can be made only through utilising the 
categories." We are however, in disagreement over the precise interpretation of this 
passage. She views formal intuition both as a kind of pre-conceptual unity, but 
distinguished from the form of intuition, and as a product of a conceptual synthesis. Upon 
our interpretation Kant is solely committed to the latter view. See also Gooter Zoller, 
"Comments on Professor Kitcher's 'Connecting Intuitions and Conceptions at B 160n'," 
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 Supplement (1986): 152-4. 
i3 "die Form der Anschauung blofi Mannigfaltiges, die formale 
An s c h a u u n g aber Einheit der Vorstellung giebt." 
74 "Zusammenfassung des mannigfaltigen ... in eine anschauliche 
Vorstellung" 
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if the manifold is to be anything other than an absolute unity, it is necessary for the 
relations between intuitions minimally to be temporal and this applies whether one 
takes the manifold of intuition to be conceptually synthesised or simply associated. 
Whatever else one would wish to stipulate as a condition for any synthesis giving 
rise to awareness of more than the absolute unity of the manifold, it is in every case 
necessary that the synthesis occur through time. Although Kant carries this 
conclusion over from the Aesthetic into the Deduction, his argument does not 
presuppose the transcendentally ideal status of time as a form of intuition. All that 
is pertinent for the argument of the Deduction is that it is necessary for time to be 
unified, because the conceptual synthesis of intuitions is then in every case 
necessary _ Yet the unity of time is equally the condition of the occurrence of any 
temporal association of intuitions. If there were, for example, different streams of 
time running in parallel, or if there were discrete blocks of time incommensurate 
with one another, then association of intuitions could not occur according to 
relations of, for example, succession or contiguity. This is because these intuitions 
could then be placed within different time frames. Indeed, it is only insofar as 
intuitions are in temporal relationship with one another that they are anything but 
absolute unities. The time from the one intuition to the next must itself be unified 
such that both intuitions are placed in a single time frame. In any case where such 
association could occur, the particularities of intuitions notwithstanding, it is also 
possible (given the appropriate conceptual capacities) for there to be a 
representation of the intuitions in time. This conclusion, however, is weaker than 
the one that Kant draws at the end of his discussion of the synthesis of apprehension: 
All synthesis, therefore, even that which renders perception possible, is 
subject to the categories; and since experience is knowledge by means of 
connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of 
experience, and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience. 
[B161] 
(Folglich steht aile Synthesis, wodurch selbst Wahmehroung m6glich 
wird, unter den Kategorien, und, da Erfahrung Erkenntnili durch 
verkniipfte Wahrnehmungen ist, so sind die Kategorien Bedingungen 
der Moglichkeit der Erfahrung, und gelten also a priori auch von allen 
Gegenstanden der Erfahrung.] 
The claim advanced here docs not concern the possibility of conceptualising the 
manifold of intuition, but rather the stronger claim that the synthesis of apprehension 
itself, and therefore even association, requires conceptual synthesis. The materials 
·101 . 
required for a justification of this step are already before us. 
The point upon which we have concentrated, and on which criticisms have 
focused, concerns the legitimisation of the application of concepts to experience. All 
of the critics involved in the Transcendental Argument debate make this point. 1bc 
alternative account that we have been considering is that the association of the 
manifold of intuition according to relations of contiguity, succession, etc., could 
provide a sufficient basis for the unity of experience, to which a subsequent 
conceptual detennination is applied such that a self-conscious awareness of the 
experience is possible. If this were the case, then we would be necessarily and 
systematically mistaken about the nature of our experience. However, even if we 
were mistaken in this way, our experience would be made up of an awareness of the 
temporal or spatio-temporal relations bet\veen intuitions. Assuming that intuitions 
do not themselves possess any particular temporal or spatio-temporal quality as an 
intrinsic detennination, in our experience of the contiguous or successive relations of 
intuitions we must, therefore, have an awareness of time and space within which the 
intuitions are associated according to these relations. TIlls awareness of times 
within time - or spaces within space - does, however, itself presupposes the 
objective unity of consciousness, and this is because it is only under the condition 
that it is possible for the 'I think' to accompany the representation that there can be 
any consciousness of the unity of representations. Otherwise stated, a succession of 
conscious states is not a consciousness of the succession. It is, therefore, necessary 
for there to be an objective unity of consciousness if the association of intuitions 
according to temporal and spatio-temporal properties is to occur. 
It is no longer merely the case that intuitions are contingently limited by the 
particular faculties that we possess, i.e. that our faculties allow no intuitions \vhich 
are neither spatial nor temporal. Kant has indeed established the conclusion that he 
wants: that it not possible for there to be an intuition which does not conform to the 
categories. 75 This is to say, experience is not a particular interpretation placed upon 
75 It should be noted that this does not match the productive capacity that Fichte attributes 
to the imagination. Intuition is determined with regard to its fom}, and hence the 
imagination is productive in the sense that the form of objectivity is a priori introduced to 
manifold of intuition, but the intuitions themselves are not produced: the imagination 
"merely combines and arranges the material of knowledge, that is, the intuition, 
'which must be given to it by the objcct."[B145] 
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the intuitions that we receive. If this were the case, then there would be a gap, 
wherein scepticism's problematic resides, between how experience is conceived and 
how that experience actually is. However, no such sceptical leverage is possible 
because, according to Kant's argument in the B-Deduction, the very forms of 
intuition are themselves categorised. We can here see why this second half of the 
Deduction was in fact necessary: that the manifold of intuition must be brought 
under categories for any representation of that manifold to occur was already 
established, but that it should be a priori categorised was not. 
3.4.2 Step Four: Summary 
The Deduction will be completed when it is demonstrated that the 
representation of the manifold of intuition is not conditional upon the contingent fact 
that intuitions happen to arise in a sufficiently orderly fashion for concepts to be 
applicable to them. In addition to the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, the 
representation of this manifold necessitates that the temporal or spatio-temporal 
properties of the intuitions are brought into synthetic relationship. Space and time 
are, therefore, represented through concepts insofar as we have any representation of 
intuitions which calls for their temporal or spatio-temporal characteristics to be 
synthesised, as would be the case for the representation of causality. If, however, all 
intuitions have spatial or temporal form, and space and time are represented through 
concepts, then all intuitions must be able to be synthesised simply inasmuch as they 
have this form. There is, therefore, no need to consider the representation of 
intuitions to be conditional because we know a priori that they are conceptually 
synthesisable. 
3.5 The Transcendental Deduction in Summary 
As we saw at the start of this chapter, Cas sam divides the Deduction's 
argument into a "Conceptual" and a "Satisfaction Component" in order to illustrate 
that it is a prejudice on Kant's part to assert that an unconditional necessity be 
attributed to unity of the manifold of intuition.76 This 'prejudice' Cassam ascribes 
to Kant's commitment to transcendental idealism. However, if we review the 
[nur den Stoff zum Erkenntnill, die Anschauung, die ihm durchs Object gegeben 
werden muB, verbindet und ordnet] 
i6 For the original description of Cas sam's account see pp. 65-68 of this chapter. 
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account of the Deduction that has been advanced above, then we shall see that not 
only is Cassaro's presentation of the Deduction misleading, but also that Kant has a 
direct response to Cassam' s suggestion that an empirical unity of consciousness 
meets the conditions of the Satisfaction Component. 77 
The initial premise of the Deduction as we have presented it consists in a 
statement regarding the manifold of intuition. This set out the general claim that the 
manifold of intuition must be subject to a temporal Synthesis if there is to be any 
awareness of the manifold as anything other than an absolute unity. Correlative to 
this first point is Kant's argument regarding the need for there to be a unitary 
subject of any representation of this synthesis. If this is what Cassaro is indicating 
in his description of the Conceptual Component as involving the claim that 
"individual experiences must belong to a unified consciousness",78 then we are at 
this point in agreement. The situation with regard to the Satisfaction Component 
is, however, more complicated. Whereas we can agree with Cassam that Kant does 
indeed intend to reach the conclusion that "only experience of objects could provide 
77 A similar argument to that of Cassaro is advanced by Ralph C. S. Walker, "Synthesis 
and Transcendental Idealism,." in Immanuel Kant: Critical Assessments, vol 2, cd. Ruth F. 
Chadwick (London: Routledge, 1992). Walker draws a distinction between the argument 
in the A and B editions of the Deduction. He claims that the notion of an affinity of thc 
manifold found in the A edition means that Kant has surreptitiously realist commitments 
because, according to Walker, p. 234, "there is nothing we can do to construct the world of 
appearances in such a way that every agent has a cause, if the data given in intuition do 
not manifest the appropriate regularity." Transcendental synthesis is therefore dependent 
upon intuitions manifesting the appropriate empirical qualities. As reformulated in the B 
edition, however, the notion of affinity is entirely absent and, Walker says, p. 236, "the 
mind can classifY data together in whatever manner it determines." This alleviates the 
problem that Walker finds in the A-Deduction of it being possible to read properties of 
things-in-themselves from the natural affinities contained in the manifold, but it remains 
the case that the classification of intuitions rests upon regularities contained in the 
manifold. The situation has only altered to the ex1ent that the rules of ordering are not 
delimited in scope by natural affinities. 
However, once it is recognised that in both the A and B editions Kant argues that there 
must be a synthesis of space and time, the claim that Kant requires the manifold to display 
regularities no longer has any pertinence. If there is a particular set of concepts required 
for the synthesis of space and time, then all experience is subject to the transcendental 
guarantee that it can be classified in terms of these concepts, e.g., in terms of cause and 
effect. Whether in addition to this objective unity of consciousness there will be any 
subjective unity, whether experience will display sufficient regularity that associations can 
be generated which lead to classifications in terms of causal laws, is altogether a different 
matter because it is not a condition of the possibility of experience and, thereby, falls 
outside of the range of transcendental philosophy. 
i8 Cassam, "Transcendental Arguments," 361. 
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a basis for the unity of consciousness",79 we are in disagreement as to what the 
import of this statement is. According to Cassaro, Kant maintains this conclusion 
because if there were not sufficient regularity in the manifold such that intuitions 
could become synthesised with one another, then there would be no opportunity for 
the unity of consciousness to arise. Cassam then points out that the ground of the 
unity of consciousness cannot, for Kant, be accounted for in a realist fashion. In 
other words, Kant's denial of all knowledge of things as they are in themselves 
means that he cannot explain the regularity of experience by appealing to the regular 
nature of the world. One of Cassam's conclusions is, therefore, that it is as a 
consequence of Kant's anti-realist position that Kant maintains that the manifold 
must be subject to a transcendental synthesis which renders the unity of 
consciousness possible. This means that rather than the Conceptual Component 
indicating that experiences must belong to a unified consciousness if they are to have 
any representational status, it states that individual experiences must belong to a 
unified consciousness because such experiences are not experiences of things-in-
themselves. "Whereas in the former case the unity of consciousness is conditional 
upon the order of experience, in the latter case the unity of consciousness has 
priority, i.e. there would be no individual experiences unless there were a unity of 
conscIOusness. 
The reason that we have called Cassam's account misleading is that Kant 
reaches the conclusion stated in the Satisfaction Component on two separate 
occasions. The relationship between the unity of consciousness and the experience 
of objects is first established in Kant's discussion of the difference between the 
objective and the subjective unity of consciousness. If this point constituted the sole 
argument upon which the Satisfaction Component rested, then Cassam' s criticism 
would be pertinent. For Kant, the subjective unity of consciousness is without 
relation to objects because the manifold is not united in a concept. However, if, like 
Cassaro, one were to maintain that experience is ordered in such a w·ay that the 
subjective unity of consciousness is possible because it has a direct relationship to 
objects (tbings-in-themselves) which have unity and are regularly ordered., then it 
does appear to be the case that Kant rules out the relationship bet\veen subjective 
79 Ibid. 
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unity and objects. And this is because Kant denies that objects are things-in-
themselves. One can therefore say that, without idealistic restrictions, the subjective 
unity of consciousness meets the Satisfaction Component, which, for Cassam, 
means that Kant does not answer Hume' s problem. 
What we have seen is that Kant's argument proceeds to another stage which 
demonstrates why concept-application is necessary for experience. TIlls docs, 
therefore, legitimise the claim that it is an objective unity of consciousness which 
alone meets the requirement of the Satisfaction Component. It is only within a 
conceptually mediated experience that the synthesis of the manifold of intuition can 
represent objects in the sense that the unity of consciousness is a consciousness of a 
unity. If, however, we can have experience on the basis of the subjective unity of 
consciousness alone, then the objection arises as to whether the concepts employed 
within the objective unity are, in fact, legitimate or not. There could, for instance, 
be multiple different conceptual frameworks capable of being applied to one and the 
same expenence. The argument of the Deduction does not go so far as to 
demonstrate why this is not the case. It does, however, provide a justification for 
why concept application is necessary for all experience. 
As a consequence, the argument of the Deduction levels the ground for the 
further claim that some particular set of concepts is always necessary. Kant 
achieves this end by allowing the associationist premise that a subjective unity of 
consciousness is possible, such that it is possible for there to be a consciousness of 
association. gO We can be aware of the associations that exist within the manifold of 
80 Michael 1. Young, "Kant's Notion of Objectivity," Kant-Studien 70 (1979): passim, also 
focuses on the distinction between the subjective and the objective and on how this aspect 
of the Deduction provides a key to understanding Kant's answer to Hume. The distinction 
between the subjective and the objective is, however, drawn by Young, p. 132, in terms of 
a contrast between appearance and reality where reality corresponds to the representation 
of "objects of scientific knowledge". Young maintains the distinction in this manner 
because of what he perceives to be a failing in what he terms, p. 132, the traditional 
account within which Kant is taken to hold the view that '<the employment of the 
categories is what makes possible the representation of public objects or things." This 
traditional view is taken to be a misinterpretation of Kant because both the passages 
within the Prolegomena on judgements of experience and perception and the discussion of 
subjective unity in the Deduction allow for the possibility that we can. at the very least, be 
aware of intuitions 'without subsuming them under categories. The consistency of Kant's 
position can, however, be upheld if Kant is taken to be arguing that insofar as objects are 
to be understood in a scientific manner as obeying universal and necessary laws. then it 
must be the case that categories are applied to the intuitions of them: we conceive. 
according to Young, p. 138, of objects in such a way that "we can understand their 
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intuition without it being necessary for this awareness to involve the conceptual 
determination of the manifold in the awareness of an object manifested in the 
objective unity of consciousness. Such awareness, however, involves locating the 
manifold within determinate spatial or temporal co-ordinates. According to Kant, it 
is this awareness of the manifold as being associated according to spatial location 
(as in relations of contiguity) or temporal location (as in relations of causality) that 
cannot be granted to the associationist, because it is already necessary for there to 
have been a conceptual determination of space and time themselves. Space and time 
must be represented as unities such that there is one space across which - or one 
time through which - the manifold is associated. 
Hypothetically speaking, what the subjective unity of consciousness could 
provide is an awareness of different locations or instants: but what the subjective 
unity could not provide is the relationship that these locations or instants have to one 
another in space or time, such that one could be aware of the contiguity of the 
instants as contiguous in space or simultaneous in time.81 It has already been argued 
behaviour and properties as consequences issuing from the operation of universal law." 
Although this interpretation takes the valuable step of identifying the distinction 
between the subjective and the objective as crucial for the overall argument of the 
Deduction, it does nonetheless face insurmountable difficulties. The first of these is that 
there is little evidence within the B-Deduction to suggest that the distinction between the 
subjective and objective can be aligned with a distinction between an awareness of objects 
in a non-scientific and a scientific manner. Kant is clear that it insofar as there is any 
awareness of intuitions as united in the concept of an object, then there is an objective 
unity of consciousness. It is only because Kant's position as stated in the Prolegomena is 
used by Young to interpret the Deduction that his interpretation seems plausible. Yet, we 
have shown that the Deduction employs the distinction made in the Prolegomena without 
falling into the difficulties that are generally thought to accompany it. Furthermore, by 
interpreting the Deduction in this manner we can account for the entirety of its structure, 
which would appear to present a difficulty for Young because Kant reaches his 
conclusions regarding objective unity half-way through it. Finally, as an answer to Hume, 
the Deduction appears, on Young's view, to constitute a description of what we must take 
the world to be if we are to engage with it in a scientific manner, but it leaves unanswered 
the question as to whether we are entitled to do so. 
81 It should be noted that this conclusion is flush with the distinction Kant draw'S between 
the consciousness of humans and that of animals. On a number of occasions Kant 
attributes a consciousness of representations while denying that they can have any self-
consciousness. In the letter to Marcus Herz of the 26th May, 1789, the distinction is 
between representations connected according to empirical laws of association within 
which there might be a consciousness of each individual representations, and the 
consciousness of the unity of the representations in relation to the their object which 
requires the synthetic unity of apperception. IX! 52] Similarly in the Logic Kant's c1ainl is 
that animals arc aware [kennen] of objects, have a consciousness of them, but that they do 
not know [erkennenJ them.[IX 65] On our interpretation of the Deduction, it is clear that 
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by Kant that the unity of the manifold in the representation of an object requires the 
objective unity of consciousness, and this argument is mobilised once again in 
relation to this representation of the unity of space and time. The intuitions of space 
and time are united in the concepts space and time, providing a ground for the 
associations which have hitherto been understood to operate without conceptual 
mediation. Given that it has been accepted that experience requires synthesis and 
that the alternative accounts of this synthesis are either based on concepts or based 
on an invocation of associations built upon the spatio-temporal properties of 
intuitions, we can draw the significant conclusion that all experience requires 
conceptualisation. 82 Furthermore, if one accepts that all experience is spatio-
Kant attributes to animals a subjective unity of consciousness in which intuitions (given 
the appropriate empirical conditions) are associated, but for animals the consciousness of 
the intuition is not a consciousness of it as a manifold. This, furthermore, implies that, for 
Kant, although animals are conscious they do not have a temporal consciousness, in that 
to be conscious of the temporal relations between intuitions requires that the manifold is 
run through and held together, and this is only possible though the synthetic unity of 
apperception. For a discussion of the status attributed to animals by Kant see Steve 
Naragon, "Kant on Descartes and the Brutes," Kant-Studien 81 (1990). 
82 This is to reverse the order of relations between part and whole that is proposed by Hoke 
Robinson in his "The Transcendental Deduction from A to B: Combination in the 
Threefold Synthesis and the Representation of a Whole," The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 25 Supplement (1986): 52-7. It is Robinson's claim, p. 56, that that the unity 
of consciousness can be established "by showing that experience requires, as an ideal, that 
all objects be components of the world-object, in which all representations considered to be 
real are combined through the representation of the whole." Rather than it being the case 
that the unity of consciousness requires that all objects be synthesised or otherwise 
summed together in the production of an ideal unity, the status of which seems to be rather 
unclear, this unity, on our interpretation, is produced through the necessary synthesis of 
the manifold of space and time. We do not arrive at a world-object as a consequence of 
the synthesis of the representations which are considered to be real within a whole greater 
than any of those objects. Rather, the synthesis of representations allowing for the 
representations of objects is possible only on the condition that there is a spatio-temporal 
world. 
It should also be noted that the distinction which Robinson draws between the first and 
second editions of the Deduction is also affected by this reversal. Robinson's claim, pp. 
50-1, is that in the A-Deduction knowledge of objects is achieved in two steps: the first is 
the synthesis of intuitions and the second is the positing of the transcendental object to 
serve as the referent for the representations. In the B-Deduction, on the other hand, there 
is no distinction to be made between the formation of an intentional object and the 
conceptual synthesis of the manifold. However, on our interpretation consistency can be 
maintained between editions because we could view the transcendental object as the 
conceptual synthesis as it applies to the forms of intuition. This object is transcendental in 
the sense of being a necessary condition of all empirical representation of objects, as such, 
Kant describes it as = X and as nothing to us. Yet this object is distinct from the thing-in-
itself, because we can have no awareness of the pure empty forms of space and time as 
such, we are always aware of objects in space and time. This would also make coherent 
Kant's reference, which Robinson fails to mention, to the T or soul as the transcendental 
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temporal, then because space and time must be synthesised it might well be the case 
that there is some immutable set of concepts which are necessary for this synthesis 
to occur; such concepts would be the categories. 
Thus, in schematic form, Kant's Deduction can be summarised 
according to the four steps outlined above in sections 3.1 to 3.4 - as follows: 
3.1) Premise Experience of temporal diversity requires a synthesis of the 
manifold. 
3.2) Stage 1 The representation of synthesis requires the analytic unity of 
conSCIousness. 
3.3) The analytic unity of consciousness requires conceptualisation. 
3.4) Stage 2 All experience of temporal relations involves the representation 
of synthesis. 
The first stage of Kant's argument unproblematically outlines the 
assumptions to which accounts of experience based on association must employ and 
comes to no conclusions regarding the validity of the concepts required for the 
objective unity of consciousness. It does demonstrate, however, that some synthesis 
of the manifold is necessary and that, if there is to be an objective unity of 
consciousness, this synthesis must employ concepts. This corresponds to the first 
two steps in the argument as it was outlined in the previous chapter. 83 What the 
second stage contributes is an argument that the objective unity of consciousness is a 
necessary condition of the subjective unity of consciousness, where this involves a 
consciousness of the synthesis of representations. Although Kant invokes the 
conclusions of the Transcendental Aesthetic regarding space and time as the forms 
of intuition and, therefore, draws upon the transcendental idealistic claim that we 
can have no knowledge of things-in-themselves, his argument requires this backdrop 
only to the extent that it allows him to claim that it is necessary for all experience to 
have a spatio-temporal form. That experience is ordered within space and time is, 
however, a commitment shared by associationism. The associationist must, 
therefore, accept the conclusion that experience is subject to a conceptual 
determination. Kant's conclusion, therefore, establishes the final point he required 
to answer Hume, that concepts are necessary for experience. 
object of inner sense [A 361]. See also Karl Ameriks, "Remarks on Robinson and the 
Representation of a Whole," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 Supplement (1986): 
63-6. 
83 See above p. 36. 
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4. Guyer on the Ded uction 
Within the body of this chapter we have distinguished our reading of Kanfs 
Transcendental Deduction primarily from that provided by Cassam, as well as 
offering critical comments on the interpretations of Allison, Kitcher, Robinson, 
Walker and Young. However, within recent secondary literature on the Deduction 
the account given by Guyer provides the most outstanding challenge to the above 
interpretation. 84 Guyer finds four different arguments for the transcendental 
necessity of the categories spread throughout the Analytic of the first Critique and 
Kant's Nachlaf3. These arguments are distinguished according to their 
presuppositions; namely whether they assume either (I) some knowledge of objects 
or (In knowledge of ourselves as the subject of unified representations, and whether 
this knowledge is either (A) pure or (B) empirical. Upon this basis Guyer proceeds 
to argue that within the Deduction itself Kant employs a combination of strategies 
(lA, llA and IB) but that each of these arguments fails, and that the only successful 
strategy (ITB) is to be found in the Analogies of Experience and the Refutation of 
Idealism. The Deduction itself is considered to be an aberration, thought to bc in 
conflict with Kant's original intentions, and also to be the only coherent argument 
for the categories. The interpretation that we have given of the B-Deduction will be 
used to bring out the inadequacy of the approach employed by Guyer. We shall take 
issue with his dissection of the argument of the Deduction into its constituent parts. 
As we shall see, Guyer judges each part to be a failure without considering how the 
various divisions of the argument form a coherent whole. 
The first argument that Guyer finds in the B-Deduction is of the IA variety, 
in which there is an assumption of synthetic a priori knowledge and in which the 
possibility of knowledge of objects is also taken as a given. In other words, 
according to Guyer, Kant proceeds from the dual assumptions that we can have 
knowledge of objects and a definition of what an object is, to the conclusion that 
there arc a priori concepts because v~1thout them, by definition, we simply could not 
have knowledge of objects. This argument corresponds to the first half of the 
84 Paul Guyer, Claims of Knowledge and "Psychology and the Transcendental Deduction.," 
in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. E Forster. The material upon 'which we shall 
be drawing for Guyer's account of the B-Deduction is contained in Kant and the Claims of 
Knowledge but is also to be found in an almost unmodified from in "The Failure of the B-
Deduction," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 Supplement (1986). 
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Deduction and proceeds, according to Guyer, in 5 stages. 85 
The first stage is comprised of the assumption (discussed above in Section 
3.1) that synthesis is not given through objects themselves, but rather must bc 
introduced via the activity of the subject. Guyer sees Kant's entire argument as 
encapsulated within this statement because, on his interpretation, Kant takes this to 
be simply equivalent to the claim that such synthesis requires the addition of a 
concept of an object to the manifold. This, "'the opaque inference of § 15", Guyer 
claims, '"represents Kant's most basic level of thought".86 Kant is seen to beg the 
question raised by any empiricist opponent because he argues as if there were no 
alternative account of how the manifold could be synthesised without a priori 
rules.87 The subsequent sections of the first half of the Deduction are presented by 
Guyer as providing merely a simulacrum of an argument which justifies this initial 
assumption. That is, these sections divert attention from this assumption by making 
an appeal to the conditions of apperception, and in these sections Kant also claims 
that apperception is a condition of combination. The conditions of apperception can 
then be used to justify the initial assumption that rules of combination are necessary. 
The second stage (§l6) in Kant's argument involves the claim that the 
elements of the manifold must belong to a single self-consciousness if they are to be 
synthesised. While one would expect this to be followed by an investigation into the 
conditions of self-consciousness, all that one finds (§ 17 and § 18), according to 
Guyer, is that Kant ")ust uses first the concept of an object and then the concept of 
an objective judgement to provide the necessary conditions of apperception itself,.gg 
What Guyer means by this is that, rather than deriving the conditions under w'hich 
synthesis can occur from apperception, Kant simply uses the concept of an object to 
stipulate what the conditions of apperception are. From this point on Kant can 
proceed swiftly onto stages 4 and 5 (§19 and §20): firstly, the identification of 
85 Guyer, Claims of Knowledge, 109-121. 
86 Ibid., 110. 
87 '"Kant often employed the inference directly from an act of combination to a priori 
rules as to the whole of a transcendental deduction, whether of the categories or even 
of the forms of intuition. That is, apart from any special implications of the concept 
either of self-knowledge or of knowledge of objects, Kant clearly believed that the 
basic fact that aU concepts of synthesis require an a priori framework for their 
organisation is sufficient to undermine the empiricist assumption that all concepts are 
abstracted from experience". Ibid. 
88 Ibid., 117. 
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judgement as the means by which synthesis achieves objectivity and, secondl). the 
categories can now be introduced by means of their relationship to the logical 
functions of judgement. In short, according to Guyer, Kant simply assumes that any 
empirical knowledge of the manifold implies the combination of that manifold:89 
Kant's most favoured version of the deduction ... rests upon a 
conception of the nature of empirical knowledge that no empiricist., let 
alone skeptic, is likely to countenance. 90 
However, if we refer back to the analysis of the Deduction that we have 
provided, we can see just how seriously Guyer errs in his judgement upon the 
Deduction. With regard the first assumption found by Guyer we find ourselves in 
agreement with him with regard to the status of Kant's conception of empirical 
knowledge. It is indeed a definitional point for Kant that if we are to have 
knowledge of objects then the manifold of intuition must have been subject to 
combination. However, this assumption does not function as a premise upon which 
the subsequent argument is built, begging the question against the empiricist or 
sceptic. On the contrary, it is the definition of knowledge which must be adopted if 
the alternative conceptions are to be challenged. That is, the empiricist derivation of 
both knowledge of objects and the acquisition of concepts from a synthesis of 
intuitions has lead to a historical situation in which the empiricist has become a 
sceptic; we have no knowledge of objects because we know no necessary connection 
and hence, in Hume's view, '''what had hitherto been regarded as reason was but an 
all-prevalent illusion infecting our faculty of knowledge."[B 128]91 It is not merely 
the problematic nature of Kant's definition of knowledge that Guyer takes issue with 
(given the alternative empiricist accounts), but he also finds that Kant employs it to 
provide support to the supposedly independent argument from apperception. Guyer 
takes it that Kant's argument for the reciprocal relationship between synthesis and 
apperception is derived from the definition of knowledge (see above p. 83). On the 
basis of the interpretation that we have provided this is, at best, a partial 
understanding of the argument. It is certainly true that the condition of the synthesis 
89 Guyer also identifies the further assumption that synthesis is an intrinsically conceptual 
activity. This potential problem has already been identified and rejected above in Section 
3.3. 
90 Guyer, Claims o/Knowledge, 120-121. 
91 "eine so allgemeine fUr Vernunft gehaltene Tauschung unseres 
Erkenntnilh'ermogens" . 
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of the manifold is apperception, and that apperception is only possible under the 
condition of there being a synthesis of the manifold, but this argument is not the one 
through which either synthesis or apperception are established. As has been shown, 
this argument is only to be found within the second half of the Deduction. It is, thus, 
one of the principle failings of Guyer's account that he can condemn the Deduction 
as failure whilst only dealing with one half of the text. 92 
5. Conclusion 
Rather than it being the case that the Deduction proceeds on the basis of the 
assumption that we have knowledge of objects to the end-point of the categories as 
the conditions of possibility of this experience, Kant's argument requires merely, as 
a first premise, that we accept that intuitions are not intrinsically representational 
and, as a second premise, that we can attribute spatio-temporal determinations to 
intuitions. On the basis of the first premise Kant argues that the representational 
status of intuitions is derived from the form of synthesis to which they are subject, 
and that his account of synthesis as being a conceptual determination of intuitions 
provides a coherent explanation of how intuitions can come to represent, whereas the 
explanation based on association fails. The second premise allows Kant to claim 
that space and time as forms of intuition must themselves be synthesised before even 
the perception of spatio-temporal qualities can take place. In both cases the 
materials employed within scepticism to challenge any claims to knowledge are used 
by Kant to construct an answer to this ver), challenge. With regard to the first half 
of the Deduction the distinction between the judgements applied to experience and 
nature of that experience itself is maintained; it establishes only that a synthesis 
according to concepts is necessary for representation, but does nothing to show that 
intuitions themselves are given according to these conceptual determinations. 
However, the second half of the Deduction delimits the space in which the sceptic 
can form denials; it is only under the condition that the spatio-temporal 
determinations of experience be denied that the sceptic can assert that Kant's 
92 It is true that provides some account of the second half of the Deduction in other 
sections of Claims of Knowledge, 371-83, but because he has deduced a schema of 
argumentative strategies which he takes Kant to be employing in every instance he cannot 
deal with the case of the B-Deduction where two arguments are employed to arrive at a 
single conclusion. Within Guyer's schema this simply amounts to two separate inadequate 
arguments. 
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argument rests upon unacceptable premises. It is, moreover, not at all clear what 
such a denial could amount to, since it is of no matter whether spatio-temporal 
determinations be correctly or mistakenly applied, but merely their occurrence that 
Kant requires. 
Within this chapter it has been contended that Kant successfully argues that 
the application of concepts to experience is not reducible to a claim about how 
experience must be regarded. To this extent Kant manages to show that it is 
possible that some concepts are not merely subjectively necessary, but also have 
objective validity. Although the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition comes 
about by subjective acts, the concepts employed within this activity have an 
objective validity insofar as they are the conditions of possibility for experience. 
However, a central tenet of this argument has been that the 'I think' must be able to 
accompany my representations, or that experience requires that it be possible for the 
subject to have a consciousness of itself as possessing the intuitions experienced. 
The ground of this claim was that in order for the 'I think' to accompany 
representations, it is necessary for there to have been a synthesis of the manifold of 
intuition. It has, furthennore, been assumed that the proposition that the 'I think' 
can accompany representations would be assented to. However, what has not been 
demonstrated is that the only condition required for the 'I think' to accompany 
representations is the synthesis of the manifold. It is at this point that the problems 
(which we have associated with Schulze) outlined in the previous chapter re-emerge. 
The questions to be explored in the next chapter concern the relationship between 
awareness of the synthesis of the manifold and the awareness that the subject has of 
itself. Most simply put, for Kant, self-consciousness, or the 'I think' accompanying 
representations, involves the a",rareness of the synthesis of the manifold and this 
synthesis is an activity performed by the subject. However, in such a case is my 
awareness of myself, in the 'I think,' an awareness of myself as performing the 
activity of synthesis? If so, does this not mean. that I have an awareness of myself as 
I am in myself? 
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Chapter Four 
Apperception and the 'I Think' 
1. Introduction 
Within this chapter we shall be examining the criticism levelled by G. E. 
Schulze, in the 1792 publication Aenesidemus, against Kant in the light of our 
discussion of the Transcendental Deduction in the previous chapter. A brief resume 
of the difficulties raised by Schulze with regard to the argument as we have 
presented it is outlined in Section 2. The subsequent focus is upon the seemingly 
paradoxical situation of the subject within the Deduction. The Kantian subject, in 
explicit contradistinction to the Cartesian subject, has no direct and immediate 
knowledge of itself. However, as is argued in Section 3, despite the fact that there is 
no manifold of intuition associated with the subject such that it can become an 
object of knowledge, Kant maintains that we can be aware of the existence of the 
subject. It is contended that the concurrence of Kant's claims that the I exists and 
that the I is something intellectual can be accounted for in terms of the reciprocal 
relation established in the previous chapter (and expanded upon here). 
\\!hat is at issue is the relationship between the synthesis of the manifold of 
intuition and the ability for the ') think' to accompany thoughts. Kant can 
legitimately claim that the existence of the subject is felt because, although no 
specific act of synthesis is required for its production, the I is nonetheless the 
product of synthesis in general. In Section 4 of this chapter it is shown that it is on 
the basis of a misunderstanding of the relationship between the subject as an empty 
representation and the processes of synthesis that the problems identified in 
Aenesidemus arise. Furthermore, Fichte's introduction of a notion of intellectual 
intuition does nothing to alleviate this misunderstanding. Instead, it constitutes an 
un-Kantian solution to a problem that does not exist. Some contemporary 
interpretations of the Kantian subject, presented in Section 5, provide further 
arguments in favour of some kind of non-sensible awareness of this subject. It is 
shown that interpretations such as these underwrite Fichte's interpretation by raising 
the problem of how representations can be identified as my representations without 
some prior awareness of myself The maintenance of a distinction between the 
analytic and synthetic unities of consciousness, which is discussed in Section 6, 
resolves this potential difficulty, as well as those previously discussed. This is 
because such a move allows us to disambiguate the I of which we have an 
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awareness, the I as a transcendental condition of experience, and the I that is said to 
carry out acts of synthesis. It is suggested that the confusion of the various senses 
of the I is responsible for the attribution to Kant of an intellectual intuition of the 
subject. 
2. Schulze, the Subject and the Transcendental Deduction 
At the end of Chapter Two, pp. 58-61, the difficulty involved m 
maintaining the objective validity of the categories was summarised in terms of a set 
of alleged tensions that arise for Kant in relation to scepticism. It was suggested 
there that the only way in which Kant could provide an answer to Hume's Problem 
was to adopt at least one question-begging assumption. As argued by Schulze, this 
assumption was concerned with the nature of the mind. Stroud, by contrast, saw the 
assumption as regarding the synthetic a priori nature of a particular linguistic 
framework. On the other hand, Gram saw the assumption as one concerned with the 
nature of experience. As we have seen in the previous chapter, pp. 65-68, the latter 
two interpretations stress the difficulty that Kant faces in moving from, in Cassam' s 
terms, the "Conceptual Component" of the argument to the claim made within the 
"Satisfaction Component". For both Stroud and Gram, Kant can provide no 
justification for the claim that the conditions outlined in the Satisfaction Component 
are met merely on the basis of an analysis of the Conceptual Component. On their 
accounts, it is either necessary for Kant to be able to verify that it is not merely a 
contingent fact that the conditions of the Conceptual Component are satisfied, or he 
must simply assume that they are. On the basis of the reconstruction of the 
Transcendental Deduction provided in the previous chapter, we reached the 
conclusion that Kant's notion of transcendental synthesis provides a coherent 
response to these criticisms. What has been established is that the synthesis of the 
manifold of intuition is both a priori and conceptual. From this we have drawn the 
conclusion that Kant can rightfully maintain that it is not merely a contingent fact 
that the conditions under which experience is possible happen to be manifested in the 
world, but rather that the transcendental form of experience itself provides the 
characteristic unity which renders experience possible. 
The preceding analysis, however, left uninterrogated the problems identified 
by Schulze. It will be recalled that Schulze questions the status of the knowledge of 
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the subject that Kant supposedly relies upon within the Transcendental Deduction. 1 
In particular, it was Schulze's claim that if the objective validity of the categories is 
to be established, then we must have some knowledge of subject of experience in the 
performance of the acts of spontaneity which determine the manifold of mtuition. 
Furthermore, Schulze also insisted that such knowledge, though necessary for 
Kant's argument, was incompatible with Kant's overarching stricture that there can 
be no knowledge of things-in-themselves. On Schulze's account, the oonflict arises 
because the argument for the objective validity of the categories requires more than 
it being necessary for the subject of experience to be regarded as spontaneous. lbat 
is to say, Kant's argument cannot simply demonstrate the hypothetical conjunction 
that if the categories are objectively valid, then the subject must be spontaneous. 
What is required in addition to this is the knowledge that the subject is in fact 
spontaneous. This, however, cannot be knowledge of the empirical subject. It 
cannot be such, because all knowledge of the empirical governed is by the very 
transcendental conditions that are in the process of being accounted for. More 
specifically, if this were Kant's argument, the relation of determinator to determined 
which pertains between the subject and experience would be that of cause to effect, 
and Kant would, therefore, be illegitimately assuming the validity of one of those 
concepts that he is in the process of attempting to justify. Apparently, therefore, the 
conclusion which must be drawn is that Kant is committed to the view that we have 
knowledge subject as it is in itself - at least insofar as its spontaneous nature is 
concerned. 
The terms in which the criticisms of Schulze are framed are heavily indebted 
to the interpretations of Kant current amongst his contemporaries. In particular, the 
attempt to formulate a Cartesian point of certainty - the 'Proposition of 
Consciousness' advocated by Reinhold - is a clear target of Schulze's criticism. 2 
I See, Chapter 2, pp. 44-50. 
2 This was discussed in note 19 on p. 45. The Proposition of Consciousness, as stated in 
Fundament, 81 - "Representation is that which is distinguished in consciousness by the 
subject from object and subject, and is referred to both." - is not Cartesian in that a 
systematic methodology is employed to derive the proposition, rather it is simply 
proclaimed as self-evident. Indeed, the argumentative structure employed by Reinhold 
necessitates that there is no argument from which his first principle could be drawn. 
Indeed, were this not the case, then Reinhold's principle would be neither first nor 
absolute. However, Reinhold is also not employing a transcendental argument - he is not 
claiming that the principle of consciousness is either a neccssaI)' presupposition of 
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However, the account of the Deduction presented in the preceding chapter, suggests 
that Kant himself is in no way committed to this form of Cartesianism. On the 
contrary, it has been our contention that Kant draws only upon the claim that in 
order for the 'I think' to be able to accompany representations, those representations 
must be something to me and, furthermore, we have contended that this claim is 
analytic. In which case, there is no need for Kant to claim any substantial 
knowledge, be it empirical or transcendent, of the subject. 
Although our interpretation of the Deduction may appears to render the 
Schulze's problems of merely historical interest, both textual evidence and current 
interpretations demonstrate that the situation is considerably more complicated and 
ambiguous than has so far been acknowledged. The textual ambiguities will be 
investigated in detail in Section 3; within the remainder of this Section we shall 
consider some of the current major disputes within the secondary literature. 
2.1 Current Debates on the Kantian Subject 
Within the secondary literature on Kant there has been no definitive 
response or rebuttal to the debate concerning the status of Transcendental 
Arguments that we previously reviewed. The focus of scholarly attention has 
instead turned to providing detailed reconstructions of the Deduction, and the rather 
schematic formula employed within the Transcendental Argument debate have come 
to be seen as inaccurate representations of Kant's argument. Throughout the last 
rnro decades, however, the secondary literature on the first Critique has been 
influenced by the type criticisms raised by Stroud and Gram, to the extent that there 
has been an extended and continuing discussion of the role that the subject plays 
within the Deduction. 3 There is a direct relationship between this question and the 
experience in general or of the critical philosophy in particular - that is, Reinhold is not 
employing an argument that is justified by dint of our acceptance of its consequent. 
Rather the Proposition of Consciousness is intended to be an immediate expression of the 
fact of consciousness; insofar as it is granted that we are conscious Reinhold thinks that 
we cannot but assent to the proposition. 
3 For an instructive discussion of this and other recent trends within the secondary 
literature see GOnter ZOller, '''Main D{welopments in Recent Scholarship on the Critique of 
Pure Rea .. mn," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993): passim. The shift 
of emphasis from schematic accounts of transcendental arguments to the more text based 
accounts current today is detailed on pp. 450-4. The increasing focus upon the subjective 
aspects of the Deduction is evidenced in the contrast between this review of the literature 
and one undertaken II years earlier 'within which the subject is not mentioned at all; see, 
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Transcendental Argument debate because what is denied in much of the recent 
literature is Kant's claim that the subjective conditions of thought have objective 
validity. If, however, one can give an account of the spontaneous nature of the 
subject which places it in a detennining relationship to experience - i.e. if one 
could adopt what might be regarded as a strongly idealistic stance - then what 
disappears is the supposedly questionable gap between experience as reflected upon 
and experience as such. Such an argument would bring to light the capacities used 
by the subject in detennining experience, and would show how the nature of that 
experience could unambiguously be known to have an a priori, conceptual form. 
Even if a realist interpretation of the kind proposed by Cassam or Guyer were 
adopted, one would still need to find resources within the first Critique itself for 
relegating the function of the subject to a subsidiary role. 
At present there is little consensus within the secondary literature regarding 
these questions, but there are, broadly speaking, two problems around which the 
debate is centred. 4 The first of these is the epistemological question regarding the 
knowledge of the subject presupposed by the Deduction, and the second concerns the 
ontological status of the subject to which spontaneity is attributed. 
The epistemological problem arises in the context of Kant's claim [8L32] 
that it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations, if 
those representations are not to be nothing to me. In addition to the interpretation of 
this claim as analytic, whose major proponent within the secondary literature is 
Allison and to which we have adhered, there are also interpretations which attribute 
a substantive status to this claim. For Kitcher this claim amounts to something like 
an empirical hypothesis regarding the unity of consciousness, and for Henrich it is a 
synthetic a priori assertion about the identity of the subject. Opinions regarding the 
ontological status of the subject to which the assertion applies are equally widely 
distributed: Kitcher attributes spontaneity to the empirical subject and Allison 
attributes it to a transcendental subject. In yet other instances - seminally in 
Karl Ameriks, "Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy," American Philosophical 
Quarterly 19 (1982): passim. 
4 A survey of the various 'camps' into which current critics fall is presented by Ameriks 
in the complementary pair of articles: "Understanding Apperception Today," in Kant and 
Contemporary Epistemology, ed. Paolo Parrini (Dordrecht: K1uwer, 1994), and "Kant and 
the Self: A Retrospective," in Figuring the Self, ed. David E. Klemm and GUnter ZOller 
(Albany: SUNY, 1997). 
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Strawson • s Bound 's ~f Sense - spontaneity is attributed to the noumenal subject. 
Although there is some conflicting textual evidence regarding the analytic 
status that Kant attributes to the synthetic unity of consciousness, the interpretations 
offered by both Henrich and Kitcher are underwritten by philosophical disputes. 5 
The problematic within which Henrich places Kant is that of, what he tenns, the 
"reflective theory of self-consciousness." The model of self-consciousness which 
Henrich attributes to Kant is one in which the subject comes to know itself on the 
basis of an act of reflection through which the subject comes to recognise itself: in 
summary, "the essence of the Self is reflection.,,6 By a process of elimination and at 
some considerable distance from Kant's text, Henrich arrives at the conclusion that, 
if the Transcendental Deduction is to have any chance of success, what must be 
recognised in this act of reflection is the numerical identity of the subject. 7 Any 
evaluation of this claim is made problematic by the interpretative strategy employed 
by Henrich which consists in the reconstruction of an argument by establishing 
criteria which the argument must meet and then eliminating argumentative strategies 
by means of these criteria.8 However, not only is it difficult to find textual evidence 
5 The main textual ambiguity stems from Kant's apparent commitment, in the A-
Deduction, to the synthetic nature of the proposition which attributes a unity to 
conSCIousness: 
"The synthetic proposition, that all the variety of empirical consciousness must be 
combined in one single self-consciousness, is the absolutely first and synthetic 
principle of our thought in general."[Al17] 
[Der synthetische Satz: dafi alles verschiedene empirische BewulHsein in 
einem einigen SelbstbewuBtsein verbunden sein mUsse, ist der schlechthin erste und 
synthetische Gmndsatz unseres Denkens Uberhaupt.] 
It should, however, be noted that the synthetic nature of this proposition does not 
contradict the exposition of Kant's B132 claim contained in Section 3.2 of the previous 
chapter. Kant's point here is the more general, in that all empirical consciousness must be 
brought under the transcendental unity of apperception - this is indeed the synthetic 
proposition which, as has been argued, forms the conclusion of the B-Deduction. 
6 Dieter Henrich, "Fichte's Original Insight," translated by David R Lachterman, in 
Contemporary German Philosophy, vol 1, ed. Darrel E. Christensen, Manfred Riedel, 
Robert Spaemann, Reiner Wihl and Wolfgang Wieland (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State UP, 1982), 19. 
7 Henrich's most detailed account is his position is presented in "Identity and Objectivity: 
An Inquiry into Kant's Transcendental Deduction," translated by Jeffrey Edwards, in The 
Unity of Reason, ed. R. Velkley (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994), 160-208. A more 
concise account is gi\'en in his "The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental 
Deduction," in Reading Kant, ed. Eva Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, 266-79. 
8 Some of the ambiguities which arise in relation to Henrich's method are highlighted in 
Guyer, review of Jdentitiit und Objektivitiit: Eine Untersuchung tlber Kanis 
transzendentale Dedu":tion, by Dieter Henrich, Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 151-2. 
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for the interpretation offered by Henrich, the attribution of a reflective thool) of 
consciousness to Kant is, as we shall see, also highly problematic. 9 
The basis for Kitcher's attribution of a synthetic status to Kant's B132 
claim derives from her reading of Kant as providing a direct response to Hume's 
scepticism regarding the subject.lO Within this context the unity of the subject 
cannot merely be founded on the basis of an analytic proposition, rather it must be 
demonstrated that this unity constitutes one of the conditions which must be met if 
representations are to be able to represent objects. TIris leads Kitcher to interpret 
the Deduction as an argument which establishes that, what she terms, an "'existential 
dependence,,11 between cognitive states is produced by synthesis and it is these 
dependency relations which constitute the unity of consciousness. The problems 
which have been raised with regard to the coherence of this argument 
notwithstanding,12 once the relationship between the transcendental unity of 
apperception (Kitcher's "unity of consciousness") and the analytic proposition 
regarding the 'I think' is fully articulated, as is undertaken below in Section 6, we 
shall see that the conflict between the synthetic and analytic status of the unity Kant 
attributes to the 1 operates only on a superficial level. 
Our agreement with Kitcher also extends to her position regarding the status 
of the subject in relation to the spontaneous activity of transcendental synthesis. In 
drawing a parallel beuveen Dennett's notion that consciousness arises from 
"subpersonal" processes and Kant's account of synthesis, Kitcher advances the 
9 The reading of Kant adopted by Henrich has not gathered widespread support. For 
examples of some criticisms see Karl Ameriks, "Kant and the Self: A Retrospective," 60-3 
and Dieter Sturma, "Self-Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind," in Proceedings of 
the Eighth International Kant Congress, vol 1, ed. H. Robinson (Milwaukee: Marquette 
UP, 1995): 663-8. Henrich's notion that Kant subscribed to the reflective theory of 
consciousness has, nonetheless, exerted a strong influence on subsequent interpretations. 
The form which this influence has taken is that the radical break with the reflective 
theory, which Henrich associates l\'ith Fichte, has been co-opted as Kant's rather than 
Fichte's innovation. 
10 Kitcher's defence of her interpretation of the Deduction, and, in particular. Kant's 
account of the transcendental unity of apperception, is to be found in a number of places, 
for example, "Kant on Self-Identity." Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 58-9, "Kant's Real 
Self," in Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, ed. Allen W. Wood (London: Cornell UP, 
1984), 114-21, and also in Transcendental Psychology, 91-116. 
II Kitcher, Transcendental Psychology, 103 and passim. 
12 For some detailed criticisms of Kitcher's position see both Henry Allison. "On 
Naturalising Kant's Transcendental Psychology," Dialeclica 49 (1995): passim, and Karl 
Arneriks, "Understanding Apperception Today," 338-44. 
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interpretation that, rather than there being a single source of the act of spontaneity, 
there is nothing within the first Critique which commits Kant to the view that it is 
the subject which performs the acts of synthesis.13 However, Kitcher also goes on to 
advance the claim that, because of our lack of knowledge of the noumenal, --the I 
with which we identify" or the "I that thinks" is "phenomenal and causally 
determined. ,,14 This position has come in for considerable criticism from both 
Allison and Robert Pippin.15 These criticisms arise not only because of the 
immediate and familiar difficulty that Kitcher appears to be invoking - namely, 
that involved in employing a causal relationship within an investigation which 
purports to provide a justification of the principle of causality - but also because 
of Kant's clear commitment to the spontaneity of the apperceiving subject. Both 
Allison and Pippin associate this spontaneity with the ability that Kant attributes to 
the subject to have an awareness of itself as that which carries out acts of 
synthesis. 16 On their account, this awareness is to be distinguished from the 
knowledge that we have of ourselves through introspection, and also from any 
knowledge of a noumenal subject. In both of these cases there is some object of 
awareness, whereas the awareness that we have of ourselves in acting has no object, 
it is intransitive. It will be shown that while Allison and Pippin legitimately stress 
the significance of self-awareness as being both spontaneous and an awareness of 
the identity of the subject in the act of synthesis, they are mistaken when they draw 
the inference that this leads to the rejection of the first of !Gtcher's points and also 
err in their view that there is distinctive kind of consciousness which is a 
consciousness of the act of synthesis. It will be maintained that the transcendental 
subject is purely formal and that it is illegitimate to attribute the activity of synthesis 
13 Daniel Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1969), 
93-6. The same notion is also to be foun<L although stated in different terms, in his 
Consciousness Explained (London: Penguin, 1991), 228. The analogy between Kant and 
Dennett with regard to this point is also drawn by Andrew Brook, Kant and the Afind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994),30 and passim. 
14 Kitcher, Transcendental Psychology, 139. 
15 Specific criticisms of this point are given by Allison in "On Naturalising Kant's 
Transcendental Psychology," 346-9, and "Kant's Refutation of Materialism," Monist 72 
(1989): 196-203. The most sustained attack is to be found in Robert B. Pippin, "Kant on 
the Spontaneity of Mind," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1987): 465-73. 
16 For instances of this, see, for example, Allison, "On Naturalising Kant's Transcendental 
Psychology," 341, 345. The key passages in Kant upon \vhich this interpretation dra,,,s 
arc A 108 and B133. 
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to it. 
Before we move on to justify the claims that have made here, however, we 
shall identity the very real textual difficulties and apparent contradictions that 
plague Kant's account of the subject. 
3. Kant's Invitation to Intellectual Intuition: Intelligence and 
Feeling 
The I at the beginning of the B-Deduction functions as a moment of 
epistemological certitude from which the validity of the categories follows (i.e. given 
that it is known that the 'I think' must be able to accompany any representation, it 
follows that the conditions under which it is possible for this to happen must also be 
conditions for representation per se). In the case of Descartes's argument in the 
Mediations, the certitude in the representatOt of the cogito's existence provides a 
point from which the validity of other representations is also assured (via an 
argument for the existence of a beneficent God). Despite some superficial 
similarity, there is a startling contrast between Descartes's starting point and that of 
Kant. Descartes is not merely assured of his own existence, but also of his existence 
as a thinking thing; what it is for him to exist as a thinking thing is discovered, in the 
first Meditation, though the subtraction of all those elements inessential to the mind. 
The very process of this analysis reveals to Descartes that he can "achieve an easier 
and more evident perception of [his] own mind than of anything else.,,1? It is, 
indeed, only on the basis that his ovm. nature is completely open to his inspection 
that Descartes can deduce that he lacks the requisite capacity to produce the idea of 
God which he finds within himself. It is a consequence of this inadequacy that there 
must exist a being with sufficient objective reality to pass this idea on to him and the 
existence of God is thereby established. 
Self-evidence of the I plays a systemic role within Descartes' method of 
doubt because it is only upon the presupposition that a bedrock has been reached 
that the search for knowledge can proceed. If in knowing ourselves it were to be the 
case that we knew nothing about ourselves, then we would know nothing at all. At 
17 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol 2, translated by John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugland Murdoch (C~bridge: Cambridge UP, 1984), 
23. Page references are to the standard Oeuvres de Descartes, vol. 7, edited by Ch. Adam 
and P. Tannery (revised edition, Paris: VrinlC.N.RS, 1964-76) . 
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its most straightforward, Kant's response to Descartes comprises an investigation of 
this very point; from self-consciousness nothing can be concluded about the nature 
of the substance which underlies such consciousness. Indeed it is not even possible 
to conclude that there is any such substance, any 'thing' which thinks. Whereas for 
Descartes we can know the world only through our capacity for self-knowledge, for 
Kant our capacity to experience the world necessitates that we have no capacity for 
self-knowledge. That is to say, as we saw in the previous chapter, the possibility of 
representations being accompanied by the 'I think' is a condition of the possibility of 
those representations representing objects. Concurrently, the 'I think' is placed in 
the paradoxical position of not being numbered amongst the representations which 
represent. This is not to contradict the patent representations which we do have of 
ourselves as being conscious, but that which is represented in such cases - the I as 
an object of consciousness - cannot be that which is the condition for such objects 
being represented. The point of Descartes's enlightenment becomes in Kant a point 
to which we are blind: 
Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given a priori, is thus 
the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori 
all my detenninate thought. [B 134] 
[Synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauungen, als a 
priori gegeben, ist also der Grund der Identitat der Apperception selbst, 
die a priori allern rn e i n e m bestimmten Denken vorhergeht.] 
We see here the structural necessity of the blindness of the 1 to itself. Kant 
works with the premise that the manifold is given as diverse, which is to say that 
there is nothing intrinsic to the manifold of intuition which makes it a representation 
of something. In the synthesis of the manifold, the manifold is grasped conceptually 
by means of the a priori activity of the understanding: the manifold is unified and a 
coherent experience is produced. Crucially this process functions not only as the 
condition of possibility of coherent experience, but is also the condition of the 
possibility of any experience being attributable to an L It has been argued that this 
is not merely for the straightforward reason that there be no experience without the 
activity of synthesis, but also because without this process there would be no I: the 
manifold, as given, is not given to a subject (or at least it is only retrospectively 
interpreted as being so given). Indeed, it is only though the unification of that 
manifold that the distinction between a subject and object is created: without the 
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possibility of the 'I think' there can be no synthetic unity of the manifold, no 
representation of objects~ but without the synthetic unity of the manifold there can 
be no 'I think'. This argument that Kant puts forward with respect to the subject 
~ therefore, be seen to parallel his argument regarding the object. On the one 
hand, the conditions of possibility of the experience of the objects are the conditions 
of possibility of the objects of experience and, on the other hand, the conditions of 
possibility of the experience of the object are also the conditions of possibility of the 
subject of experience. That is to say, there would be no subject which the 
'experience' of the unsynthesised manifold (which is no experience at all) could be 
said to belong to. There is no subject which could be said to have this 'experience' 
because it is only through the activity of synthesis that identity is introduced into the 
subject. As a consequence of this, the transcendental subject appears to stand in a 
peculiar position: it can be neither sensible nor intelligible. 18 
As a condition of the possibility of the empirical, the transcendental subject 
cannot constitute a part of that sensible world without raising the question of its own 
conditioning, yet it cannot be the object of an intellectual intuition. The subject is 
not on a par with objects of empirical intuition in that it contains no manifold to be 
synthesised into an object of knowledge. The option available to Kant on other 
occasions of making a distinction between the schematised and the unschematised 
categories cannot be invoked here. In other contexts Kant can argue that, although 
it is not an object of empirical intuition, the subject has a practical legitimacy within 
the realm of the unschematised categories. However, this argument cannot apply in 
the case of the transcendental subject, because Kant wants to claim that the subject 
has a constitutive rather than a merely regulative role. As we shall see, Kant 
appears to oscillate between nvo contradictory theses regarding the nature of the 
subject, attributing it exclusively either to thought or to intuition, maintaining all the 
while that it the I, exists. 
3.1 The Problematic Subject 
The range of the understanding being greater than that of possible 
18 The tenn 'transcendental subject' is to be understood, as explained in Chapter 2, as 
referring in a generic manner to the subject as a condition of the possibility of experience; 
it is not intended to bear any strict correlation to Kant's own (very limited) use of lhat 
tenn. 
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experience, it is possible to think 'something' with the categories of experience that 
is not a possible object of experience. While the confusion of these two domains 
leads one into critical errors, and this confusion is frequently identified by Kant 
when diagnosing the failures of other philosophers, the distinction between the 
schematised and the unschematised categories allows a space to emerge into which 
the non-experiential aspects of the critical system can be placed. Kant makes this 
quite clear in the second Critique: 
This explains the foremost riddle of critique: how we are able to deny 
objective reality to the supersensible use of the categories in speculation 
and yet grant them this reality with regard to objects of pure practical 
reason. [V 5] 
[Hier erklart sich auch allererst das Rathsel der Kritik, wie man dem 
iibersinnlichen G e bra u c he de r Kat ego r i e n in der Speculation 
objective Realitat absprechen und ihnen doch in Ansehung der 
Objecte der reinen praktischen Vernunft diese Realitat 
zugestehen konne]. 
The point that Kant is making here is already familiar, in that the apparent 
contradiction between the thoughts of, for instance, necessity and freedom can be 
reconciled by placing restrictions on the applicability of these terms; there can be an 
empirical causal determinacy alongside a noumenal freedom.19 Although Kant does 
not make this point explicitly with regard to the subject, it appears on occasion as if 
the subject were occupying the intellectual, or noumenal, realm which lies entirely 
outside the field of the sensible. Thus, Kant says that the representation of the 
subject to itself is "a thought, not an intuition. "rB 157fo Since knowledge requires 
not merely thought but also an intuition, i. e. "a determinate mode of intuition, 
whereby this manifold is given"[B 15 7fl, the transcendental subject is placed firmly 
on the side of the noumenal: it can be thought, but because there is no intuition 
which can possibility correspond to this object of thought there can be no knowledge 
of the subject. 
I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of 
combination; but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I 
am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, that 
this combination can be made intuitable only according to relations of 
19 This is an issue of considerable complexity and we shall not be pursuing the details of 
Kant's account here. For a general overview of the issue see Allison, Kant's Theory of 
Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990), Chapter 2. 
20 "ein Den ke n, nicht ein Ansc ha ue n ," 
21 "noch eine bestimmte Art der Anschauung, dadurch dieses Mannigfaltige gegeben 
wird". 
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time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of understanding, strictly 
regarded. [B 158-9] 
rich eXlstrre als Intelligenz, die sich lediglich ihres 
Verbindungsvermogens bewu6t ist, in Ansehung des Mannigfaltigen 
aber, das sie verbinden soli, einer einschrankenden Bedingung, die sie 
den inneren Sinn nennt, unterworfen, jene Verbindung nur nach 
Zeitverhaltnissen, welche ganz auBerhalb den eigentiichen 
Verstandesbegriffen liegen, anschaulich zu machen). 
The problem in reading statements such as this one, lies in how we are to 
understand the existence which is being attributed to the I. This existence appears to 
be something more than the problematic 'Pickwickian' existence of the noumeno~ 
because, although there is the limit of inner sense disallowing any determinate 
intuition of the I as power of combinatio~ there remains nonetheless a residual 
feeling of the existence of this subject. This subject is described, in the 
Prolegomena, as 
nothing more than the feeling of an existence without the slightest 
concept and is only the representation of that to which all thinking 
stands in relation (relatione accidentis).[IV 334] 
[nichts mehr als Gefiihl eines Daseins ohne den mindesten Begriff und 
nur Vorsteliung desjenigen, worauf alles Denken in Beziehung 
(relatione accidentis) steht.] 
Here the situation of the subject seems to have undergone a complete 
reversal: intelligence has become a matter of feeling, and is associated with the 
sensible in explicit contradistinction to the conceptual domain of the understanding. 
This position also carries the consequence that there can be no knowledge of the 
transcendental subject, but the inference comes from, as it were, the other direction. 
Rather than being due to the absence of an intuitive element that is rendering the 
concept of the transcendental subject empty, it is the absence of a concept through 
which the 'feeling' that we have of this transcendental subject can be grasped. 
The situation of this subject is, then, in a non-technical sense, decidedly 
problematic. The fundamental equation that Kant makes regarding knowledge -
that it is only possible though the union of concept and intuition - implies, as Kant 
makes clear throughout the first Critique, that in any particular instance we can be 
mistaken in one of two ways: either we can regard the conceptual or we can regard 
the intuitive to be alone (and individually) sufficient for knowledge. If it were 
possible for something to be both sensible and intellectual (without thereby being a 
possible object of knowledge) then, clearly, Kant's system would be in danger of 
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collapse. 
3.2 The Existence of the I: "something real that is given" 
Kant wants to be able to make the claim that in the process of producing the 
empirical world the transcendental subject is itself revealed to be "something 
real"[B423f2. That is, although Kant cleaves Descartes's thought of his own 
existence from the thought of his existence as a thinking thing, Kant nonetheless 
wishes to maintain the coextensive nature of thought and being established in 
Descartes's first moment, '"that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true 
whenever it is put forward by me."n For Kant, the abstract contentless nature of 
this I does not, in fact, necessitate the conclusion that absolutely nothing can be said 
with regard to it: 
I am conscious of myself, not as 1 appear to myself, nor as I am in 
myself, but only that I am.[BI5?] 
rich bin mir ... bewuBt, nicht wie ich mir erscheine, noch wie ich an 
mir selbst bin, sondem nur daft ich bin.] 
Although the I cannot be characterised, it remains true that it, in some sense 
or other, is. At this point in the first Critique (§25 of the Deduction), Kant is 
limiting himself to making the negative remark that any determination of manner in 
which the I is taken to be, can only take place though the form of inner sense. That 
is to say, any such determination requires that the manifold of intuition be given and, 
therefore, any knowledge of the I built upon these conditions will be knowledge of 
the empirical subject. It, nonetheless, remains true that 'existence' is a given: 
The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence 
is already given thereby, but the mode in which 1 am to determine this 
existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby 
given. [B 157] 
[Das, Ich denke, driickt den Actus aus, mein Dasein zu bestimmen. Das 
Dasein ist dadurch also schon gegeben, aber die Art, wie ich es 
bestimmen, d. i. das mannigfaltige zu demselben Gehorige in mir setzen 
solIe, ist dadurch noch nicht gegeben.l 
We have seen that Kant goes on to say that, due to the spontaneous nature 
of this act, it is possible to entitle the I an intelligence. It may well seem that Kant is 
here committing the very Paralogism that he attributes to the rational psychologists; 
that of hypostatising the I as a thinking thing - they --hypostatise what exists 
22 "etwas Reales." 
23 Descartes, Philosophical Writings, 17. 
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merely in thought, and take it as a real object existing, in the same character, outside 
the thinking subject."[A384]24 However, it is important to recognise that the I is 
termed spontaneous, and therefore something intellectual, only by default. The lack 
of any determinate representation of the 1 renders it of necessity something 000-
sensible~ we do not receive a representation of thc 1 just as another part of the 
manifold of eJl..'}Jerience and it is, therefore, not given to us as the manifold is given. 
Here Kant is stressing the distinction between the 1 as an object of our experience -
an object which is given to us - and the 1 as the subject of experience: a mere 
something in general which is not localised or experiential. The 1 might then be 
designated as an intelligence. However, as something which is thought as 
something, the I is hypostatized into the noumenal subject, something which cannot 
be an object of experience: it is neither intellectually nor sensibly grasped, yet it is 
felt. As Kant puts it, the 'I think' expresses [drtickt] 
something real that is given, given indeed to thought in general, and so 
not as appearance, nor as thing in itself (noumenon), but as something 
which in fact exists [B423). 
[etwas Rea1es, das gegeben worden und zwar nur zum Denken 
uberhaupt, also nicht als Erscheinung, auch nicht als Sache an sich 
selbst (Noumenon), sondern als Etwas, was in der That existirt]. 
The "pure intellectual faculty"[B423]25 is given as existing, but not as 
existing in itself; that is to say, the transcendental subject is not given independently 
of perception, and it is only in relation to the sensible that it is possible to attribute 
reality to this capacity. The I is clearly not being attributed the capacity of auto-
generation or self-subsistence, since as a capacity it is limited to the perfonnative 
function of synthesising and has no reality outside of this activity: 
Without some empirical representation to supply the material for 
thought, the act, 'I think', would not, indeed, take place [B423). 
[Allein ohne irgend eine empirische Vorsteilung, die den Stoff zum 
Denken abgiebt, wtirde der Actus: 1ch denke, doch nicht stattfinden]. 
Although Kant reiterates the reciprocal point, that even though the I exists 
through the empirical representation it does not exist as an empirical representation 
of an object, he is also highlighting the strictly limited nature of this capacity. The 
logical, indeed analytic, relation between thinking and existing remains, but it is not 
24 
2'5 
"was bIos in Gedanken existirt, hypostasirt und in eben derselben Qualitiit als einen 
wirklichen Gegenstand auBerhalb dem denkenden Subjecte annimmt". 
"reinen intellectuellen Vermogens." 
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unconditional: to claim that "I am thinking but no synthesis is occumng and, 
therefore, I am not presented with any given representations' would be a 
contradictory statement for any human, 26 This claim rests once again on the 
reciprocal relation between the synthesis of the manifold of intuition and the 'I 
think', 
3.3 Kant's Position Reconstructed 
We have seen that there is no object which corresponds to the representation 
that 'I think', in that the 'I think' does not designate any particular item within 
empirical consciousness. It is on this basis that Kant, following his rigid 
demarcation of sensibility and understanding, can attribute the 'I think' to the 
domain of the understanding. This is because sensibility, as the receptive faculty, 
has the task of 'delivering' the manifold of intuition to the understanding, and in the 
case of the representation of the 'I think' there is no manifold of intuition, The I on 
the other hand is not merely a thought of the understanding without any intuitive 
content - indeed, if this were the case then Kant would not have the right to 
attribute any existence to the subject. As was indicated in the previous chapter, the 
emptiness of this representation follows from the relationship bern'een it and the 
synthesis of the manifold of intuition. Indeed, the synthesis of the manifold requires 
not merely the thought of the manifold, but the thought of the manifold as a 
manifold. The constitutive intuitive elements themselves do not constitute a 
representation of anything; it is only upon their combination in a single 
consciousness that they can be said to for a representation of an object. However, 
the single consciousness in which intuitions are combined does not constitute some 
26 This is also emphasised in Sturma, "<Das doppeJte Ich im BewuBtsein meiner selbs!'. 
Zur Struktur von Kants Begriff des SelbstbewuBtseins," in Proceedings of the Sixth 
International Kant Congress, vol. 2/1, ed. G. Funke and T. Seebohm (Washington: Centre 
for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and UP of America, 1989): passim. Sturma 
draws on Kant's essay On the Progress in MetaphYSiCS [XX 268] to advance the claim 
that there is an intimate tie between the logical sense of the I as subject and the embedded 
nature of a psychological subject within a spatio-temporal framework. 
It is also noteworthy (if speculative) that those who find in Kant the notion of a self-
consciousness which is not phenomenal in nature have not attributed to him the 
corresponding view that there is also a non-phenomenal consciousness of matter - yet. 
there appear (in the Refutation of Idealism) to be clear parallels, including the notion of 
"unmittelbare Bewu6tsein," [B276) between the consciousness that we have of 
ourselves and the consciousness of something outside of ourselves. 
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external perceIver, as if intuitions needed to be presented to some homunculus 
pulling levers to engage acts of synthesis upon a field of raw data. Rather the single 
consciousness is constituted by the manifold of intuition being synthesised in the 
particular manner prescribed in the Deduction. That is to say, the single 
consciousness is not a condition of synthesis in the sense that oxygen is a condition 
of combustion; it is not a precondition of synthesis but rather a predetermination of 
it. This predetennination states that if the synthesis is not to be in vain (that is, if it 
is to result in the representation of objects), then the intuition must be synthesised 
according to concepts: that synthesis takes this form necessitates that a further 
(entirely spontaneous) representation can accompany any of the synthesised 
representations. 
Once again we can legitimately describe the 'I think' as spontaneous 
because it contains no manifold: there is no particular intuitive 'trigger' which gives 
rise to the representation, but it is not without relation to the manifold of intuition. 
The formation of a synthetic unity out of the manifold of intuition is not merely the 
condition under which intuitions can represent, but also allows for the possibility of 
the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. As was stated in the 
Chapter 3, the 'I think' is just this representation of the synthetic unity of the 
manifold, it ascribes to representations the common property which all 
representations necessarily share of conforming to the conditions of transcendental 
synthesis. 27 Therefore, although there is no determinate intuition legitimating the 
claim to existence, there is nonetheless an indeterminate intuition.28 We take this to 
mean that the capacity of representations to represent - to which no feature of the 
manifold of intuition itself corresponds, because nothing in this manifold 
intrinsically represents anything - is itself designated by the attachment of the "I 
think' to those representations. This is our interpretation of Kant's statement: 
It is obvious that in attaching 'I' to our thoughts we designate the 
subject of inherence only transcendentally, without noting in it any 
quality whatsoever - in fact, without knowing anything of it either by 
direct acquaintance or otherwise. It means a something in general 
(transcendental subject). [A355] 
27 The original discussion is on pp. 84-86. 
28 Kant employs the vocabulary of "indeterminate perception" [unbestimmte 
Wahmehmung] and "indeterminate empirical intuition" [unbestinunte empirischc 
Anschauung] in his discussion of the properties of the 'I think' in the B-Paralogisms on 
B422-3. 
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rEs ist aber ofIenbar: ~ das Subject der Inharenz durch das dem 
Gedanken angehangte lch nur transscendental bezeichnet werde, ohne 
die mindeste Eigenschaft desselben zu bemerken, oder iiberhaupt etwas 
von ihm zu kennen oder zu wissen. Es bedeutet ein Etwas tiberhaupt 
(transscendentales Subject)]. 
To claim the that transcendental subject exists, and that this subject cannot 
be the object of any sensible intuition and is also spontaneous, implicates Kant in 
neither a contradiction nor any confusion regarding the nature of the subject. Each 
of these claims forms a part of a longer argument regarding the conditions under 
which the representation of objects is possible. Furthermore, at no point in this 
argument does Kant surreptitiously rely on there being an intellectual intuition of the 
subject. On the contrary, the awareness that we have of ourselves as expressed in 
the representation "I think' constitutes nothing but the sensible and limited nature of 
our intuitive capacities, and it is precisely because we have no unmediated 
intellectual awareness of objects that it is possible for the transcendental conditions 
of both the experience of object and the representation of the I to arise. 
This initial attempt to remove some of the apparent contradictions within 
Kant's account of the subject is not without its own difficulties. It was Schulze's 
claim that Kant required some knowledge of the subject, at least with regard to its 
spontaneity. What we have seen is that Kant does indeed make some attempt to 
provide an account of the subject's knowledge of itself, although it has been stressed 
that the claims that Kant makes with regard to this are distinguished both from the 
knowledge that we have of empirical objects and from the notion that there is an 
intellectual intuition of the subject as it is in itself However, the gloss which we 
have put on the notion of an "indeterminate intuition" is itself ambiguous. We have 
related this notion to the somewhat vague notion that it is an awareness of 
representing or of the capacity that representations have to represent. This is of 
sufficient generality to cover, at least, two completely distinct positions: the first of 
which lays claim to an awareness of the activity of synthesis as such, and the second 
takes the awareness to be of the product of the act, of the unity of representations. 
The current major proponents of these interpretations are Allison and Kitcher 
respectively. These positions can be seen to represent two different responses to the 
problem raised by Schulze. The first accepts that the spontaneous subject can have 
some awareness of itself, but that this does not involve the a claim to knowledge of 
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the mind or the subject is in itself. In the second both Kant's commitment to this 
form of self-awareness and the need for it for it within the Deduction are denied. 
Within this chapter an interpretation which will be supported is, broadly 
speaking, in agreement with Kitcher. Allison's position, however, has both 
widespread support and is firmly entrenched within the historical reception of Kant's 
philosophy. In order to demonstrate the failings of Allison's line we shall approach 
it via the first attempt to formulate a response to the problems raised by Schulze, 
which is also the origin of the claim that that there is an immediate awareness of the 
activity of synthesis. This is to be found in Fichte. 
4. The Origin of Fichte's Misunderstanding (and Defence) of Kant 
In Chapter 2 we saw that one of the criticisms Aenesidemus states against 
Reinhold's proposition of consciousness is that it leads to an infinite regress. The 
awareness of the subject of a representation, if it itself is considered to be a further 
representation, demands that there be a further subject to be aware of the subject-
representation, and in that second representation there needs to be a further subject, 
and so on.29 This problem certainly captures an aspect of the Kantian subject as it 
has been described above; namely that the transcendental subject always escapes its 
own gaze. This is, however, not to say that Schulze and Henrich have identified an 
aporia buried deep within the fundamental structure of Kant's argument. This 
ought to be clear from the fact that Kant is aware of the existence of such a regress: 
The subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories acquire a 
concept of itself as an object of the categories. For in order to think 
them, its pure self-consciousness, which is what was to be explained, 
must itself be presupposed. [B422] 
[Das Subject der Kategorien kann also dadurch, daB es diese denkt, 
nicht von sich selbst aJs einem Objecte der Kategorien einen Begriff 
bekommen; denn um diese zu denken, muB es sein reines 
Selbstbewufitsein, welches doch hat erklart werden soilen, zum Grunde 
legen.)30 
29 In attributing the original formulation of this potential problem to Fichte. Henrich is 
clearly doing Schulze an injustice. Fichte clearly attempts to provide a response to this 
regress which Schulze finds within the first Critique, but it is not Fichte's original insight 
Henrich's account of the relationship of this problematic to Fichte's philosophy is to be 
found in "Fichte's Original Insight," 19-21. A more general account of the relationship 
between Fichte and Schulze is given in Breazeale, "Fichte's Aenesidemus Review and the 
Transfommtion of German Idealism," Review of Metaphysics 34 (1981): passim. 
30 The footnote which was used to investigate the nature of existence attributed to the 
subject follows this passage. 
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The solution that Kant would offer in response to the challenge of Schulze 
and Henrich is clearly visible in this passage. Although the subject is a 
representation, this representation is empty. What Kant is concerned with is that the 
subject cannot become the object of a representation, i.e. there can be no intuition of 
the subject, but this does not force us into a regress any more than would questions 
concerning the location of space or the duration of time. The subject is more like a 
form of experience than an object of experience, and so to ask a question regarding 
the properties of the subject is to treat it like an object, and any supposedly 
problematic conclusions arrived at through such questioning illustrate only a highly 
questionable interpretation of Kant's position?l Fichte, however, through his denial 
of the identity of the mode in which we are aware of the subject as subject and 
subject as object, understands the problem somewhat differently. While Fichte's 
response takes the subject out of Schulze's regress by denying that we come to be 
aware of the subject in the same way that we are aware of objects, he does so via an 
across the board denial of the representational status of the su bj ect. F ichte' s claim 
is not that the subject is a representation which does not refer to any determinate 
object (but that nonetheless has the status of a representation), but rather that the 
subject is something other than a representation. 
It is not difficult to see how Fichte could be drawn to such a conclusion; it 
appears that the most economical solution to the problem raised in Aenesidemus 
3l Kant highlights the formal nature of the synthetic unity of apperception in his 
summaries of both editions of the Deduction, A129 and B169. 
Space and time are the forms of receptivity and all intuitions contain some temporal or 
spatio-temporal determination which is not detennined on the basis of concepts alone. 
The argument employed in the first half of the B-Deduction establishes that, in addition to 
these specifically human forms of intuition, the understanding itself imposes a form upon 
experience merely on the basis that knowledge of objects cannot be arrived at through 
concepts alone. We argued above that the ability of representations to be accompanied by 
the 'I think' was an eXl'ression of the conformity of the synthesis of the manifold of 
intuition to the conceptual form required by the understanding for the production of 
knowledge. The <1 think' is said to constitute a form of experience in the sense that 
experience must take the form such that it is possible for the 'I think' to accompany it. It 
has been said that the subject is more like a form because the same restrictions apply in 
this case as also apply to the forms of intuition, in that it is illegitimate to reify it by 
treating it as an object. However, more exactly stated, the conceptual form of experience 
is the synthetic unity of apperception, rather than the analytic unity of the subject found in 
the 'I think,' because the necessity associated with this analytic unity is merely that it must 
always be possible rather than actual. See Section 6, pp. 152-158, of this chapter, for a 
detailed discussion of the relationship between the synthetic and analytic unities. 
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would be to claim that the relationship betwecn the knowing subject and the knO\\n 
object is not, in every case, mediated by the constitutive forms of representation, and 
to deny specifically that such a mediated relationship holds in the case of awareness 
of the subject. Such a proposition is, on the face of it, not unreasonable since it is 
precisely the difference between the awareness that we have of ourselves and our 
awareness of objects that allowed Descartes to escape the clutches of the malin 
genie. In contrast to the case of the subject's awareness of objects, the subject, in 
being aware of itself, does not stand as something over and against thc subject of 
awareness. Instead, the object of awareness simply is the subject that is aware. 
Such awareness would require no mediation by representation, since there is nothing 
to mediate. If we turn with this in mind to the Proposition of Consciousness, as 
formulated by Reinhold, we can see how Fichte draws the further conclusion that 
self-consciousness is a necessary component of all consciousness. According to that 
proposition, the awareness of objects entails in every case an awareness of the 
subject, and this awareness of the subject as subject is only possible on the basis of 
the immediate self-conscious awareness; Fichte's conclusion follows quite 
straightforwardly. It could, indeed, be suggested that Fichte is forced into the 
position of characterising the awareness that there is of the subject in terms of an 
intellectual intuition simply because he remains true to the Kantian dichotomy 
between the sensible and the intellectual. Our awareness of objects requires that 
there be some intuitive component, and if sensibility is ruled out as a source of this 
intuition - because there is no sensible intuition corresponding to our awareness of 
ourselves - then there must be some kind of intellectual intuition. 32 
If there is no other way to prevent the regress than by invoking the notion of 
intellectual intuition (and Kant, as we have seen, recognises the possibility of such a 
regress), then it could be mere slight of hand on Kant's part that allowed him to 
escape Fichte's un-Kantian conclusion. This is Fichte's own argument and, given 
Kant's equivocation over the nature of our awareness of the subject of experience, it 
is not without force. The transcendental subject is characterised as being a concept 
that is without intuitive content and that is also, simultaneously, something whose 
.,2 A sympathetic overview of Fichte's notion of 'intellectual intuition' or 'immediate 
consciousness' is given in ZOller, "An Eye for an I," in Figuring the Self, ed. David E. 
Klemm and GUnter ZOller, 80----6. 
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existence and reality are felt though the sensible faculty. At the hidden core of the 
first Critique, there, thus, appears to Fichte to be an intellectual intuition filling the 
space left by the removal of the Cartesian subject. 33 
However, if we consider some of Fichte's arguments for the notion of 
intellectual intuition, we will come to see that his argument is fundamentally at odds 
with Kant. He says that self-consciousness '"is not a representation", because it 
lacks 
that through which the representation refers to an object and becomes a 
representation of something, which we [Kant, Schulze, and Fichtc I 
agree in calling sensible intuition [F 474]. 
From what has already been argued it should be clear that Fichte is adopting a 
position that is, in fact, subtly different from Kant's. In general terms, Fichte is 
quite correct: the notion of a representation without intuitive content is incoherent 
and nothing other than an empty thought. Fichte is also correct in claiming that self-
consciousness is not a representation of something; if that were the case, self-
consciousness would be consciousness of an object, and Kant is quite happy to agree 
that consciousness of objects presupposes (the possibility of) self-consciousness 
rather than denoting it. However, the difference between Kant and Fichte lies in the 
way in which they respond to these points. 
Fichte moves from the denial that self-consciousness is not a representation 
of something to the claim that it is not a representation. By contrast, Kant's claim is 
that although self-consciousness is not a representation of something determinate, it 
is, nonetheless, representational, and what is involved is a representation of 
something in general. It is possible for Fichte to maintain that he is not diverging 
33 Examples of extended and sympathetic accounts of Fichte' s relationship to Kant with 
regard to this point are to be found in Frederick Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990),64-116, John Taber, "'Fichte's Emendation of Kant," 
Kant-Studien 75 (1984): passim, and Marek 1. Siemek, "Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre und 
die Kantische Transzendentalphilosophie," in Die transzendentale Gedanke, ed. Klaus 
Hammacher (Hamburg: Meiner, 1981): passim. In each case the view expressed is that 
Fichte's notion of intellectual intuition constitutes a restatement of something already 
implicit in Kant's clainl that there is an awareness of the activity of synthesis and of the 
existence of the subject. 
It should be noted that our rejection of Fichte's reading of Kant and our defence of Kant 
against apparent paradoxes in his account of the subject is as far as our concern with 
Fichte's theory of self-consciousness extends. The tenability of the model of self-
consciousness proposed by Fichte (as interpreted by Henrich) is critically evaluated in 
Ernst Tugendhat, Se{{-Consciousness and Self-Determination, translated by Paul Stem 
(London: MIT, 1986), Chapters 2 and 3 . 
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from Kant because the claim made by Schulze is that a regress develops if self-
awareness is understood to involve the awareness of an object, in that such 
awareness requires a subject distinct from the object of which it is aware. Indeed, 
self-awareness seems to require that a subject of awareness be invoked which is 
distinct from the object of this awareness, and the awareness of the subject of such 
self-awareness seems to require yet another subject, and so on. Neither Fichte nor 
(contra Schulze and Henrich) Kant attempt to give an account of self-awareness in 
terms of a reflective theory of consciousness, and Fichte can legitimately claim to be 
adopting a Kantian standpoint when denying that self-awareness conforms to the 
conditions under which we are aware of objects. This is because the argument 
provided by Kant in the first part of the B-Deduction proceeds without any reference 
to the forms of sensible intuition. However, as we have seen, the lack of sensible 
detennination of the subject does not mean that self-awareness is not conditioned by 
sensibility. Rather, sensible intuition is required for self-awareness, but no 
particular intuition is required for such self-awareness. It is on this last point that 
Kant and Fichte diverge. 
4.1 From Unconditioned to Undetermined 
Although it is far from clear exactly what Fichte takes the intellectual 
intuition to be an intuition of, and although this difficulty is necessitated by the fact 
that the subject of thought could not simply be described in the manner of some 
object or thing that is represented, it is clear that the subject of thought has some 
degree of specificity. 34 The subject, for example, is not the activity of thought as 
such, it is a 'something'; and additionally, this subject is a something to be 
distinguished from the contents of thought. In other words, intuitions, objects, 
representations, and so forth, do not, somehow or other, cumulatively give the 
subject of thought. Fichte is explicit on this point: he quotes Kant's remark to the 
effect that the <I think' must be capable of accompanying all representations [B1321, 
34 There is come considerable degree of complexity surrounding Fichte's use of the term 
'intellectual intuition.' Not only are there difficulties in understanding what Fichte takes 
it to refer to on any particular occasion, but there are also variations in Fichte's own use of 
the ternl. It appears to have evolved from (what some regard as) a Kantian awareness of 
the subject to something more contentful and closer to Schelling's use of the term. This 
issue is discussed in Alexis Philonenko, "Die intellektuelle Anschauung bei Fichte," in 
Die transzendenlale Gedanke, ed. Klaus Hammacher, passim. 
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and then asks, 
Which "I" is in question here? Is it perhaps the I that the Kantians have 
confidently thrown together from the manifold of representations, an I 
that is not in any of these singly but is in them all thcm togethcr? In 
which case, Kant's quoted words would mean this: "1, who think: D, anl 
the Sanle I who thought C and B and A; and through the thought of my 
manifold acts of thinking, I first become I to myself, flanlely the 
identical in the manifold." [F 475] 
This passage is important to us in a number of respects. It is, firstly, a 
statement of an interpretative position that Fichte clearly wants to avoid. In this 
respect, if this standpoint can be made clear then we have a firm, if negative, ground 
from which Fichte's own interpretation of Kant can be developed. Secondly, the 
interpretation which Fichte is rejecting bears some similarity to the one that was 
advanced in this and the previous chapter. This raises the dual challenges to identify 
what Fichte thinks is wrong with this interpretation, and to consider how this 
interpretation differs, if at all, from the one we are advancing in this thesis. 
Let us, then, first consider this interpretation that Fichte is rejecting. There 
are two significant points here: firstly, the I is something which is retrospectively 
discovered; and, secondly, what is discovered in the manifold is something which 
remains self-identical throughout, and this is named as the I. There is a degree of 
ambiguity in this second alternative, in that it is not clear whether the I that remains 
identical is something that is found within the manifold - which would be a view of 
the I as Hume's 'bundle' plus the identical element which Home claimed he could 
not find. The other alternative is that the identity of the I resides in the fact that the 
manifold is always thought by the I. If we reject the first interpretation on the basis 
of its prima facie implausibility, then the identity of the I resides not in the manifold, 
but rather in something about the way in which the manifold is taken up. It would 
seem that the manifold is assumed to be comprised of various elements (A, B, C and 
D) and that the thought of anyone of these elements in isolation is not the thought of 
the 'I think'. The logic of this proposition would appear to be straightforward: for 
every thought there needs to be thinker, but the thinker of the thought could not 
become conscious that he or she thinks D unless that person had also had other 
thoughts. It is only due to the variation in thought that the thinker divorces him or 
herself from what is thought: from "thinking D' to 'I think D.' The argument may 
be simplistic but, nonetheless, has a commonsensical plausibility. Thus, for 
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example, if we only ever heard the one sound, could we be become a,vare that \VC 
hear anything at all? Furthermore, as was discussed in the previous chapter, Kant's 
argument concerning the synthesis of apprehension in intuition proposes the need for 
there to be an intuitive manifold for a representation to be anything other than an 
absolute unity [A99]. However, as Fichte makes clear, as a comprehensive 
interpretation of the Kantian 'I think', this position is clearly inadequate: 
because then, according to Kant, the possibility of all thinking would be 
conditioned by another thinking and by the thinking of this thinking, 
and I would like to know how we are ever meant to arrive at thinking! 
[F 476]35 
The problem of a regression has arisen once again because the spontaneous 
nature of the subject has been left out of this account. The consciousness of the self 
is not something which arises after an accumulation of evidence, but neither is it to 
be found within experience. Rather, the 'I think' is intrinsically bound up with 
experience itself. For Fichte this consists in the spontaneity of the subject being the 
condition of experience and, therefore, of the 1 that is identified in experience. This 
spontaneous activity is identified as the unified and identical subject, the self-
positing subject, an original self-consciousness. The difference between Kant and 
Fichte lies not so much in the elements on this list but, rather, in the fact that Fichte 
takes them to describe a single thing. The first evidence for this claim comes in 
Fichte's very next paragraph, where he quotes, with approval, Kant claim that 
"pure apperception ... is that self -ronsciousness which, while generating 
the representation 'I think' (a representation which must be capable of 
accompanying all other representations, and which in all consciousness 
is one and the same), cannot itself be accompanied by any further 
representation." [F 4761B132; Fichte's emphasis] 
I reine Apperception ... dasjenige SelbstbewuBtsein ist, was, in dem es 
die Vorstellung: Ich denke, hervorbringt, die aile andere mtill begleiten 
konnen und in allern BewuBtsein ein und dasselbe ist, von keiner weiter 
begleitet werden kann.] 
There are two points in the quotation which do not square with the 
interpretation that Fichte is giving: firstly, that the 'I think' need only be capable of 
accompanying all representations; and secondly, that it itself is a representation. 
What allows Fichte to misread the capacity as an ever present reality, and to treat 
the features mentioned above as a unit, is evident in the gloss that he provides of the 
above quotation: 
35 See also F 526-7. 
-140 . 
the nature of pure self-consciousness is ... therefore undeterminable bv 
any accidental feature of consciousness; the I in self-consciousness is 
determined solely by itself, and is absolutely determined. [F 476] 
Even setting aside the leap to the absolute in the last clause it is clear that, 
from Kant's perspective, there is something peculiar about Fichte's argument here. 
Fichte takes it that the original self-consciousness is self~etermining, gives itself to 
itself (and is, therefore, absolute). This is for the two-fold reason that the attempt to 
locate the nature of self-consciousness in some element of conscious experience 
presupposes the very consciousness that we are attempting to explain, and, 
furthermore, this will apply universally to any particular feature of consciousness, 
not just to the discovery of an identical and unified 1 though reflection. 
What Fichte takes the argument to imply is that self-consciousness has a 
transcendental priority. That self-consciousness is not determined or conditioned by 
any of the contingent features of consciousness implies, for him, that self-
consciousness is not conditioned or determined at all. This lack of determination not 
only places self-consciousness in a privileged position with respect to the contingent 
features of consciousness (in that it is logically independent of them), but 
furthermore it is transcendentally privileged (in that it is taken to be the condition of 
certain general features of consciousness). In the account of self-consciousness that 
Fichte is rejecting, the unity of the 1 is discovered though conscious experience, yet 
the unity of this conscious experience is itself left unaccounted for. This unity itself 
requires (according to both Fichte and Kant) a transcendental conditioning. Thus, 
for Fichte, the locus of this transcendental unity simply is the unity of original self-
consciousness. Fichte deduces this conclusion not only on the basis of the premise 
that lack of determination implies self ~etermination, but also because he assumes 
that lack of determination implies a lack of conditioning. As undetermined condition 
the 1 requires no further conditions, it is absolute: 
Thus, according to Kant, the possibility of all consciousness would 
actually be conditioned by the possibility of the I or pure self-
consciousness, just in the Wissenschaftslehre. [F 476-7] 
However, as we have seen, Kant's position is clearly distinct from Fichte's 
here. Thc capacity of the -I think' to accompany representations is precisely 
restricted to a capacity and need not always be actualised, because the 'I think' is 
neither the sole nor absolute condition upon which the possibility of consciousness 
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rests - indeed, strictly speaking, it is not a condition of consciousness at all.36 It is 
not the case that the manifold is synthesised into a unity because of the unity of self-
consciousness, as Fichte would have it, but rather that the unity of self-
consciousness is only possible on the condition that the manifold is unified. That is 
to say, Fichte is engaged in a project which re-injects an absolute subject into a 
position of standing behind, and being other than, the representations with which it is 
presented. For Kant the representations have a dual aspect, in that it is only insofar 
as they are unified that that they can be said to be representations of something, but 
it is also the case that the subject of the representations is also constituted through 
the unity of the representations. Fichte is, then, quite correct to highlight the 
relationship between the unity of representations and the unity of the subject, but he 
is quite wrong in attributing a directionality to this relationship where the one has 
priority over the other. 
There is a sense in which Fichte's reading is of some considerable interest. 
The focus on intellectual intuition is not completely at odds with Kant's argument in 
that the identity which, for Fichte, pertains between the subject and the object in 
intellectual intuition does appear to be implied by Kant. For Kant, however, this 
does not pertain on the basis of some capacity which the subject possesses, rather it 
is due to the nature of relations which hold between representations - it has its 
origin in the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. Whereas for Fichte it is 
necessary to make experience immanent to the subject of that experience, it makes 
no sense whatsoever to say this \\>1.th regard to Kant's philosophy in which there is, 
in this sense, no absolute; but only the reciprocal relationship between experience 
and the subject of experience. 
5. Recent Reverberations of Fichte's Misunderstanding 
The invisibility of the subject to itself - or the mind's inaccessibility to 
itself through introspection - has provided a central motif in two highly divergent 
debates on Kant's contemporary significance. The first of these concerns the 
structuralist and post -structuralist problematic of the disappearance or 'death of the 
subject.' The focus of attention here is allegedly aporetic nature of the subject that 
it is simultaneously necessary and impossible. This argument has a number of 
36 See above, note 81, p. 107. 
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structurally analogous forms,37 but we shall quote just the one here: 
it is precisely with Kant, who relates the Being of all beings to the 
Subject, that the Subject becomes the object of a radical dispute that 
denics it all possiblc Bcing.38 
Since it is a condition of anything being something that it can be something 
to someone (i.e. since existence can only be attributed to objects which conform \\>i.th 
the conditions of any possible experience, and all experience can be accompanied by 
the 'I think'), the subject of experience cannot itself derive its Being from 
constituting part of the contents of experience. If this were to be the case, then we 
would be placed in the position of either falling prey to the regress identified by 
Aenesidemus, or having to follow Fichte in the attribution of a self-positing nature 
to the subject. However, neither can the subject derive its Being through appearing 
to itself as other than a phenomenal object - at least not without violating the very 
principle at issue, namely, that Being is not extra-experientia1?9 The ground of the 
Kantian system is then said to be ungrounded, victim to the same self~estructive 
moment to be found within all philosophy reliant on self-presence. This argument, 
however, far from providing a diagnosis of Kant's argument which runs counter to 
that of Fichte, merely reinforces the framework within which Fichte interprets Kant. 
37 For examples see John Sallis, Spacings - of Reason and Imagination (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), 16-9, or Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative 
(Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1993), 12-8. Although emphasising Schelling's response to 
Fichte rather than Fichte's response to Kant, a general account of the relationship of 
Deconstruction to Gennan Idealism is given by Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration: 
Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory (London: Verso, 1987), 19-
34. 
38 Michel Henry, 'The Critique of the Subject,' in Who Comes After the Subject?, ed. 
Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (London: Routledge, 1991), 158. 
39 For a structurally analogous argument from within the analytic tradition of Kant 
interpretation see Susan Hurley, "Kant on Spontaneity and the Myth of the Giving," 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1994). The conclusion which Hurley arrives 
at, pp. 162-3, is that transcendental idealism 
"is ultimately incoherent, and the pivot of its incoherence is its conception of 
spontaneous agency. It supposes that we must really be spontaneous, and yet that our 
spontaneous activity, the source of unity, belongs neither to the realm of appearances 
nor to the realm of things in themselves. In fact there is no room for it anywhere. As 
the basis of the idealistic point of "iew, our spontaneous activity is somehow outside 
of the scope of that point of view. " 
The response to Hurley by Graham Bird, that Hurley conflates transcendental and 
empirical apperception in such a way that transcendental apperception becomes some kind 
of privileged act of consciousness, accords \\'ith the reply offered here to the difficulty 
raised by some within the continental tradition. See Bird, "Kantian Myths," Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian SOciety 96 (1996). 
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That is to say, it remains the case that the subject is reified as something to which 
representations are presented. However, this argument creates an inconsistency or 
an inevitable paradox where none exists, since it ignores the positive, and yet non-
paralogistic, account of the transcendental subject that Kant presents. 
The second Fichtean interpretation of Kant is to be found in Brook's recent 
argument for the relevance for cognitive science of Kant's notion of the subject.40 
Broadly speaking, Brook starts from the recognition that Kant's idealism can be 
interpreted as a form of functionalism. This point is widely discussed (for example, 
by Dennett, Kitcher, Meerbote and Thomas Powell)41 and consists in the general 
observation that Kant is not committed to any particular account of what the mind 
is; rather Kant details a series of capacities that the mind must have if it is to engage 
in representational activity. Given a set of data, the mind performs a set of 
transformative operations upon that data and a certain output results, namely 
experience. Everything within the Kantian system, from the faculties themselves to 
concepts, intuitions and syntheses, is characterisable by the role that this content 
plays within a system of representations. Thus, on such a reading, it is only insofar 
as any mind/mental state is within such a system of representations that it itself can 
be a representation. The functionalist tenet that the representational system be 
neutral as to the medium in which it is implemented, also forms an integral part of 
Kant's argument. It follows from the denial of any knowledge of things-in-
40 See, in particular, the first chapter of Brook, Kant and the Mind. The following 
reconstruction of Brook's argument is intended to present a faithful and plausible account 
of the key themes of the book; it is nonetheless a somewhat abstract reconstruction of his 
argument. 
41 Dennett, "Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology," in Brainstorms 
(London: Penguin, 1981), 111; Kitcher, Transcendental Psychology, 111; and Thomas C. 
Powell, Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 200. Two 
articles in The Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science, ed. 1. C. Smith (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1989), are dedicated to this topic: Kitcher, "'Kant's Dedicated Cognitive System," 
and Meerbote, "Kant's Functionalism." This latter debate is indebted to Wilfred Sellars, 
" ... This I or He or It (the Thing) which Thinks ... ," in Essays in Philosophy and Its 
History (Dordrecht D. Reidel, 1974). 
There are many articles on the more general question of the relationship between Kant's 
philosophy and both historical and current conceptions of psychology. The historical side 
is discussed in, for instance, Gary Hatfield, The Natural and the Normative (London: MIT, 
1990). For an evaluation of Kant's influence within contemporary psychology - an 
evaluation which judges this influence to have been powerful but primarily negative - see 
Christina Emeling, "Cognitive Science and the Future of Psychology," in The Future of 
the Cognitive Revolution, ed. Christina Emeling and David M. Johnson (Oxford: Oxford 
UP,1997). 
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themselves that the substratum - or Indeed substrata - which supports the 
representational system remains unknown to us. What is maintained is that we 
cannot determine from the functions perfonned by the system whether that system is 
implemented In a medium which is material (such as the brain) or a medium of 
mind-stuff; neither can it be determined whether the system is a complex 
connectionist network or a simple soul. 42 
On the face of it any attempt to reconcile functionalism, even if it is as 
general as Kant's functionalism, with the idea that we have an intellectual intuition 
of ourselves as we are In ourselves, would appear to be a somewhat perverse 
undertaking. However, Brook, like Fichte, is careful to avoid making the claim that 
we have any knowledge of the noumenaJ subject, that is, of the subject as a 
substantive entity, by means of a path other than empirical intuition. However, that 
we have knowledge of ourselves only as empirical objects does not exhaust all the 
ways In which we could be aware of ourselves. This point has already been met in 
the discussion surrounding the feeling or awareness that we have of ourselves simply 
as the subject of experience. As we have seen, such an awareness is posited by Kant 
in the following quote: 
in the S}nthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, 
not as I appear to myseJL nor as I am in myseJL but only that I am. 
[B157] 
lbin ich mir meiner selbst . . . in der synthetischen urspriinglichen 
Einheit der Apperception bewuBt, nicht wie ich mir erscheine, noch wie 
ich an mir selbst bin, sondern nur d a 6 ich bin.] 
Our previous discussion established both that we ought to be cautious of 
straightforwardly accepting Kant's own characterisation of this as an awareness of 
the subject as an "Intelligible object,"[A5461B574]43 and that existence is 
attributable to the subject only on a conditional basis. These points mitigate against 
any Interpretation of this passage which draws the inference that Kant is gesturing 
42 This is only to accept that function does not dictate fornl in the negative sense that from 
function we cannot determine what the form is; it is not, however, as Brook claims (p. 13) 
to accept the mind could take on a variety of different forms. He assumes that if there 
were to be only one possible medium, the form of the mind would be inferable [rom 
function. He concludes that because we cannot make such an inference without violating 
the doctrine that things-in-themselves are unknowable, whatever the mind is it must be 
possible for it to take a number of different forms. No such thing follows. Just because we 
cannot determine the fornl of the mind from its functions, it does not mean that there is 
not just one form that the mind can take. 
43 "intelligibeler Gegenstand. ,. 
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toward an intellectual intuition of the subject. Negatively statecL the argument for 
such an intellectual intuition is that if there is an awareness of the subject which is 
not an awareness of the subject as an appearance (as an object of sensible intuition). 
then, whether we can legitimately call what this awareness an intellectual intuition of 
the subject or not, Kant must accept some form of non-sensible awareness. This 
argument suffers from a clear inadequacy; namely, that it makes the inference from 
there being an awareness of the existence of the subject, to the claim that there is 
some object for this awareness. It is Brook's attempt to steer a path between the 
(recognised) inadequacy of this argument, and yet do justice to the peculiar nature of 
the subject's awareness of itself, that leads him to adopt a Fichtean standpoint. 
For the sake of clarity Brook's argument can be broken down into three 
separate stages: the first consists of the claim that'!, is a referring expression; the 
second identifies the I referred to as the subject of experiences via an awareness of 
the activity of this subject; the third stage, in distinguishing between knowledge and 
awareness of something as it is in itself, suggests that our awareness of ourselves as 
the subject of experience cannot merely be an awareness of how we appear to 
appear to ourselves, but is an awareness of the subject-in-itself. 
Although conducted from an entirely different perspective, Allison's account 
of the Kantian subject reaches many of the same conclusions arrived at by Brook. 
Allison, as has already been indicatecL is hostile to the notion that there could be any 
reconciliation between Kant and functionalism. However, the aspects of Brook's 
argument that we shall be focusing on do not bear upon his general thesis regarding 
the contemporary relevance of Kant's theory for cognitive science, but rather upon 
the more limited concern of his account of the Kantian subject. The issue which will 
be key for us - and over which Brook and Allison are in agreement - is whether 
there is for Kant, in Brook's terms, an '"immediate awareness" or, Allison's 
preferred term,. an "intellectual consciousness" of the subject.44 
44 Brook Kant and the Alind 247 and Allison., Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 276. , , . 
Within this context, the position advocated by Pippin is identical to that of Allison; see 
Pippin, "Kant of the Spontaneity of Mind," 459-63. Although Ameriks adopts a 
distinctive position, and disagrees explicitly with Allison regarding the nature of the 
awareness to which Kant is conunitted, he is also of the view that there is a "primordial 
'self-consciousness' ," sec "From Kant to Frank," in The l'vfodern Subject, ed. Karl 
Ameriks and Dieter Sturma (Albany: SUNY, 1995), 226. Ameriks' criticism of Allison is 
to be found in "Kant and the Self," 65. 
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Brook's argument for the referential character of the I is made by bringing 
into connection two points that we are already familiar with. These are, firstly, that 
there is an I that does not involve the ascription of any properties and, secondJy, that 
when we do ascribe properties to ourselves, in empirical judgements, the I is al"'ays 
already presupposed. Evidence that Kant takes the I to involve a reference to the 
subject comes in those places where Kant discusses the fact that we have no 
intuition of any qualities of the subject. Although in the B-Deduction and the 
Paralogisms Kant articulates the view that the I is not an object of intuition, he 
retains the notion that we are, nonetheless, conscious of the subject as existing: 
in attaching T to our thoughts we denote the subject of inherence only 
transcendentally, without noting in it any quality whatsoever - in fact, 
without knowing anything of it either by direct acquaintance or by 
reasoning. [A355] 
[das Subject der Inharenz durch das dem Gedanken angehangte Ich nur 
transscendental bezeichnet werde, ohne die mindeste Eigenschaft 
desselben zu bemerken, oder iiberhaupt etwas von ibm zu kennen oder 
zu wissen.] 
Given the contentless nature of the denotation, it might be wondered by 
what right this is taken to be a reference to myself as myself; that is to say, it might 
be wondered how this awareness can not only be an awareness of myself, but also 
an awareness "that it is me of which I am aware. ,>45 It will be recalled that in our 
discussion of the B-Deduction the capacity to attach the 'I think' to a representation 
follows not from any special features of our awareness of ourselves, but rather from 
the necessary conditions for the objective unity of representations. In this case, it is 
problematic to take the I to denote (if it is to denote anything at all) something other 
than the objective unity of the representations. 46 However, this account appears to 
lose a feature which accompanies the attachment of the I to representations, namely 
that those representations are my representations. Kant indicates this when he says 
that it is precisely because they are my representations that "they must conform to 
the condition under \vhich alone they can stand together in one universal self-
45 Brook, Kant and the Mind, 72. Similar points are also discussed, in reference to the 
reflexive nature of consciousness or the personal quality of representations, in Allison, 
"On Naturalising Kant's Transcendental Psychology," 343-6, and also in Ameriks. 
"Understanding Apperception Today," 332-4. 
46 We will return to this point in our criticisms of Brook's position. 
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consciousness"rB 132t7. That is, Brook takes Kant to be claiming that the 
awareness of the objective unity of representations does not constitute an awareness 
of the subject of these representations; if the I were not to denote there could be no 
awareness of representations as mine. There must, therefore, be an awareness of 
myself as the subject of representations.48 This argument is further reinforced by 
Brook when he notes the "perpetual circle"[A346IB404]49 which Kant says we 
revolve in when making any judgement concerning the 1 of the 'I think' because that 
which "was to be explained, must itself be presupposed."[B422Fo Brook takes this 
to mean that in order to apply any empirical judgement to myself, 1 must first be 
aware that it is to me that these judgements are being applied, secondly, that it is me 
that these judgements are taken to be true of and, thirdly, that this awareness of 
myself is not derivable from any knowledge of myself through properties ascribed on 
the basis of empirical judgements. According to Brook, the I of the 'I think' must 
therefore be a term which denotes me as me; it is the awareness of myself as 
myself. 51 
47 
"als meine Vorstellungen ... mussen sie doch der Bedingung notwendig gemaB sein, 
unter der sie allein in einem allgemeinen Selbstbewufitsein zusammenstehen 
konnen" . 
48 This argumentative structure is employed not only by Brook but also by Powell. For 
example, see Powell, Self-Consciousness, 234. The difference between the positions they 
adopt is as follows: Brook takes the awareness of ourselves which is referred to when we 
are aware of representations being ours, to be the same T that can accompany 
representations when they form an objective unity; for Powell, by contrast, this second 'I' 
is merely formal and is not a referring expression (or refers merely to the objective unity of 
representations), and the awareness of representations being ours involves an awareness of 
ourselves as Strawsonian persons or embodied agents. Exactly what this second kind of 
awareness is an awareness of is somewhat difficult to determine from the information that 
Powell provides, but there would appear to be only two alternatives, neither of which 
would be readily reconcilable with an unmodified Kantian position: either it needs to be an 
empirical awareness, or what is required is some kind of intellectual intuition. 
49 "bestandigen Cirkel." 
50 "welches doch hat erklart werden sollen, zum Grunde legen [mufi]." 
51 "Awareness of myself as subject, as myself, has to be something more than awareness of 
properties of myself, no matter what the properties; I must be able to be aware of myself 
simply as myself - no properties, no manifold." Brook, Kant and the Mind, 76. 
Although Brook, on p. 88, indicates that he regards his position on this point as clearly 
distinct from that of Allison, the situation is ambiguous. Allison alludes (in Kant's 
Transcendental Idealism, 290--3) to the "Wittgensteinian" view that, p. 282, the I "does 
not refer to anything at all," what he means by this is that there is no object to which the I 
refers. His position, however, is merely less articulated than that of Brook, rather than 
being distinct from it, because he too is committed to the view that there is an immediate 
self-conscious awareness distinct from empirical self-consciousness, and that this self-
consciousness is not an awareness of some property or attribute of an object. Allison's 
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Brook's account of the manner in which this awareness of ourselves is come 
by forms the second stage in his argument. What is crucial here is Kant's insistence 
on the distinction between our awareness of the self as an object via a synthesis of 
the manifold of intuition (given when we, for instance, consider oursel ves in the 
mirror), and the awareness that we have of the self as a subject which contains no 
manifold. This distinction, as we have seen, at the very least raises a question as to 
how we are aware of our own existence and opens up the possibility of a different 
form of awareness. 
Despite the fact that being able to attach the 'I think' to representations acts 
as a keystone to the argument of the Deduction, Kant has very little to say about our 
awareness of ourselves. Furthermore, what he does say does little more than 
highlight that our awareness of ourselves is not an awareness of an object. It is both 
Allison's and Brook's suggestion that Kant's comments can be rendered coherent 
and consistent with the introduction of a distinction between an awareness of objects 
of representation and an awareness of the act of representing. 11ris interpretation 
receives general textual support from the different capacities attributed to sensibility 
and the understanding. Kant frequently highlights that the synthesis of the manifold 
is an activity performed by the understanding, an act of spontaneity, and he says that 
this activity gives us a consciousness of ourselves: '"I exist as an intelligence 
conscious solely of its power of combination"[B158f2. 
This statement appears to give us two key elements in support of the Brook-
Allison interpretation. Firstly, the combination of the manifold is an activity 
performed upon intuitions, but this activity itself adds no intuitive content While 
this activity produces the unity of representations though which we can be aware of 
objects, it itself provides no additional elements to the manifold of which we can be 
aware as an object (or as some characteristic of an object). We are conscious, 
therefore, not of an object but of the activity itself. Secondly, Kant's remark 
provides a clear link between the consciousness of activity and our consciousness of 
ourselves as the subject of representations: we have an awareness of ourselves 
though the awareness of the activity, because it is the I that performs this activity. 
clearest discussion of these issues is "Kant's Refutation of MateriaJism," 192-4. 
52 "ich existire aJs Intelligenz, die sich lediglicb ihres Verbindungsvermogens bewuBt 
ist." 
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Although this point is left largely unelucidated by Kant, this link can be clarified if 
we recall Kant's argument to the effect that if representations are to be synthesised 
then those representations must all have a common subject. It seems that any 
awareness of the activity of synthesis is an awareness that there exists a subject 
common to the representations synthesised. 
In asserting, and at this point departing from the interpretation offered by 
Allison, that the awareness we have of ourselves through the activity of synthesis is 
an awareness of the noumenal subject, Brook appears (for reasons outlined in our 
discussion of intellectual intuition) to be advancing a straightforwardly un-Kantian 
claim. However, this assertion is finessed by means of the distinction behveen 
awareness and knowledge. 53 Knowledge always involves some intuitive content, 
whether that be provided by means of sensibility or (as in some hypothetical case) 
by means of an intuitive understanding. The awareness that we have of ourselves as 
subjects has no intuitive content and as such involves no claims to knowledge of the 
subject as either phenomenon or noumenon: "I am conscious of myself, not as 1 
appear to myself, nor as 1 am in myself, but only that 1 am."[B157]54 However, if 
we accept the :first and second stages of Brook's argument of what the I refers to, 
and we have an immediate awareness of ourselves as that something which performs 
the activity of synthesis upon the manifold of intuition, then we seem to be driven to 
the conclusion that we have an a,vareness of the noumenal subject 55 That is to say, 
if the I refers to the subject such that the subject is that which performs acts of 
synthesis, and if I am further aware of myself as that which performs these acts, 
53 Brook, Kant and the Afind, 252-4. The same distinction is also drawn by Allison in 
Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 290. Allison's denial that the immediate self-
consciousness which he attributes to Kant constitutes any kind of knowledge of the 
noumenal subject, arises from his unwillingness to collapse the distinction between the 
immediate self-consciousness of the subject and an intellectual intuition. The kind of 
capacities that Kant says are required for intellectual intuition are distinct from those 
involved in the inlIDediate self-awareness and so, from Allison's perspective, for Brook to 
introduce the language of noumena at this point is, at the very least., misleading, because 
this language is being employed in a manner inconsistent with Kant's own understanding 
of the terms. For Allison, p. 293, this awareness is a new and unacknowledged form of 
consciousness, which falls outside of the "phenomenal-noumenal distinction." 
54 "bin ich mir meiner selbst ... bewuBt, nicht wie ich mir erscheine, noch wie ich an 
mir selbst bin, sondern nur d a.B ich bin." 
55 For a similar attempt (from within the Brook-Allison framework) to articulate the 
relationship between the I of the 'I think' and the moral or supersensible subject see Lewis 
Baldacchino, "'Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness," Kant-Studien 71 (1980): passim. 
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then I am aware of myself as I am - and not as I appear to myself. Kant himself 
appears to make this very point (although he forgets the distinction between 
awareness and knowledge): 
I, as intelligence and thinking subject, know myself as an object that is 
thought, in so far as I am given to myself beyond that which is in 
intuition [B155]. 
IIch, als Intelligenz und denkend Subject, erkenne mich selbst als 
g e d a c h t e s Object, so fern ich mir noch tiber das in der Anschauung 
gegeben bin]. 
These three arguments advanced by Brook provide clear support for 
Fichte's interpretation of Kant. This is not to say that these two interpretations are 
by any means identical, but the interpretations offered by Brook and Allison retain 
some of the key features in common with Fichte's interpretation - whilst avoiding 
the inadequacies of the latter. Thus, both Brook and Allison account for the 
references we make to the subject in terms which do not reduce the I to a mere 
formality within the system of representations. They also account for our awareness 
of ourselves as an awareness of something that is both real (non-illusory) yet 
fundamentally different from our awareness of objects. These readings evade our 
previous criticisms of Fichte in that they rely on the notion that the transcendental 
subject is not absolute. The activity that Fichte attributes to the transcendental 
subject is not merely the activity of synthesis~ for Fichte it is a confusion on Kant's 
part to introduce the notion that there is something given to us which is not a 
produce of the activity of the absolute subject. Hence, the activity of which we are 
aware, for Fichte, is not that which renders representations my representations on 
the basis of my having synthesised them, but rather the activity of producing the 
self-conscious subject through a free act of reflection. Although this does not 
legitimate Fichte's claim that his Wissenschafislehre is nothing other than the 
Kantian Syst~ nonetheless it does open the way for him to argue that the notion of 
a given relies on things-in-themselves, and that things-in-themselves are an internal 
contradiction within Kant's system. Fichte does, in other words, make a plausible 
case for claiming that the Wissenschqftslehre is the only coherent system of 
transcendental idealism. However, Fichte leaps to an attribution of directionality to 
the relationship between the subject of experience and the content of experience, in a 
way that Brook and Allison do not. The latter both maintain that there is a 
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reciprocal conditioning between the activity of synthesis and representations 
synthesised~ it is not the case that we could have an awareness of our existence in 
the absence of there being anything given to the subject for it to synthesise. In this 
sense the subject loses the absolute status that Fichte attributes to it, because the 
subject is not in the position of being able to posit itself unconditionally. 
6. The Transcendental Unity of Apperception and the 'I Think' 
In the previous chapter and the preceding Sections, we have already 
gathered sufficient material for an evaluation of the residual Fichtcan clements in 
both the Brook-Allison interpretation and the deconstructionist interpretation of the 
subject. The problem with these interpretations, including Fichte's own, resides in 
the conflation of the 'I think' with the transcendental unity of apperception: the first 
result of which is the reading of the 'I think' as transcendental, as a part of the 
necessary structure of experience. Before returning to how these interpretations 
stand up under examination, we shall begin by drawing together the materials 
assembled in both this chapter and the previous one for the interpretation that we are 
advancing. Only after this has been achieved will the Fichtean interpretations be 
scrutinised further. 
6.1 The 'I Think' 
We have already seen how, within the Deduction, Kant thoroughly 
intertwines the 'I think' with the conditions of possibility of experience. However, it 
was also emphasised that Kant's interest in the 'I think' follows from the connection 
between it being possible for the 'I think' to accompany representations and those 
representations that "can stand together ill one universal self-
consciousness"[B132].s6 That is, the conditions under which representations 
represent to me are of interest because they provide a starting point for the 
investigation into the conditions under which representations represent per se. 
Although it is necessary for the 'I think' to be able to accompany representations for 
those representations to be anything to me, the 'I think' is not numbered amongst 
these latter conditions. It remains possible for a representation to represent in the 
absence of the 'I think.' 
56 
"in einem aJigemeinen SelbstbewuBtsein zusammenstehcn k 0 nne n ". 
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The most explicit support for this contention comes in the B-Paralogisms 
where Kant claims that the "I think' is "'an empirical proposition"[B422f7 • The "I 
think' does not function as both necessary and a priori in the manner of a category 
of experience. Rather, it is a contingent matter as to whether any experience is, in 
fact, accompanied by the 'I think', and it is always necessary for there to be some 
given experience, a posteriori, before the 'I think' itself can be thought. Due to this 
latter factor, there is distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate emplo)ment 
of the categories and the legitimate and illegitimate inferences that can be made on 
the basis of the 'I think': each gives rise to a quite different set of problems. With 
regard to the former, difficulties arise not from any misunderstanding of the 
concepts themselves (i.e., the concepts are invariant across their legitimate and 
illegitimate uses), but rather from the employment of the concepts within domains 
where we can have no knowledge of their applicability. Thus, the legitimacy of the 
categories within the bounds of experience follows from their being constitutive of 
that experience. However, it also remains the case that any application of the 
categories to something which is not a possible object of experience is problematic. 58 
Furthermore, the <I think' can have no problematic application since '"without some 
empirical representation to supply the material for thought, the act, 1 think, would 
not, indeed take place"[B423]59. The <I think' is tied to the purse strings of 
experience not only for its legitimate employment, but for any employment 
whatsoever. In such a case, illegitimacy arises from a misunderstanding of what is 
implied by this tie. As Kant contends in the Paralogisms, it is a mistake to argue 
that because the 'I think' is always available to accompany experience, it is, 
therefore, substantial; or because it is always singular, it must be simple; or because 
it is always the same, it is, therefore, identical. 
57 
58 
59 
"ein empirischer Satz." 
"we have an understanding which problematically extends further, but we have no 
intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects 
outside the field of sensibility can be given, and through which the understanding can 
be employed assertorically beyond that field. "[A2551B31O] 
[wir haben einen Verstand, der sieh problematisch weiter erstreckt a1sjcnc, aber 
keine Ansehauung, ja auch Dieht einmal den BegrifI von einer m6glichen 
Anschammg, wodureh uns miller dem Felde der Sinnliehkeit Gegenstande gegcben 
und der Verstand fiber dieselbe hinaus assertorisch gebraueht werden k6nne.] 
"AlJein ohne irgend eine empirische Vorstellung, die den Stoff zurn Denken abgiebt, 
wiirde der Actus: Ich denke, doch Dicht stattfinden." 
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This notion of the 'I think' as an empirical proposition is fully compatible 
with the argument found in the Deduction where, as we have seen, the capacity of 
the 'I think' to accompany representations was attributed to the transcendental 
condition of there being a synthesis of representations. It was there argued that all 
representation involves a synthesis, and that the capacity of the "I think' to 
accompany any of the intuitive or representational components being taken up in a 
synthetic unity, is a function of that synthesis. That is, we took Kant's claim that 
"the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a 
certain synthetic unity"[B 133]60 to mean that it is merely a logical function of 
synthetic unity that the elements of the manifold be given to a single subject. It was 
argued that it is necessary for there to be a synthesis of the manifold before this 
manifold can be attributed the common property of belonging to the "I think.' 
Furthermore, we have seen that it was precisely due to the contentless nature of the 
'I think,' as a representation which contains no manifold, that it can be applied to 
any synthetic unity. Indeed, no further synthesis between the representation • 1 think' 
and the representation which is thought is necessary, because the 'I think' is simply 
a re-presentation of the unity of the representation itself - without any additional 
content being introduced into that representation. This requirement from the 
Deduction for there already to be a synthetic unity is expressed in the Paraiogisms in 
terms of the 'I think' being an empirical proposition - something must be given 
through intuition for synthesis to occur. Furthermore, the contentless nature of this 
representation is expressed in the Paralogisms by 'I think' preceding "the experience 
which is required to determine the object of perception through the category in 
respect oftime."[B423]61 In other words, what has been claimed is that the 'I think' 
does not itself need to denote an object of perception (whichever item of inner sense 
one takes to represent the mind or soul), because the 1 has no manifold. 
The coincidence of two seemingly contradictory properties - namely that 
the 'I think' is both an empirical representation and yet, at the same time, is an 
analytic unity - is entirely eXl'lained by the lack of manifold contained in this 
60 
61 
"die ana Iyti sche Einheit der Apperception ist nur unter der Voraussetzung irgend 
einer syn theti schen moglich." 
"geht aber vor der Erfahrung vorher, die das Object der Wahrnehmung durcb die 
Kategorie in Ansebung der Zeit bestimmen soli" . 
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representation. It is, firstly, an analytic unity m that the '[ think' which 
accompanies any representation cannot be distinguished from the . I think' 
accompanying any other representation., since it has no properties by means of which 
it could be differentiated.62 It is, secondly, analytic that the 'I think' is "singular". 
that it is one. Indeed, if there were two representations each accompanied by the -I 
think' which could not yet be thought together as the common representation of a 
single 'I think', then those representations could not constitute a synthetic unity and, 
consequently, would not be part of one experience in general; quite simply they 
would be the experience of two different subjects.63 
6.2 Transcendental Apperception 
The 'I ~ , as both empirical and analytic, needs to be sharply 
distinguished from transcendental apperception., the "'necessary synthesis of 
representations"IB 135]64 which is presupposed by the analytic unity of empirical 
apperception. Where the 'I think' is an item of consciousness - albeit \\-ith 
properties, or rather a lack of them, which distinguish it from all other 
representations - transcendental apperception is a formal feature of all 
representations. Formal here does not carry the implication that transcendental 
apperception can be derived from the mere concept of a representation, but rather 
that it is the form of representation as such. The evidence for this claim has already 
been gathered in our discussion of the role of transcendental apperception within the 
B-Deduction. 
We have seen, firstly, that transcendental apperception functions as the 
condition of possibility for an intuition (or, more generally, a representation) 
62 
63 
64 
"The proposition, that in all the manifold of which I am conscious I am identical with 
myself, is likewise implied in the concepts themselves, and is therefore an analytic 
proposition." [B408] 
[Der Satz der Identitat meiner selbst bei allem Mannigfaltigen, dessen ich mir bewu8t 
bin, ist ein eben so wohl in den Begriffen selbst Iiegender, mithin analytischer Satz]. 
"That the I of apperception, and consequently in every thought, is singular, and 
cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and consequently signifies a logically 
simple subject, is something already contained in the very concept of thought, and is 
therefore an analytic proposition. " [B407] 
[DaJ} das Ich der Apperception folglich in jedem Denken ein Sin g u I a r seL der 
nicht in eine Vielheit der Subjecte aufgeloset werden kann, mithin ein logisch 
einfaches Subject bezeichne, liegt schon inl Begriffe des Dcnkens, ist folglich ein 
anaJytiscber Satz]. 
"einer norn'endigen Synthesis derselben. ,> 
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representing; secondly, that the condition of representations representing is that they 
are synthesised; and thirdly, that such synthesis must involve the use of concepts 
because it is only through concepts that representations are related to objects. The 
forms of intuition give the conditions under which intuition takes place, and 
transcendental apperception gives the conditions under which representation is 
possible. 65 Just as we can have no intuition except that mode of intuition which 
conforms to the forms of space and time, we can have no intuition except that type 
of intuition which conforms to the form of transcendental apperception~ that is, 
intuition is always the intuition of an object. Kant draws the analogy between 
transcendental apperception and the forms of intuition in both editions of the 
Deduction (AI 071B 136). Furthermore, in both cases Kant indicates that it is the 
synthetic unity of the manifold which constitutes the transcendental unity of 
apperception. The original synthetic unity of apperception is that condition, 
under which all representations that are given to me must stand, but 
under which they have also first to be brought by means of a synthesis. 
[B135-6] 
[unter der aile mir gegebene Vorstellungen stehen, aber unteT die sie 
auch durch eine Synthesis gebracht werden musseD. ] 
To say that the representations must stand under the condition of the 
synthetic unity of apperception is not to mark this unity out as something other than 
a relation of representations, but is, instead, merely to state that the synthetic 
relationship between representations, which makes it possible for those 
representations to constitute representations of objects, needs to be distinguished 
from the other w·ays in which the relations can be constituted. In particular, this 
relationship (of representations under the synthetic unity of apperception) is to be 
distinguished from relations based on association, resemblance, contiguity, and so 
on. Kant's vocabulary of representations standing under the synthetic unity of 
65 
"The supreme principle of the possibility of al intuition in its relation to sensibility is, 
according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of intuition should be 
subject to the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of the 
same possibility, in its relation to understanding, is that all the manifold of intuition 
should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. " [B 136] 
[Der oberste Grundsatz der Moglichkeit aller Anschauung in Beziehung auf die 
Sinnlichkeit war laut der transscendentalen Asthetik: d~ alles Mannigfaltige 
derselben unter den formaJen Bedingung des Raums und der Zeit stehe. Der oberste 
Grundsatz eben derselben in Beziehung auf den Verstand ist: daB alles MannigfaJtige 
der Anschauung unler Bedingungen der ursprunglich-s)'llthetischen Einheit der 
Apperception stehe.] 
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apperception notwithstanding, we are not here dealing with a concept according to 
which the manifold of intuition is synthesised; rather the synthesis of the manifold of 
intuition itself constitutes the synthetic unity of apperception. It is not therefore to 
be distinguished from the synthesis of the manifold as something standing outside of 
or apart from this synthesis. 
Transcendental apperception is synthetic both in the sense that it is not 
derivable from the concept of an object in general, and in the sense that it itself is a 
synthesis. It is, furthermore, transcendental in that it both takes place a priori and is 
a condition of possibility for experience in general. We have already seen that the a 
priori nature of this synthesis derives from it applying to the pure forms of intuition. 
This means that whatever empirical intuition is given, it is not given merely in 
accordance with the forms of intuition themselves, but it is, rather, given as a priori 
synthesised though formal intuition. Empirical intuition fills this formal intuition 
simply as experience. Such experience is, however, not necessarily a subject's 
experience of an object; that is, it need not be the case that experience be 
consciously registered. Rather, it is only because of the synthetic unity of 
apperception that we can be self-conscious: 
The thought that the representations given in intuition one and all 
belong to me, is therefore equivalent to the thought that I unite them in 
one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them; and although this 
thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesiS of 
representations, it presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. [B134] 
[Der Gedanke: diese in der Anschauung gegebene Vorstellungen 
gehoren m i r insgesammt zu, heillt demnach so viel, als ich vereinige 
sie in einem Selbstbewu6tsein, oder kann sie wenigstens darin 
vereinigen; und ob er gleich selbst noch nicht das BevvuBtsein der 
Synthesis der Vorstellungen ist, so setzt er doch die Moglichkeit der 
letzteren voraus]. 
This is a clear statement both of the non-identity of the 'I think' and 
transcendental apperception, and of the relationship between them. Kant is here 
claiming, firstly, that unless it is possible the 'I think' to accompany a 
representation, that representation does not belong to me; secondly, that attaching 
the 'I think' (or, equivalently, uniting representations in one self-consciousness) is 
distinct from but requires a synthesis of representations. It is this synthesis that we 
have identified as transcendental apperception. The synthetic unity of apperception 
itself guarantees that representations will one and all be subject to a synthesis such 
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that they can be brought into relation with each other, and it as a consequence of this 
that they can belong to one self-consciousness. In other words the synthetic unitv of 
"... ...' 
apperception is the 'ground of the identity of apperception'IB134166 but it itself is 
not apperception, not the 'I think'. 
6.3 Confusions Regarding the Kantian Subject 
The first form of confusion, and that which deconstructionist readings of the 
subject in Kant fall prey to, is the identification of the subject of experience (as in 
the subject to whom experience belongs) and the subject which does the experiencing 
(as in that through which representations are representations of something). It is 
only on the basis of the manifold of intuition undergoing the synthesis ,,,hich is 
constitutive of the subject in this second sense that they are attributed "Being". The 
subject of experience is no different in this regard. Although the 'I think' is not 
itself the product of such synthesis, in that it is to be distinguished from thc 
empirical subject because it contains no manifold and is not given through 
experience, it is nonetheless only on the basis of there being such synthesis that the 
'I think' is itself possible. We have seen that the analytic nature of thc unity of the 
'I think' does not alter this. lbis is because it is only when a synthetic unity is 
already established that the general concept of the 'I think' can itself be extracted, 
since the 'I think' designates what the synthesised representations share - namely 
that they are subject to such synthesis - without referring to any of the intuited 
properties of the representations.67 There is, therefore, no paradox here. The 
subject, in the :first sense, does derive its being from experience; 'I think' IS an 
empirical proposition. The subject, in the second sense (which can only properly be 
called a subject in the loosest of senses), also has no being in the absence of any 
manifold of empirical intuition being given for synthesis, since as a transcendental 
unity it is the mere form of experience in generaL It is a form in that it designates 
the manner in which intuitions must be ordered if they are to constitute an 
experience of something, and, as such a form, the subject has no existence 
independent of its instantiation. 
There is, furthermore, no regress of kind identified in Aenesidemus; there is 
66 "der Grund der Identitat der Apperception." 
67 See Chapter 3, pp. 84-86. 
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no need to posit a further subject to whom the 'I think' itself appears. There is no 
need for an absolute subject to whom all representations must belong. This is 
because, firstly, it is not a condition of representations representing that such a 
subject be posited and, secondly, because the 'I think' as a representation poses no 
special difficulties due to its duality of role as both a representation and the owner of 
representations. This second difficulty evaporates as soon as it is recognised that, 
for Kant, it is a logical feature of the synthesis of representations that it is possible 
for a further representation of the subject to arise; there is no regress to ever 
deepening conditions of representations, but merely the one and the same 
representation, the 'I think,' which itself indicates no further condition of 
representation other than that there is a synthesis. Schulze and Henrich, in other 
words, posit the need for the subject to whom experience belongs to be such that it 
both receives experience and stands outside experience. This appears to be 
somewhat analogous to the adoption of a Newtonian view where space and time are 
absolute and the 'container' of objects that are found within them. The Kantian 
answer is the same in both cases; space, time and the subject (as the transcendental 
unity of apperception) are forms of experience, and, therefore, questions concerning 
the space (within which absolute space exists) or the subject (to whom the subject is 
given) are uncritical. 68 Such questions cannot be raised without stepping outside the 
frame of the critical sense, and to do this is, in effect, to close the logical gap 
between Descartes and Kant (as explicitly occurs on Henrich's interpretation).69 
The argument presented by Brook and Allison involves a similar confusion 
of the synthetic unity of consciousness and analytic unity of consciousness. It will 
be remembered that this first stage consisted in the claim that the 'I think' was a 
referring teI1l\ a term that refers to the subject as the beholder of representations. It 
was argued that in the absence of such reference there would be no way in which 
representations could be attributable to an experiencing subject. The demand made 
by this argument is that it be shown how the notion that representations are mine can 
68 For a very different defence of Kant, from within the phenomenological or Heideggerian 
tradition, see Ameriks,. "From Kant to Frank," passim. For Manfred Frank's own account 
see, for example, "Is Self-Consciousness a Case of presence a soi? Towards a Mcta-
Critique of the Recent French Critique of Metaphysics," in Derrida: A Critical Reader, 
ed. David Wood (Oxford: Black'well, 1992). 
69 Henrich, "Fichte's Original Insight," 16-7 . 
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arise in the absence of any reference to an I. However, we have already seen that 
Kant provides just such an argument. It is a condition of representations 
representing at all that they be subject to a synthesis, but it is a merely logical 
feature of synthesis that the representations synthesised are all capable of being 
accompanied by a further representation, namely the 'I think' The latter point is an 
analytic proposition because it refers to the property of being subject to a synthesis. 
This is sufficient to explain the properties that are attributed to the I, that it is 
simple, identical, unified, and it is not clear what more needs to be explained. The 
question of why representations are ascribed to me, rather than us or to some other 
person or persons, is answered quite straightforwardly by reference to the necessity 
of synthesis and the analytic consequence of this. It is no more than an illusion that 
there is some soul in the driver's seat. 70 
A similar confusion is also in play regarding the second stage of the 
Brook-Allison argument: that the awareness of the I is an awareness of the activity 
performed by this I. In a broad sense we can agree with the claim that the '1 think' 
expresses a synthesis - given that the 'I think' is dependent upon such synthesis-
but to say that the I itself plays a productive role within the synthetic activity is to 
reverse the dependency relation. However, we have already seen that Brook 
provided textual support for his interpretation at this point: "I exist as an intelligence 
70 Kant expresses this in his remarkably crisp conclusion to the B-Paralogisms: 
"I think myself on behalf of a possible expelience, at the same time abstracting from 
all actual experience; and I conclude therefrom that 1 can be conscious of my 
existence even apart from experience and its empirical conditions. In so doing I am 
confusing the possible abstraction from my empirically determined existence with the 
supposed consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self, and I 
thus come to believe that 1 have knowledge that what is substantial in me is the 
transcendental subject. But all that I reaJly have in thought is simply the unity of 
consciousness, on which, as the mere form of knowledge, all determination is 
based." [B 426-7] 
[Ich denke mich selbst zum Behuf einer moglichen Erfahrung, indem ich noch von 
aller wirklichen Erfahrung abstrahire, und schliefie daraus, daB ich mich meiner 
Existenz auch auBer der Erfahrung und den empirischen Bedingungen derselben 
bewuBt werden k6nne. Folglich verwechsele ich die mogliche A b s t r act ion von 
meiner empirisch bestimmten Existenz mit dem vermeinten BewuBtsein einer 
a b g e son d e rt moglichen Existenz meines denkenden Selbst und glaube das 
Substantiale in mir als das transscendentaJe Subject zu erkennen, indem ich bloB die 
Einheit des Be",uBtseins, welche aJlem Bestinunen als der blofien Form der 
Erkenntnill zum Grunde Iiegt, in Gedanken habe.] 
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conscious solely of its power of combination"[B158J71. Passages such as this one 
are used by both Brook and Allison as the basis for their notion of a distinctive non-
phenomenal consciousness of the activity of synthesis performed by the subject. 
However, there is no need to read these passages as positing either some immediate 
consciousness of activity or a consciousness of myself as performing an activity. 
Rather the notion of a consciousness of synthesis can be explained in terms of 
Kant's account of the conditions which intuitions can come to represent. There is no 
extra or added intuitive content which distinguishes between the association of A 
and B and the synthesis of A and B. ill the latter case, however, the intuitions are 
united under some concept and there is a transcendental, as opposed to an empirical, 
unity of consciousness. What the 'I think' (which can accompany the unified 
representation) is a consciousness of, is that 'A is the cause of B', and this 
consciousness does constitute a consciousness of the synthesis of A and B, but it 
does not imply a consciousness of something other than A and B or of the 
synthesising of them. That is to say, there is a consciousness of synthesis only in 
the limited sense that the representations which we can be conscious of are 
synthesised. There is no consciousness of the process of synthesis per se. ill 
abstraction from intuition, it can be said that the 1 exists as a consciousness of 
synthetic unity or of synthesis, but this is not to not isolate a special kind of 
conSCIOusness. It is instead merely to describe, in accordance with the general 
procedure of the Deduction, the form of consciousness. 72 The point, therefore, that 
we take Kant to be making in his reference to the consciousness of synthesis is an 
abstract one regarding the form which the empirical 'I think' proposition takes, 
rather than a claim regarding what the content of the consciousness is.73 
71 
'"ich existire als Intelligenz, die sich lediglich ihres Verbindungsvermogens bewuBt 
ist. " 
Other statements which make similar claims to a consciousness of the act of synthesis 
are to found on B133 and most ex-plicitly on AlO3-4 and A108. The clearest case of a 
counter example occurs on B134. See also Kitcher, Transcendental Psychology, 105-8. 
72 Kant employs the notion of abstracting from the manifold frequently throughout the 
Deduction, see, for examples, BI55 and B162. See also the B42&-7 passage previously 
quoted in note 70 above and B 429. 
73 For Kitcher's discussion of this issue see Transcendental Psychology, 12&-8. Kitcher's 
dismisses these passages, p. 83, on the basis of what she percei,cs to be a confusion on 
Kant's part between "the perspective of the individual who is engaging in various mental 
activities and that of the theorist who is describing those activities." On our reading. 
however, there is neither the need to appeal to "synthesis watching," p. 127 (Kitchcr's 
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The I that Kant associates with the act of synthesis itself remains completely 
unknown to us; we know only that acts of synthesis take place and take place 
independently of intuition. The only justification for associating this activity with an 
[ resides in the spontaneous nature of the act: if the act is not given through objects, 
then it is attributable to us. However, this attribution carries with it no association 
with the I of the "I think', because it is merely a condition of our being able to 
represent ourselves as simple, unified and identical that such activity take place. 
This activity itself need be none of these things, and it remains completely unknm\'ll. 
to us how the activity comes about. That is, the manner in which the activity of 
synthesis is itself represented is via the phenomenal determination of this activity in 
the representation 'I think.,' but the qualities analytically associated \vith this 
representation have no bearing on the conditions under which this activity itself 
takes place - even whether there are multiple loci of activity or just the one. All 
that can be said as to the nature of the activity is that it is spontaneous. 
The attribution of activity to the I invites the confusion between the 
empirical awareness of ourselves as subjects and our awareness of the spontaneity 
of synthesis. The results of this confusion are clearly visible in Brook's argument. 
Representations are thought to be attributable to me because I have an awareness of 
myself as the subject of representations; this awareness is not an awareness of 
myself as a phenomenal object, but rather of myself as the synthesiscr of 
representations. Although this awareness has no intuitive content, and therefore 
cannot be classed as knowledge, it is an awareness of how I must be in myself, not 
merely how I appear to myself: it is an awareness of how I must be in order to be 
able to appear to myself The first problem here is the confusion of the "I think' and 
the 1 as synthesiser; although the awareness of both contains no manifold and is not 
the awareness of an object, they cannot legitimately be identified. On the one hand, 
there is an awareness of a empirical representation which can arise as an analytic 
consequence of the synthetic activity required for any experience. On the other 
hand, there is the ground of the synthetic activity itself, the nature of which is 
description of Allison's view), or to a muddle on Kant's part Kant's statements are rather 
an account of what the form of consciousness is. If one takes Kant's statements either to 
be a case of synthesis watching or of a confusion of levels, then one is taking the form of 
consciousness to be a kind of consciousness, confusing the transcendental \'11th the 
empirical. 
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completely unknown to us. In the latter case the awareness of ourselves no more 
constitutes an awareness of the I-in-itself than intuition is an awareness of the 
object-in-itself. It is not, as is the case with the 'I think', an awareness of a 
representation, but merely the recognition on theoretical grounds that intuition is 
given as manifold and is not capable of constituting a representation of anything 
simply as a manifold. In other words, the synthesis of the manifold of intuition 
necessary for representation has an origin distinct from intuition, but this origin 
nonetheless remains unknown to us. Being aware of this need for synthesis does not 
constitute awareness of this origin, just as being aware that there must be some 
origin of the manifold of intuition itself does not constitute an awareness of things-
in-themselves. That Kant is committed to the existence of things-in-themselves is 
clear throughout the first Critique and he makes frequent reference to things-in-
themselves as the ground of appearances (e.g., B164, Al911B235, A4941B522), 
although he is quite aware of the problematic nature of this relationship: 
If appearances are not taken for more than they aetually are; if they are 
viewed not as things-in-themselves, but merely as representations, 
connected according to empirical laws, they must themselves have 
grounds whieh are not appearances. The effects of such an intelligible 
cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through other 
appearances, but its causality is not so detemlined. [A536-71B564-5] 
[Wenn .,. Erscheinungen rur Diehts mehr gelten, als sie in der That 
sind, namlich nicht:fiir Dinge an sieh, sondem blo.Be Vorstellungen, die 
naeh empirischen Gesetzen zusammenh.angen, so miissen sie selbst 
noch Griinde haben, die Dieht Erscheinungen sind. Eine solche 
intelligibele Ursaehe aber ,,-ird in Ansehung ihrer Causalitat Diehl durch 
Erscheinungen bestimmt, obzwar ihre Wirkungen erscheinen und sie 
dUTeh andere Erscheinungen bestimmt werden konnen.] 
In other words, even if we understand appearances according to the tenets of 
transcendental idealism, we can still be aware that these appearances must 
themselves have some ground which is not a possible object of experience, and when 
we speak of "'cause' in this regard we are not referring to the category of causality, 
but only reinforcing the point that the objects of which we are conscious are merely 
the appearance of something of which we can have no knowledge. To introduce 
causality is, strictly speaking, illegitimate, but we have no other way of indicating 
that there must exist a ground for appearances except in terms that apply only to 
appearances themselves. Kant makes this same point with regard to the subject-in-
itself: if we consider the spontaneity of the synthesis without regard to the way in 
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which the manifold is presented through the forms of intuition, then references to 
myself as subject of thought or as the ground of the spontaneity "do not signify the 
categories of substance or cause."[B429f4 Throughout this I am conscious of 
myself merely as thinking, and 
hQW my own self may be given in intuitiQn is set to. Qne side and there it 
CQuld be to me mere appearance Qf which I think but nQt mere 
appearance insofar as I think; in the cQnsciQusness of myself thrQugh 
mere thinking I am the being itself, admittedly nQthing of this is thereby 
given to. me fQr thQught. [B429*] 
[wie mein eigenes Selbst in der Anschauung gegeben sei, das setze ich 
bei Seite, und da konnte es mir, der ich denke, aber nieht so. fern ich 
denke, bloB Erscheinung sein; im Be'\\'Ufitsein meiner Selbst beim 
bloBen Denken bin ieh das We sen s e 1 b s t, VQn dem mir aber freilich 
dadureh noch nichts ZUlU Denken gegeben ist.] 
How I appear to myself, i.e. how the I which performs the spontaneous 
activity of thought appears in intuition, is nothing but an appearance. However, 
insofar as thinking is taking place, I am conscious not merely of the appearance of 
myself, but also of myself as an appearance. This is an appearance which (with 
regard to that aspect of this appearance not derived from intuition) is a product of a 
spontaneous activity, the ground of which is completely unknown. Insofar as 
thought is required, however, I am conscious that there is something which is the 
ground of this thought, even though nothing of this ground is itself thought. 
Kant clearly has some difficulty in expressing this point because there is no 
opportunity for a shift in vocabulary between the < I as it appears' and the 'I as it is 
in itself'. When discussing objects Kant can make use of a distinction that is 
already part of the philosophical tradition between objects as we are aware of them, 
and things as they are in themselves. Even in the case of the latter distinction, Kant 
has some difficulty in maintaining a consistent set of distinctions, as is witnessed by 
his occasional shifts from, for example, speaking of a being which is the < cause of 
appearances' and acts as a <thing-in-itself' to speaking of a <transcendental object' 
whose 'effict is met with in appearance. ' [AS 3 8-9/B5 66-7f5 Kant, furthermore, is 
committed to view that the ground of thought can be attributed a moral 
74 
75 
"Wenn ich mich hier als Sub j e c t der Gedanken Qder aueh als G run d des Denkens 
vQrstelle, so bedeuten diese Vorstellungsarten nieht die KategQrien der Substanz Qder 
der Ursache". 
"die Ursaehe VQn Erscheinungen"; "naeh ihrer Handlung als eines Dinges an sich 
selbst"; "transscendentaler Gegenstand"; "ihre Wi r k u n g dennoch in der 
Erscheinung angetrofIen wird." 
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responsibility. This leads him to speak as if the I as it appears and this ground of 
thought can be identified with one another, at least insofar as this ground is always 
referred to by a singular term.76 However, within the confines of the first Critique, 
there can be no such commitment to either the nature of the I-in-itself or what the 
relationship is between the I-in-itself and the I as it appears. Brook's point 
regarding the awareness that we have of a noumenal subject via the activity of 
synthesis has, therefore, some validity, but it is not the awareness that he takes it to 
be. On the one hand, there is an awareness that the ground of synthesis itself 
remains unknown to us because it lies outside of all possible experience; this is an 
awareness of our own limited capacities. On the other hand, there is an awareness 
of ourselves as a representation which contains no manifold, this is the awareness of 
ourselves as the subject of experience, the 'I think.' Brook's error is to confuse the 
two, associating an awareness of the subject as it is in itself V.1th an awareness of 
ourselves as the subject of experience. 
7. Conclusion 
Kant neither requires nor has any implicit commitment to there being any 
intellectual intuition of the subject; both the apparent paradoxes thrown up by the '[ 
think' being a representation without an intuitive manifold and the reinterpretations 
which suggest some solution to these imaginary problems rest upon the conflation of 
divergent senses of the term subject, 1 or apperception. The threefold nature of the 
subject which we have identified corresponds to three possible misinterpretations. 
Conflating any two terms in this trichotomy results in some variant of the positions 
that we have criticised above. We can confuse: 
1) The synthetic unity of apperception with the 'I think' . 
2) The 'I think' with the I-in-itself. 
3) The synthetic unity of apperception with the I-in-itself. 
The first form of confusion induces the problems posed by both 
76 In addition to the considerations of his moral philosophy, Kant also (even during the 
'writing of the first Critique) had thought of the unity of consciousness as the unity of a 
thinking thing. Although the Paralogisms rule out this inference, it may have found its 
way into the final version of the Critique. An infonnative account of the development of 
Kant's thought in this regard is given in Wolfgang Carl, "Kant's First Drafts of the 
Deduction of the Categories," in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckart Forster, 
11-20. See also Kitcher, "Kant's Real Self," 122-:1 . 
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Aenesidemus and those here associated with a deconstructionist approach. It 
appears to be the case that there is some internal contraction in the position 
attributed to the subject; it is on the one hand a representation and on the other that 
unity of consciousness necessary for the production of representations. As 
Aenesidemus understands it, it is constitutive of representations that they represent 
to someone~ the subject of representations is identified as the I think and yet Kant 
maintains that this is itself a representation. This position generates the need for a 
subject for the representation of the subject. Although operating at a more abstract 
level, the same problematic informs the deconstructionist approach~ it is claimed that 
representations only come to represent on the ground that they are given to a unity of 
consciousness, yet this unity of consciousness itself is nothing other than a 
representation: one could say, the subject is a representation. 
Fichte provides a pre-eminent example of the second confusion. The I 
which is the subject of the representations of objects and has merely a logical 
relationship to these representations is identified with the subject which has a 
productive relationship with representations. The subject to whom representations 
are given in this second sense is absolute because it is the condition of synthesis 
rather than being conditioned by it. 
The interpretation offered by Brook confuses the theoretical awareness of 
the form which any synthesis of representations must have, the synthetic unity of 
apperception, with the awareness of the ground of the synthesis itself. Where Fichte 
interprets a logical relationship in terms of production Brook associates a 
transcendental relationship with a productive one. The form which experience must 
take is identified with that which induces experience to take on this form. 
It follows from the reading that we are adopting here that the claims 
advanced in the Deduction and reinforced in the Paralogisms regarding both the 
existential and intellectual status of the I, do not form either an internal contradiction 
or a hidden prop to Kant's argument. 
In the first case the claim 'I exist' arises as a consequence of the distinction , 
between the analytic and synthetic unity of apperception. We have seen the analytic 
unity of apperception follows as a logical consequence of the form which experience 
must take if representations are to represent objects, that is, they must be subjcct to 
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the fonn of the synthetic unity of apperception. The representation of a 
representation merely identifies the analytic feature of representations (that they are 
subject to synthesis) and, hence, requires no additional manifold of intuition for its 
production. However, the lack of any detenninate manifold of intuition does not 
render the 'I think' a mere empty concept, because it is necessary that the 
indetenninate manifold of intuition be subject to a conceptual synthesis. 
Furthennore, Kant can legitimately claim that the 1 exists without appealing to some 
intuition of the I that exists. There is no special object corresponding to this 
representation, but, rather, the I merely serves to mark the occurrence of 
representation itself. 
In the second case the intellectual status attributed to the subject does not 
involve the identification of the 'I think' with the noumenaJ subject. As we have 
seen, the spontaneity of the 'I think' can be maintained precisely because of the lack 
of an intuitive component of any sort~ it is only due to the synthetic ordering of the 
manifold of intuition (the productive source of both the manifold and the introduced 
ordering remaining outside the field of knowledge), that the representation of 
ourselves as the subject of experience can arise. We have shown that, despite 
puzzles arising both from Kant's own ambiguities and from the Fichtean 
interpretation, Kant's account of the subject remains perfectly in harmony with the 
Deduction. 
At the end of the second chapter, "ve seemed to be faced with a trade-off 
between, on the one hand, maintaining the objective validity of the categories and, on 
the other, denying that we can have any knowledge or awareness of the subject as it 
is in itself. This choice is now seen to be specious. However, one is faced with this 
choice when one either accepts that Kant holds to the reflective theory of 
consciousness or takes Kant to have adopted a proto-Fichtean view of the subject. 
In the first instance, we are meant to be able to identify ourselves as that which 
carries out the acts of synthesis. However, since our consciousness of ourselves 
arises as a result of such activity a regress ensues. In the Fichtean case, our 
consciousness of ourselves in the activity of synthesis is taken to be immediate, and 
yet this leads to the view that we have, at least, some awareness of the subject as it 
is in itself. However, as has been explored here, and is to be investigated further in 
the next chapter, Kant's claims for objective validity, in fact, do not lead him to 
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adopt the view that there is any awareness of the subject in the activity of s!nthesis, 
nor do the claims require him to adopt such a view . 
. 168' 
Chapter Five 
An Answer to Hume? 
1. Introduction 
Within this chapter the objections which have been raised against the 
possibility in principle of the Transcendental Deduction succeeding are reconsidered. 
In the second section the progression from providing an answer to the objections 
raised by Stroud, Gram, and Cassam into the apparent paradoxes of the Kantian 
subject is highlighted. The discussion of the subject in the previous chapter is then 
employed to halt the slide from the first set of difficulties into the second. 
Subsequently, in Section 3, the more general question regarding the success of the 
Deduction as an answer Hume is raised. It is suggested that despite the fact that 
within the Deduction itself there appear to be no resources available which allow 
Kant to establish that particular concepts are categories, the success of the 
Deduction should not be judged in these terms. What the Deduction establishes is a 
domain within which distinctively transcendental justification for the application of 
categories to experience can be offered. 
2. Scepticism and the Subject 
In Chapter three the argument of the Transcendental Deduction was 
construed as an attempt to defend the notion of an a priori conceptual synthesis of 
the manifold of intuition. l The primary aim of our discussion was to demonstrate 
that the two stages of Kant's argument (or the 'Conceptual' and the 'Satisfaction 
Components ') are reconciled without a direct appeal to transcendental idealism. The 
problem to which this chapter responded was that there appeared to be no way in 
which the conditions outlined in the first stage of the Deduction's argument 
(concerning the analytic unity of consciousness and the need for a conceptual 
synthesis of the manifold) could be maintained to be universally applicable. Thus, 
the claim made by Kant's critics was that there is some limited domain within which 
it is true that the manifold of intuition must be subject to a conceptual synthesis if 
there is to be any experience of it. This, however, does not constitute a 
demonstration that the domain within which this limitation holds and the domain of 
all experience are themselves coextensive. Yet, it is necessary for Kant to establish 
precisely this point if the Deduction is to succeed. 
We have seen that the criticisms levelled by Stroud, Gram and Cassam arc, 
I See above, pp. 65-68. 
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each in their own way, centred on this problem. In each case the subjective 
necessity for there to be some synthesis of the manifold under concepts is accepted, 
but difficulties are said to arise as soon as the further claim is introduced regarding 
the objective validity of the concepts. The criteria for objective validity consist in 
the concepts not merely being universally applicable to experience, but also that they 
must play some kind of constructive or constitutive role within experience. The 
problems raised target both aspects of this claim in such a way that Kant appears to 
be placed in an unresolvable double bind. The claim to universal applicability raises 
the question as to whether Kant is simply stipulating what is to count as experience 
such that the argument merely becomes tautologous. If this is the case, then it has 
not been demonstrated that there cannot be intuitions which are something to us 
without thereby being subject to a conceptual synthesis, but rather Kant would 
merely have defined 'something to us' in such a way that it requires a synthesis 
under categories. A narrow definition of experience such as this clearly does 
nothing but beg the question of whether our experience is, in fact, experience as 
Kant defines it. If, on the other hand, appeal is made to the constitutive role that the 
categories play by virtue of the supposed fact that our experience is not of things-in-
themselves, but rather of appearances, and if one rules out on this basis the 
possibility of experience being constituted by anything other than representations 
synthesised according to concepts, then Kant's position is equally untenable. This 
once again appears to be merely a stipulation which serves to ground the universal 
applicability of the categories by means of a claim regarding the nature of 
experience. Yet, it is the nature of experience that is at issue in the question of 
whether the categories do or do not have objective validity. 
The details of the problem that Kant faces in establishing that the categories 
are objectively valid have already been considered at some length and shall not be 
pursued any further here. It has also been contended that the argument of the 
Deduction does present a convincing case for dismissing this problem. The principle 
point with which we have dealt is the relationship between the Deduction and 
transcendental idealism. The transition from the Conceptual to the Satisfaction 
Components of the Deduction need not proceed by means of an appeal to some 
limitation regarding the nature of intuitions which is derived from transcendental 
·171 . 
idealism. The stricture which both Cassam and Guyer take to be necessary, and to 
be derivative of transcendental idealism, is that intuitions always possess that degree 
of order or coherence which makes it possible for us to have experience of them. 
Unless it is held that all intuitions must be subject to a conceptual synthesis, it 
remains possible for these intuitions to be something to me, without it thereby being 
possible for the 'I think' to accompany them. It, therefore, appears that Kant must 
be making presuppositions as to the kind of intuitions that there can be. However, 
on the previous reconstruction of the second stage of the Deduction, the notion that 
there is some intrinsic order to intuitions, which allows for the application of 
categories, plays no role within the Deduction as either an explicit presupposition or 
an implicit assumption. It is the representation of intuitions in spatial and temporal 
relations, rather than the representation of intuitions as such, that is at issue. In 
other words, it has been argued that the concepts are applicable to a 'chaotic' or 
disordered manifold, that is a manifold within which there is, for instance, no 
possibility of association. It is merely insofar as intuitions are represented as being 
in spatial and temporal relationships with one another that the categories achieve 
objective validity. It is because we have taken the distinction between the forms of 
intuition and formal intuition to be a central element within the Deduction and, in 
paIticular, taken this distinction to provide a ground for the notion of transcendental 
synthesis, that the Deduction is said to draw on the tenets of transcendental idealism 
only to a minimal extent. In order for it to be possible in every case for there to be a 
conceptual synthesis of intuitions, Kant requires merely two assumptions. These are 
drawn by Kant from transcendental ideallsm, but are by no means exclusively 
associated with this doctrine. These premises are, firstly, that the spatial and 
temporal form which intuitions have is exhaustive and, secondly, that there is no 
intrinsic spatial or temporal determination to intuitions of which we can be aware. 
The deficiencies in the criticisms levelled by both Stroud and Gram are clear 
when considered in light of this interpretation of the second Stage of the Deduction. 
Stroud's claim is that Kant is committed to a form of subjectivism such that there is 
a distinction between how we regard experience (i.e. through concepts), and what 
experience actually involves. It is certainly true that it neither is nor can be a 
consequence of Kant's argument that we can know that the categories have an 
·172· 
application to whatever things give rise to our intuitions. This, however, is merely a 
restatement of the claim that we can have no knowledge of things-in-themselves. 
The potentially damaging aspect of Stroud's criticism resides in the notion that there 
is a misconstrual of the nature of experience. However, we have seen that the 
Deduction constitutes an argument as to why there is no disparity here. Stroud's 
argument seems to proceed along broadly Humean lines. He starts by suggesting 
that we regard experience in terms of concepts, such as causality, in ways that 
constitute a, perhaps necessary, misinterpretation of the real nature of our 
experience which is comprised merely of associations between intuitions or 
impressions. According to Stroud, then, Kant can maintain, on the basis of the 
Deduction, that there is nothing to which the notion of a real nature of experience 
corresponds. Even when experience is taken to be comprised of merely the 
awareness of spatial and temporal relations between intuitions or an awareness of 
the associations between intuitions, then this experience has already been subject to 
a transcendental synthesis. Furthermore, if appeal is made to the associations 
themselves, rather than to any awareness of them as constituting experience, then 
there is no way in which this can be the real nature of our experience - because 
there can no subject which could be said to have this experience. 
Similar considerations apply to the circularity objection raised by Gram 
\\rith his distinction between a strong and a weak sense of 'experience'. Kant 
certainly begins by positing a definition of experience, in that it must be possible for 
experience to be accompanied by the ') think'. However, this does not in itself 
imply that experience must be conceptual, but rather merely invokes the notion that 
experiences need to be the experiences of someone. The conceptual nature of 
experience arises as a consequence of the claim that the kind of experience that we 
have is one which minimally involves an awareness of merely the spatial and 
temporal relationships between intuitions. This awareness is said to involve a unity 
of consciousness, and this unity of consciousness is said to require a conceptual 
synthesis of the manifold. The notion of experience to which one would have to 
appeal in order to avoid this conclusion is one within which there is merely an 
a"vareness of individual intuitions \\rithout any awareness of the relationships 
between them. 
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It was on the basis of these arguments that the conclusion was reached in 
the Chapter three that the Deduction successfully establishes the need for some a 
priori conceptual synthesis of the manifold of intuition and does so only by invoking 
the claims made within the Aesthetic only to a very limited extent. This is achieved 
without begging any questions regarding either the domain over which concepts have 
application, or what the nature of experience is. Concepts can have objective 
validity with regard to all experience insofar as that experience is experience of the 
spatial and temporal relations of intuitions. 
Although the form of argument that we have found within the Deduction 
does not draw upon a strong notion of experience, on other occasions Kant does 
explicitly invoke a notion of experience which contains within it universal and 
necessary features. Most strikingly, the distinction made between judgements of 
perception and judgements of experience made within the Prolegomena assumes the 
legitimacy of judgements which attribute necessary relations to the order of 
appearances. The division that Kant draws here is between an experience of objects 
which remains invariant - no matter who has this experience or what the state of 
the subject is at the time of the experience - and the fortuitous or contingent 
connection of perceptions in a subject [IV 299]. In the former case, the synthesis of 
perceptions requires the application of categories, because the necessity of the 
relationship between the perceptions goes beyond what is given in perception itself 
- the sun causing the stone to be warm being an objective relationship, rather than 
the subjective connection between the perception of the sun and the perception of the 
warmth of the stone [IV 30 1 ] . As is perfectly fitting to the analytic method of the 
Prolegomena, this argument clearly presupposes the legitimacy of the judgements of 
experience for which the categories are said to account. Kant's argument here is 
that pure natural science exists, but its existence cannot be accounted for on the 
basis of judgements which relate intuitions to one another merely as states of a 
subject - and this is because such judgements generate neither the universality, nor 
the necessity, associated with natural science. As Guyer rightly points out, this 
argument does not support the claim that experience entails the uni versality and 
necessity that Kant attributes to it, rather the argument, from the point of view of an 
empiricist sceptic, has a hypothetical form: ~f experience is such that judgements 
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regarding necessary and universal connections of intuitions can be asserted, then 
those intuitions must be subsumed under a pure concept of the understanding. 2 
However, we have maintained that the fonn of argument employed \vithin 
the B-Deduction does not draw on a distinction between a strong and a weak sense 
of experience, but rather opposes intuitions which can be numbered amongst a 
subject's experience and those which cannot. In summary, Kant's argument began 
by defining experience in terms of that which the 'I think' can accompany, and it is 
then shown that if this is to happen, then intuitions must be conceptualised. Kant's 
argument then moves on to conclude that since there are no intuitions which cannot 
be conceptualised, the 'I think' can accompany all intuitions and the categories have 
objective validity. This argument, however, is liable to the misgiving that it contains 
an obfuscation concerning the nature of the subject. The essence of the objection 
raised against Kant is that the subject is said to play to incompatible roles, in that it 
functions as both the source and outcome of the activity of synthesis. Both this 
criticism and what we have termed the Fichtean response to it have a long lineage 
which stretches from Fichte's response to Schulze, up to current debates arising 
from Henrich's imputation of a reflective theory of consciousness, and to 
Strawson's well kno\\>ll interpretation of the 'I think' as "the tangential point of 
contact between the field of noumena and the world of appearances.,,3 
As has been discussed, according to the interpretation proposed by Schulze, 
the subject "is supposed to constitute the source of the necessary in our 
knowledge"[Aen 154], and the question he raises concerns what the nature of this 
subject can be, such that the subject can act as a source of necessity. His argument, 
in short, is that it is necessary for this source to be real - "a real and objectively 
actual thing"[Aen 155] - and known as such, in that it cannot be a mere 
2 Guyer, Claims of Knowledge, 99-102, and "Failure of the B-Deduction," 70-2. 
According to Guyer's schema - as detailed in Section 4, pp. 110-113, of Chapter 3 above 
- this argument is of type IA. Even with the Prolegomena, however, the status of Kant's 
examples is not as straightforward as Guyer assumes. It has been suggested that when 
read as an attempt by Kant to find empirical analogies for the distinction between the 
manifold of intuition and categorised experience, then what is assumed to be a defect in 
the argument can be seen to arise merely because of an inevitable looseness in the fit 
between a transcendental distinction and an empirical one. See Rhoda H. Kotzin, East 
Lansing and JOrg Baumgartner, "Sensations and Judgements of Perception: Diagnosis and 
Rehabilitation of some of Kant's Misleading Examples,'" J.:ant-Studien 81 (1990): 407-12. 
3 Strawson, Bound .. oJSense, 175. See also 17~. 247-9 . 
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supposition arising from our own limited faculties that experience has this source of 
necessity. If real, however, the subject cannot merely be phenomenal. Its reality is 
intended to be the very ground of the phenomenal and the subject must, therefore, be 
a thing-in-itself. The ambiguities in Kant's discussion of the subject merely serve to 
deepen the suspicion that the subject plays an illicit role within the critical system. 
One the one hand, the subject, in the representation 'I think,' falls under phenomenal 
consciousness. On the other hand, the ability of the representation 'I think' to 
accompany intuitions is conditioned by acts of the subject of whic~ it is said, we 
also have an awareness. These acts, however, cannot be acts of the I in the 'I think', 
because it is only as a consequence of this activity that there can be that very 
phenomenal consciousness within which the 'I think' takes place. It does indeed 
appear as if we must have some awareness of the subject as it is in itself. At this 
point it could, therefore, be suggested that although Kant is not begging the question 
as to whether we have experience of necessity or not (in that he does not define 
'something to me' in such a way as to presuppose the need for the categories), the 
appeal to the need for a synthesis of the marufold in order for there to be a subject of 
experience is in itself incoherent. If Kant's claim is that experience is something to 
me insofar as I have synthesised it in such a way that the 'I think' can accompany it, 
then he needs to explain how I can both engage in an activity and be a product of 
this activity. Furthermore, if an I is performing acts of synthesis, then could it not 
be the case that intuitions are something to this subject independently of whether as 
a consequence of this activity an 'I think' can accompany them? If this were the 
case then, Kant's argument could only succeed by firstly splitting the subject into a 
synthesiser and a representation, and then re-conflating it such that all the 
experiences which the subject has are defined in tenus of the 'I think' being able to 
accompany them. 
The persistence of problematic role that Kant attributes to the subject is 
evidenced, as we have seen, by the many debates surrounding this issue within 
current secondary material. Taking two exemplars of this from the period of 
Stroud's original essay on transcendental arguments (1968), Henrich's "Fichte's 
Original Insight" and Strawson's Bounds of Sense, both first published in 1966, 
foreground the duality of the roles of the Kantian subject to such an extent that it 
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remains an issue today. One consequence of this has been that the historical and 
analytic schools of Kant interpretation of recent years are both rooted in the same 
problem - a problem which, as we have seen, also emerges in 'continental' 
discussions of the first Critique. 
Although stripped of its ontological aspect, it is Schulze's problem that re-
emerges in Henrich's discussion of the reflective theory of consciousness. The 
difficulty identified by Henrich derives not from the question of what kind of 
knowledge the subject has of itself, but rather from the logic of how the subject can 
come by such knowledge of itself that it is possible for it to identify itself in self-
consciousness. The premise of both accounts is nonetheless the same: the subject is 
both synthesiser and synthesised, or knower or known. Whereas, for Schulze, the 
source of the necessity in experience derives from the nature of the subject as 
synthesiser, on Henrich's interpretation Kant intents it to arise from the act of self- /\' 
consciousness in which "the one who thinks and the object of his thought" are 
identical. 4 The most explicit statement which Henrich finds of this notion in Kant is 
in the claim that is necessary for the mind to have "before its eyes the identity of its 
act" if it is to be able to 'lhink its identity in the manifoldness of its 
representations"[Al08]5. However, if transcendental apperception is understood to 
be an act of consciousness reflected back upon itself, then two problems 
immediately become apparent. Both of these reveal the same paradoxical circularity 
inherent in this conception of self-consciousness. The first difficulty is that, as an 
account of self-consciousness, the theory of reflection presupposes - rather than 
explains - the origin of self-consciousness. The acts of consciousness which 
themselves are the object of awareness in transcendental apperception are taken to 
provide the foundation for transcendental apperception, rather than they themselves 
being instances of it. This foundation is simply taken for granted within Henrich's 
reflective theory, because the self or T is characterised in terms of an act within 
which the knower and the known are identical. The self is the act of reflection. 
4 Henrich, "Fichte's Original Insight," 19. Henrich's evaluation of the reflective theory 
of consciousness, upon which we are drawing, is contained in pp.19-21. 
5 "das Gemiith konnte sich unmoglich die Identitat seiner selbst in der 
Mannigfaltigkeit seiner Vorstellung und zwar a priori denken. wenn es Dicht die 
Identitat seiner Handlung vor Augen batte, welche aile Synthesis der Apprehension 
(die empirisch ist) einer transscendentalen Einheit unternirft" . 
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However, this engenders a paradoxical situation in which it is only in the act of 
reflection that the self is said to constitute itself, yet the self simultaneously 
recognises the identity of itself as subject and object in this very act. TIle very thing 
which the act of reflection is supposed to account for needs to be presupposed as 
something which is recognised in this act. The second consideration which also 
highlights the circularity of the reflection theory derives from the need for the subject 
to have knowledge of itself before it can recognise the acts of consciousness as its 
own. If the act of transcendental apperception is taken to consist in there being an 
awareness of the acts of consciousness, and if this constitutes an awareness of the 
subject, then it needs to be explained how the acts of consciousness are recognised 
as one's own acts when knowledge of the subject was meant to arise as a 
consequence of the reflective act. The subject is said to know itself by becoming its 
own object; acts of consciousness become the object of consciousness. But this 
cannot account for the origin of knowledge of the subject, because it is only on the 
presumption that the subject already has knowledge of itself that it can recognise 
itself in the acts of consciousness. 
It is Henrich's contention that the only way in which the problems identified 
with the reflective theory can be overcome is by adopting the model of sclf-
consciousness which Fichte had provided. What Henrich finds in Fichte is the view 
that self-consciousness is fundamentally different from the consciousness of objects, 
in that rather than there being an object which is recognised as the subject, as there 
is on the reflection theory, there is a direct and immediate awareness of oneself 
which is primordial. Furthermore, the notion that there are acts of consciousness 
undertaken prior to the act of reflection is eliminated and the self-consciousness of 
the subject is inscribed as the fundamental act in which the subject posits itself as 
the self-positing subject. 
The differences between the readings of Henrich and S trawson 
notwithstanding, the duality of the subject is also repeatedly highlighted and 
problematised by Strawson. He distinguishes '"'original' self-consciousness and 
empirical self-consciousness," and immediately associates original sclf-
consciousness with a consciousness of the existence of the "real or supersensible 
subject". He then questions both how Kant can establish the identity of these 
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subjects and what role the supersensible subject can perform. The problem identified 
by Strawson is that if it is taken to be the case that the awareness of myself occurs 
in time, then this cannot be a representation of the supersensible subject to itself 
because such a subject would be non-temporal. Or if the awareness is construed in 
such a manner that it is non-temporal, then Kant appears committed to the view that 
the supersensible subject has a non-temporal awareness of itself as participating in 
or enjoying "a series of temporally ordered states."6 Either Kant's account of the 
subject is contradictory or simply unintelligible. 
In the previous chapter, however, it has been contended that it is neither 
necessary to accept the problems posed by Henrich and Strawson, nor to adopt any 
of the strategies that have been advanced as purported solutions to these problems. 
It is neither necessary to attribute to Kant the notion that we have an immediate 
awareness of the activity of synthesis, nor need we simply reject portions of the first 
Critique as incoherent. What we have found is that, by interpreting thc Deduction 
in a subject-orientated manner, the problematic questions of both the epistemological 
claims regarding knowledge of the subject and the ontological status of this subject 
can be obviated. TIris way out from Henrich's and Strawson' s difficulties was 
secured by maintaining Kant's distinctions between the transcendental unity of 
apperception, the 'I think', and the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. It is only 
when there is some conflation of the different subjects in Kant that the problems 
which have their origin in Schulze's criticism arise. As the analysis provided in the 
previous chapter demonstrated, it is a mistake to suppose that in the Deduction Kant 
is placed in the double-bind with respect to the nature of the synthesis involved. It is 
not the case that Kant, like Hume, has demonstrated no more than the fact that the 
manifold must contain some organisation, without positing a subject that performs 
this synthesis. But neither does Kant make the Schulzean move of claiming that it is 
necessary for there to be knowledge of the subject as the performer of the activity of 
synthesis. Upon answering the question of hO\v the categories can have objective 
validity in the Deduction,. ~ therefore, is not forced into claiming any knowledge 
of the subject -in-itself 
If the subject is taken to be a thing-in-itself, then the answer to the question 
6 Strawson, Bounds ojSense, 248-9 
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of what kind or degree of knowledge of the subject is required for Kant to support 
the claim that the "I think' can accompany any representation which is something to 
me, is none. Neither does Kant's claim require that the subject must have some 
means by which it can identify itself in acts of consciousness or have any awareness 
of itself in the performance of the activity of synthesis. There need be no knowledge 
of the synthesiser of the manifold, and that is because the only condition that needs 
to be met for the "I think' to be able to accompany representations is that the 
manifold be conceptually synthesised. The representation of the unity of the 
manifold, rather than an awareness of that which synthesises or of the activity of 
synthesis itself, occurs in the proposition 'I think'. There is no further need to posit 
a subject which has this representation, standing "behind' or "outside' it, such that 
this subject identifies itself, has knowledge of itself, or is aware of its own acts. It 
is, therefore, possible for Kant to dismiss the apparently exhaustive alternatives 
arising from the debate on transcendental arguments. He does not need to beg the 
question against the sceptic, nor is Kant adopting a naturalistic/realistic stance 
which is either incoherent or Fichtean with respect to the subject. 
A summary presentation of the trichotomy of Kantian subjects, according to 
the reconstruction given here and in the previous chapter, would, therefore run as 
follows: By "vhatever means synthesis occurs, and however consciousness arises, the 
'subject' of these acts remains unknown to us and its existence is expressed in the "I 
think', in that this representation requires that such acts of synthesis take place. The 
'I think' is not so much a self-consciousness as that representation through which it 
is possible for there to be a consciousness of the unity of representations - not a 
consciousness of myself but a consciousness which takes the form of a self. The 
transcendental unity of apperception is that form which the synthesis of the manifold 
must take if it is possible for the 'I think' to occur. The notion that there are 
intuitions which are not synthesised, but which are nonetheless experienced, relies on 
a conflation of the synthesising subject and the experiencing subject. This 
conflation, far from being required for Kant's argument, is made only by Kant's 
critics. Furthermore, in making the distinction between the 'subject' of the activity 
of s}nthesis and the "I think', Kant does not open the way for the objection that 
intuitions can be something to me but cannot be accompanied by the "I think'. This 
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objection is misplaced - not only because it involves the reification of an activity. 
but also because the sense in which intuitions would be something to this 'subject' 
cannot involve an awareness of any, even spatial and temporal, relationships 
between the intuitions. 
3. The Categories and Objective Validity 
The issue of whether concepts can have objective validity was previously 
raised in the context of the relationship between Kant and Hume~ the subjective 
necessity attributed by Hume to concepts, particularly that of causality, was set 
against what Kant claimed to be the answer to Hume contained in the Deduction. 
However, our discussion of the Deduction has taken place in abstraction from the 
claims made regarding the objective validity of any specific category. It thus 
remains to be seen whether it is possible for there to be any transition from the 
general claim that an a priori conceptual synthesis is necessary for experience, to 
any specific concept being required. It is only when this latter question is answered 
that the success of the Deduction can be evaluated: if no specific concept need be 
employed, that is, if there is a range of alternative concepts which can be used in the 
a priori synthesis of the manifold, then the claim that those concepts have objective 
validity is undermined. 
The difficulty that Kant faces here is once again clearly brought out by 
contrasting the subjective necessity which Hume attributes to concepts like causality 
and the claim that Kant makes for their objective validity. At the most general level, 
the subjective nature of causality derives for Hume from the manner in which this 
concept serves to supplement experience without actually being constitutive of it. 
The experience which we have is said to give rise to the fictitious idea that there is 
an experience of causal relations within this experience. The idea of causality, for 
Hume, corresponds to nothing in experience, nor is it even necessary for experience: 
it results merely from a feeling induced by the associative nature of the mind. With 
or without this idea, association still takes place and, therefore, in the absence of this 
idea experience still occurs on Hume' s model. While Kant's Deduction 
demonstrates that it is fallacious to maintain that experience is possible without 
concepts and, consequently, that concepts cannot be considered subjective in the 
sense that they are added to an already constituted experience, it appears to do so 
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only at the cost of re-instituting the same problem at a new level. Concepts remain 
subjective in the sense that although they are not added to an already pre-constituted 
experience, experience is nonetheless possible under the condition that some 
alternative concept be employed. In other words, the contrast is not beP.vecn 
experience and concepts but rather between experience being conceptualised in 
different ways. Unless some concepts can be shown to be universally necessary, the 
concepts can only be subjective. 
With regard to the Transcendental Deduction, the problem which arises is 
that there appears to be no way to delimit the set of concepts with must be employed ?< 
for experience to be possible. If such an delimitation were to be undertaken, then the 
conclusions reached at the end of both stages of the Deduction would appear to 
provide the most obvious resources upon which one could draw, because it is at 
these locations that the need for there to be some conceptual synthesis is established. 
It would need to be shown either that some concept must always be used in the 
representation of the spatial and temporal relations of intuitions (that is, in the 
construction of formal intuition), or that some particular concepts arc necessary in 
order for there to be an objective unity of consciousness. However, neither of the 
arguments presented in our reconstruction of the Deduction provide any material 
upon which any attempt to specify the categories could build. 
The arguments advanced by Kant which most explicitly draw on the spatial 
and temporal nature of intuitions to justify the categories, are to be found in the 
Analogies of Experience. Kant here argues for the need of the concepts of 
substance, causality and interaction for any experience which is understood in terms 
of 'events' or in terms of relationships between coexistent objects. Setting aside the 
question of whether these arguments are successful on their o\vn right, it is not 
necessary to consider the details of these arguments to sec that they cannot be 
performing the task of establishing that these categories have objective validity in 
the sense under consideration. What the argument for objective validity requires is 
not that some concepts are required for a particular kind of experience, but rather 
that this experience is itself the only one possible. That is to say, the problem 
identified by Stroud reasserts itself - the Analogies establish the hypothetical 
conjunction of a certain kind of experience and the concepts which need to be 
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employed for that experience to be possible. Even if it is conceded that the kind of 
experience for which the conditions are found is indeed the kind of experience that 
we have, then it still remains to be demonstrated that this experience itself is 
necessary. To advance beyond this hypothetical relationship it would need to be 
shown that - given the limitation imposed by the spatial and temporal nature of 
intuitions, and given the need for concepts - the only kind of experience that is 
possible is one in which objects are subject to alteration (or endure through the 
course of events) rather than, for instance, reversing the priority and maintaining 
that objects are derivative of singular events. 
The kind of argument formulated m the Analogies needs to make 
presuppositions regarding kind of experience for which the categories are said to be 
necessary - and our comments on this limitation should not be taken to imply that 
Kant mistakenly considered himself to be establishing more than he has. Because it 
appears possible that different conceptualisations of experience can be maintained 
within the limitations imposed by the need for experience to be spatial and temporal, 
the limitation established by the first stage of the Deduction's argument is that the 
concepts employed must be such that it is possible through their use for there to be 
an objective unity of consciousness. Here, once again, the material presented is not 
sufficient for the task in hand of introducing restrictions as to which concepts are 
categories. 
The argument which established the need for there to be a conceptual 
synthesis of the manifold of intuition in order for there to be any experience, 
proceeded in an entirely general manner "vithout reference to particular concepts. 
Concepts were said by Kant to be necessary, because experience, insofar as it is a 
representation of association and distinguished from the association of 
representations, requires both that representations are unified and that there should 
be a representation of this unity. This task was ascribed to concepts according to 
Kant's account in the third step of the Deduction: they provide representations under 
which intuitions can be unified and represented. Here concepts serve as a correlate 
for the objective unity of consciousness; the individual moments of consciousness 
have no necessary relationship to one another, and it is only insofar as the intuitions 
- of which there is a consciousness - are themselves united that there can be any 
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unity in the consciousness of them. However, the very structure of the argument 
employed at this stage of the Deduction mitigates against the attempt to isolate a set 
of categories. Concepts in general are said to be necessary because of their unity, 
and it is upon this feature alone that the objective unity of consciousness dra,vs. 
Therefore, there is no scope here to draw out some specific concepts as necessary to 
any experience whatsoever. 
The conclusion that must, therefore, be drawn from our analysis of the 
Deduction is that there is no scope within the Deduction itself for there to be any 
demarcation of a specific set of concepts which have objective validity. 
Furthermore, the Deduction is not a preparatory argument which allmvs the 
categories to be arrived at via the consideration of the conditions under which space 
and time must be synthesised. As an answer to 'Hume's Problem' the Deduction 
can consequently only be considered a limited success. Insofar as it is demonstrated 
that concepts are necessary for experience, Kant undermines the Humean notion of a 
pre-conceptual experience to which concepts are mistakenly applied. Whereas for 
Hume the need for concepts arises from the contingent structures of human 
psychology within which the feeling of necessity accompanies association (and for 
which this feeling is the idea of causality), for Kant the experience is a priori 
conceptual and necessarily so. However, it could also be maintained that given the 
general similarities between what both Hume and Kant take experience to be - it is 
such that it supports the belief that are objects which have a continuity of existence 
and that these objects have causal relations to each other - then as an answer 
specifically to Hume, the Deduction does, nevertheless, achieve all of its aims. The 
Analytic of Principles presents the case for \\-'hy this notion of experience requires 
the concepts which Hume rejects as fictitious. In conjunction with the Deduction, 
these arguments could then be said to demonstrate to Hume why the categories have ! 
\ 
objective validity: but they, nonetheless, do not demonstrate th~ objective validi~ of J 
the categories per se. Outside of the context of the presumptIon about expencnce ) 
that Humc and Kant share, the Deduction cannot establish that there are categories 
\vhich have objective validity - and that is because Kant's account in the 
Transcendental Deduction possesses no internal mechanism by means of which some 
particular set of concepts can be shown to be required to make experience possible. 
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To evaluate the success of the Deduction in tenns of how completely it 
provides a solution to Hume's problem is, however, to do Kant an injustice. The 
task of demonstrating that some particular concept is a category is not carried out 
within the Deduction, but is rather given over to the Metaphysical Deduction (which 
provides a clue to the discovery of the set of categories) and to the Analytic of 
Principles (which has the task of demonstrating the categorical nature of concepts 
found in the Metaphysical Deduction). The role which the Transcendental 
Deduction plays within this argumentative schema is that of establishing the very 
possibility of transcendental philosophy itself - it must show that it is possible for 
there to be concepts which have categorical status. On the reconstruction of the 
Deduction that has been provided here, Kant is successful in this regard. What has 
been rejected is the notion that, in the absence of transcendental synthesis, there 
remains an experience to which a sceptical appeal can be made in order to invalidate 
the objectivity of conceptual relations. In other words, in terms of the way in which 
Kant's answer to Hume has been seen to be in dispute throughout the course of the 
previous chapters. What has been upheld is the possibility of a distinctively 
transcendental answer to the question of whether concepts have objectivity validity. 
Within the debate that has been our primary focus, dispute has centred upon 
the distinction between subjective necessity and objective validity. Kant's attempt 
to maintain the legitimacy of this distinction - in the face of Hume's naturalistic 
account of the origin of the concept of causality - places him in the position of 
facing an apparent trade-off. This trade-off is said to reside in the competing 
demands of adopting a position that is both non-naturalistic and not question-
begging with regard to the empiricist sceptic. Naturalism is inimitable to Kant's 
position to the extent that the justificatory procedure employed, at most, refers to a 
necessity, or need, derived from something of a given constitution. In the particular 
case at hand, the use of the concept or idea of causality is regarded by Hume as 
arising because the human mind is so constituted that, upon the regular presentation 
of sequential data, it generates an expectation that upon receipt of the first item in 
the series the second will follow. For Hume, the concept or idea of causality is 
illegitimately used when taken to designate an objective relationship, but rather 
merely arises from a subjective response to a series with regular but not causal 
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order. If Kant is to be able to maintain the contrary view, then it appears that he 
will have to make some strong assumptions regarding what the nature of experience 
is. Kant wants to claim that the representation of the data of intuitions requires the 
employment of concepts not because of the subjective conditions according to which 
the mind operates, but rather because this constitutes a condition which must be met 
if there is to be any representation of the intuitions. In essence, the argument takes 
on the hypothetical form which Guyer finds in the Prolegomena where it is assumed 
that judgements of experience have validity and then a demonstration follows of 
what concepts must be employed in such judgements. 
Within the first Critique, the Transcendental Analytic as a whole could be 
viewed as engaging in both of these strategies: the Metaphysical Deduction makes 
an appeal to subjective necessity and the Analytic of Principles relies on 
assumptions regarding the nature of experience. In the case of the Metaphysical 
Deduction the isolation of a particular set of concepts is effected by means of the 
relationship that these concepts are said to have to judgements.7 Kant's argument, 
firstly, introduces a set of judgements which, with regards to their form, are claimed 
to be exhaustive. The nature of the understanding is such that it can only judge in 
conformity with these forms; but this raises, for Kant, the possibility of similarly 
restricting a class of a priori concepts. Such a restriction is effected by translating 
the function expressed in a judgement into a concept. The various complexities of 
Kant's argument for this point notwithstanding, the most that the Metaphysical 
Deduction can establish is that it is necessary for us - those of us who possess an 
understanding restricted to forms of judgement contained in Kant's table - to 
employ some a priori concepts. The relationship between these concepts and 
possible experience (or whether these concepts are categories) is, however, 
undetermined. It remains possible for it to be the case it is subjectively necessary to ~ 
use these concepts without this use being in any way constitutive of experience. 
Correspondingly (and at the same level of generality), the Analytic of Principles 
makes appeal to features of experience and attempts to show that it is only on the 
7 Kant's nwn analogy at the beginning of the Metaphysical Deduction [A681B93] between 
the restrictions imposed by the fonns of intuition and the fonns of judgement is potentially 
misleading in this regard. The need for thinking to confonn to the Table of Judgements 
does not imply that the categories deri"ed from this table are conditions of the possibility 
of experience. 
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condition that concepts are applied to experience that experience is possible. Thus, 
in the first Analogy, Kant appeals to our capacity to determine appearances as 
objects, in the Second Analogy it is the distinction between subjective and objective 
succession that is at issue, and the properties of extensive and intensive magnitude 
are drawn on in the Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations of Perception 
respectively. It is this argumentative strategy that provides the paradigmatic cases 
of transcendental arguments, because it provides a mechanism of engaging with 
scepticism at a local leveL When effective such arguments posit some feature of 
experience upon which the sceptic himself draws - as explicitly occurs in the 
Refutation of Idealism - and then proceeds to demonstrate that it is only by virtue 
of the very aspect of experience which is subject to sceptical doubt - outer 
experience - that it is possible for experience to have that aspect - lOner 
experience - that the sceptic affirms. The force of this argumentative form, 
however, is not in itself sufficient to establish the possibility of a distinctively 
transcendental philosophy. It might on occasion provide a means of refuting some 
particular sceptical position, but it remains intrinsically hypothetical in form. 
Additionally, and more seriously, the synthetic a priori status of the concepts 
remains in dispute in the sense that it is possible to question, through the distinction 
between, what Cassam terms, a Conceptual and a Satisfaction Component, whether 
experience is possible because of the application of these concepts - or whether 
within any possible experience these concepts must be applied. 
Placed between the Metaphysical Deduction and the Analytic of Principles, 
the Transcendental Deduction bridges the gap between subjective pathology and the 
nature of experience. In these terms the Transcendental Deduction is a success. 
The need for concepts within experience cannot be reduced to a subjective necessity 
arising from human nature. Furthermore, the applicability of concepts to experience 
cannot be reduced to a realist condition regarding the coherence which intuitions 
must have if we are to experience them. Kant's answer to Hume is that 
transcendental philosophy is possible. 
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Conclusion 
I asked myself this: on what grounds does the relationship between that 
which is in us, termed 'representation,' and the object rest? ... Our 
understanding, through its representations, is not the cause of objects ... 
yet objects are not the cause of the understandings representations (in 
sensu reaJi). The pure concepts of the understanding, therefore, cannot 
have been abstracted from sense perceptions, nor can they eX1>ress the 
receptivity of representations through the senses: their source lies in the 
nature of the soul, but without either requiring to be effected by the 
object or producing the object itself. [X 130] 
[Ich frug mich nemlich selbst: auf welchem Grunde beruhet die 
Beziehung desjenigen, was man in uns Vorstellung nennt, auf den 
Gegenstand? ... Allein unser Verstand ist durch seine Vorstellungen 
weder die Ursache des Gegenstandes ... noch der Gegenstand die 
Ursache der Verstandsvorstellungen (in sensu reali). Die reine 
Verstandesbegriffe mtissen also nicht von den Empfindungen der Sinne 
abstrahirt sein, noch die Empflinglichkeit der Vorstellungen durch 
Sinne ausdrticken, sondem in der Natur der Seele zwar ihre Quellen 
haben, aber doch weder in so feme sie vom Object gewirkt werden. noch 
das Object selbst hervorbringen.] 
In 1772 Kant already knows what critical philosophy needs to demonstrate. 
It must show how we can legitimately claim a knowledge of objects in those cases 
where this knowledge is derived from neither an empirical nor a transcendent source. 
We certainly claim to have knowledge of this sort: natural science requires that all 
effects are caused, that matter can neither come into existence nor pass out of 
existence, and so on. Such claims, however, are not susceptible to a natural 
scientific explanation since they demand a knowledge of necessity, but yet go 
beyond anything that could be derived on the basis of logic alone. Hence, the 
question is refined, and in the first Critique Kant asks: how are S)TIthetic a priori 
judgements possible? 
Kant's answer has met with opposition, but the line of criticism that has 
been followed here poses the particular challenge of suggesting that it is impossible 
for Kant to answer this question. The critics' argument against Kant first makes the 
distinction between the question of how synthetic a priori judgements are possible 
and the question of how synthetic a priori judgement seem to be possible. It is then 
suggested that Kant answers the latter question in one of two ways: through an 
investigation into the nature of either the object of experience or the subject of 
experience. In the first instance, Kant is said to posit a conception of experience 
from which the validity of synthetic a priori judgements can be deduced, but the 
critics have argued that Kant also does nothing to justify his original assumptions 
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regarding experience. If, on the other hand, an attempt at justification occurs, then 
this takes place via an argument which claims that it is necessary for the subject to 
regard experience as conforming to this conception. Neither option is satisfactory. 
One is left either with a hypothetical argument (if experience is so conceived, then 
... ), or with a subjective necessity (one must regard experience in the following 
ways ... ). Furthermore, the hypothetical argument is merely question begging, and 
the argument for subjective necessity employs the reflective theory of consciousness. 
Kant's difficulties do not end here. If Kant wishes to advance the claim that 
pure concepts have objective validity, then it is necessary for him to invoke the 
activity of a transcendental synthesis performed by the transcendental subject. As 
has been discussed, this is said to lead to Kant breaking through to a deeper level of 
incoherence in that he must make an unjustifiable assumptions regarding the matter 
of experience (that it, a priori, is such that it can always be synthesised) and the 
subject of experience (we have an immediate knowledge of ourselves as performing 
the activity of synthesis). In short, in answering the question of how synthetic a 
priori judgements are possible, transcendental philosophy demonstrates its own 
impossibility; to answer the questions that transcendental philosophy raises, it is 
necessary to make assumptions and claim knowledge deemed illegitimate within 
transcendental philosophy itself 
As we have seen, one finds aspects of this line of criticism across a range of 
philosophical traditions: from the time of the publication of the first Critique up to 
the present day. Most often it is presented in a piecemeal fashion without 
implicating Kant, as we have done, in the double-binds of equally unsatisfactory 
alternatives. It is, after all, enough to demonstrate that Kant fails, without also 
having to pursue the question of just how often he does so. In each case, though, the 
result is the same: Kant can at best suggest that categories are subjectively 
necessary, but cannot demonstrate their objective validity. In terms of this thesis 
and, it has been argued, in Kant's own terms, any such line of questioning would 
mean that he fails to answer Hume. 
In our defence of Kant we have not pointed to one single interpretative crror 
or confusion on which this criticism is founded. There is certainly enough teAwaJ 
complexity, and at times ambiguity, within the first Critique to make it impossible 
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to dismiss a two-centuries' old problematic as straightforwardly false. There is. 
nonetheless, a recurring theme within the critics, summed up in the question as to the 
content of the transcendental. What is the content of transcendental synthesis? 
What is the content of our self-knowledge? To specify any content is taken to 
produce incoherence - and yet to deny content appears simply to be question 
begging: if transcendental synthesis does not impose order, then order must be being 
assumed; if we have no self-knowledge, then the synthetic activity of the subject 
must be being assumed. Therefore, Kant is either incoherent or question begging. 
The proposition that has been defended within this thesis is that Kant can 
simultaneously deny content to the transcendental without invoking premises which 
are question begging with regard to Humean scepticism. 
The thesis proceeded on two fronts. Firstly, it has been maintained that 
Kant's notion of transcendental synthesis is viable without requiring presumptions to 
be made regarding the content of experience. Secondly, it was held that 
transcendental synthesis, and the objective validity of synthetic a priori judgements 
which follow from it, does not implicate Kant in any claims regarding awareness of 
the activity of synthesis or knowledge of the subject-in-itself. 
The first argument centred on an interpretation of the Deduction and, in 
particular, on the distinction between the first stage (demonstrating the subjective 
necessity for a conceptual synthesis) and the second stage (showing that such 
synthesis independent is of the content of experience). It was shown that if 
concentration is focused on the first stage of the Deduction, then it is perfectly 
correct to hold that Kant's argument shows only that intuitions must display some 
regularity or coherence (to the extent that they can be synthesised to produce a unity 
of consciousness), This allows for the translation of the argument of the Deduction 
into a naturalistic, realist, or Humean mode, whereby the fact that intuitions are 
ordered does not follow from any transcendental conditioning of experience, but it 
still allows one to maintain that concepts are subjectively necessary. The crux of the 
argument is this: just because it might be necessary for empirical intuitions to be 
sufficiently orderly as to allow a conceptual synthesis to take place, this does not 
imply that intuitions are so ordered because of that conceptual synthesis. In this 
context the notion of a transcendental synthesis appears like an unnecessary (and 
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hollow) addendum springing from Kant's desire to stifle the contingent under the 
thrall of the necessary. However, as we have seen, this is not the context in v.hich 
the notion of transcendental synthesis arises. It is not with regard to the content of 
intuition, but rather to their form that transcendental synthesis operates. In other 
words, transcendental synthesis is not that special synthesis which prepares the 
manifold of intuition for an empirical one, such that there is a transcendental 
guarantee that it will in every case be possible for the manifold to display the unity 
necessary for experience. On the contrary, the synthesis is designated transcendental 
because it functions merely with regard to those aspects of intuition which are 
necessary and universal, namely their form. Although certain limitations regarding 
this argument were acknowledged, we established that there was no incoherence 
involved in Kant's claim that intuitions are subject to a synthesis with regard to their 
formal (temporal and spatial) properties. Already having demonstrated the need for 
concepts in the first stage of the Deduction, we concluded that synthetic a priori 
judgements are indeed possible - although a further argument (outwith the scope of 
this thesis, but, for Kant, contained in the Metaphysical Deduction and the Analytic 
of Principles) would be required to demonstrate that such judgements are actual. 
The need for a further defence of Kant with regard to the nature of the 
subject presupposed within the Deduction arose from matters both intrinsic and 
extrinsic to Kant's argument. Here, more than anywhere else, Kant makes highly 
suggestive remarks regarding the status of our knowledge of the subject, and the 
numerous textual ambiguities and apparent contradictions serve to deepen the 
suspicion that the subject's awareness of itself is problematic in relation to the rest 
of the Deduction. The problem here is multifaceted, but can be seen to derive from 
the question of whether it is subjectively necessary to regard experience as 
constituted through a transcendental synthesis, or whether we can have knowledge of 
the occurrence of this synthesis. Responding to this, as has been argued here, by 
maintaining that the subject is itself constituted through such synthesis and further 
maintaining that we can therefore claim synthetic a priori knowledge simply by 
virtue of the fact that the 'I think' can accompany representations, is not 'without its 
own difficulties. Problems emerge because the subject is apparently situated in the 
position of being both that which carries out the activity of synthesis and also 
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constituted as a result of this activity (introducing a reflective theory of 
consciousness)_ Furthermore, if Kant is taken to imply that our self-awareness 
arises not as a result of reflection but rather is an awareness of the activity of 
synthesis itself, then this once again is suggestive ofan awareness of the subject as it 
is in itself However, the thesis has argued that our response, given an appropriately 
nuanced interpretation of the Kantian subject, does not give rise to the reflective 
theory or awareness of the subject-in-itself The self-consciousness of the subject 
manifested in the representation "I think' requires no identification on the part of the 
subject with that which carries out the activity of synthesis; the subject does not 
need to identify itself because the identity of the I follows from the nature of this 
representation, it is analytic_ Furthermore, the synthesis of representations is a 
necessary condition of the representation of the subject, of the 'I think,' but it is not 
the acts of synthesis of which one is aware but rather the outcome - synthetic unity 
of the manifold_ The problems identified by Kant's critics arise once again from 
injecting content into the formality of the transcendentaL In one case this content is 
the subject's awareness of its identity of itself through reflection, and in the other 
there is specific kind of transcendental consciousness which consists in an awareness 
of an activity_ The result in both instances is problematic because, in essence, 
transcendental philosophy cannot account for the content of the transcendental: that 
content must either be empirically given (in a way that Kant would rule out as 
impossible) or have a source which would exceed the boundaries of legitimate 
knowledge as delimited through the Kantian framework However, the 
transcendental subject is not a special kind of subject and transcendental 
consciousness is not a special kind of consciousness: the term 'transcendental' 
merely delineates the form of the empiricaL We concluded, therefore, that, despite 
the textual ambiguities (which are, in any case, more apparent than real), Kant's 
thought here is perfectly in hannony with the general strictures imposed by 
transcendental idealism_ Thus, Kant's account of the subject is internally self-
consistent and coherent_ 
To argue that Kant's answer to Hume is the answer that Kant says he gives 
to Hume, as has happened throughout the course of this thesis, is hardly to advance 
an original c1aim_ Nonetheless, some have denied it. However, we have seen that 
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Kant is right in situating himself in relationship to Hume through the contrast of 
subjective necessity and objective validity. Hume is not more Kantian., nor is Kant 
more Humean, than Kant supposes. More significantly, the possibility of Kant 
providing an answer to Hume with regard to exactly this point has been strenuously 
and all too frequently denied by Kant's critics. The thesis traced some of the 
historical contours of this denial, systematised it, and demonstrated the nature of the 
double-binds into which Kant has been placed. A defence of Kant has been offered 
through a careful analysis of the structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, 
making its presuppositions and argumentative flow evident~ and by disambiguating 
the role, nature, and relations between, the subjects within the Deduction, a defence 
of Kant has been offered. No grander claim can be offered in conclusion -
regarding the pressing need to take Kant seriously, put him into service, or recognise 
his impact on the Zeitgeist - than to say that it is possible that synthetic a priori 
judgements are possible. Transcendental philosophy is not impossible . 
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